Authors: Dahlia Lithwick and Mark Joseph Stern, SLATE

Trump is challenging decisions by the Colorado Supreme Court and Maine’s Democratic secretary of state to disqualify him under the 14th Amendment’s ban on “insurrectionists” in the wake of his supporters’ mob attack on Congress that followed his campaign to overturn the 2020 election.

In his petition to the Supreme Court Trump argues that he did not take part in an insurrection; that his eligibility should be determined by Congress, not the courts; and that the insurrectionist ban did not apply to the presidency in any case.

1. Shape perceptions to advance specific foreign policy aims

 2. Shape perceptions to advance Russia’s broader worldview and interests

3. Sow confusion and mistrust. Specific supporting objectives related to each are described in what follows.

Strategic Objective 1. Shape Perceptions to Advance Specific Foreign Policy Aims

Actors directly controlled by or openly affiliated with Russian state

Russian state actors

Russian is spoken at home by about 37% of the Latvian population, predominantly on the south-east part of the country, near the border with Russia and Belarus, as well as by those Russians that resided in Latvia after the fall of the USSR.

Poland is a major supplier and conduit of military equipment to Ukraine, and has taken in millions of refugees. This can be partly explained by Poland’s historic animosity towards Russia. In October 2023, the main opposition party the Civic Platform Party (PO in Polish) led by former Polish President and former president of the European Council Donald Tusk won the parliamentary elections. PO is anti-Russian but more liberal socially and opposed PiS initiatives to reduce press freedoms and judicial independence.

Lithuania was once part of the Russian empire, but  after World War II, Lithuania was forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union.

The fear of Russian aggression now drives Lithuanian diplomacy and military planning, which is based on a belief that Lithuania’s population of 2.8 million would be annihilated in a war. Therefore, Lithuania’s strategy is to deter Russia via a strong NATO and, if that is unsuccessful, fight with forces that are not a tripwire but sufficient for a forward defense. Lithuanian society understands this and therefore accepts conscription reforms.

Hungary is an outlier to the West’s response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. While Hungary has agreed on most EU sanctions against Russia, it has done little to diversify its energy dependence on Moscow or support Ukraine. In December 2022, Hungary initially blocked an 18 billion euro ($19 billion) EU financial package for Ukraine and in June 2023, voted against funds for the European Union’s long-term commitment to bolster Ukrainian security.

After the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829, Russia formally incorporated Moldova into its empire. Moldova’s heritage as an appendage of the Ottoman, Russian, and Soviet empires and two decades as part of Romania, coupled with a heterogenous population that is mostly Orthodox in faith but not Slavic in ethnicity, are key ingredients of its current political identity crisis. A central question for Moldova is whether to remain neutral but Russian-leaning, or embark upon a journey westward to enter the European Union and possibly NATO.

Russia’s political warfare strategy is to remove Western influence and reestablish Moscow’s hegemony in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe. It’s attempting to do so by exploiting peoples’ fears that their identity and welfare are threatened. Key identity issues are minority group grievances, and religious and cultural values. Welfare issues are based on economic needs or threats to those needs. These fears are turned into narratives to convince people that the West is the source of their problems and that Russia and pro-Russian governments are the solution.

Georgia