POLICY ACTORS WITHIN THE EU

Policy requires shaping and managing people’s behaviour, so understandably those groups of persons affected by policy either positively or negatively are important actors to be consulted in the policy formulation process. Policy actors can be categorized broadly into three sectors of society: State, Market and Citizen.

Policies are made i.e. they are formulated by a wide range of players i.e. elected officials and their appointees. In the private sector, policy makers are CEOs, Boards of Directors and other top ranking corporate officials.

Policy makers usually are influenced by special interest groups (private interest groups). These are entities that do not have the power to make or enforce policy themselves, but who influence development of a particular policy for their own interest or the interest of third parties. Private interest groups include public policy advocates, lobbyists, political groups, individuals, corporations, donors, NGOs and many others. A second group in setting policy consists of technical advisors or policy analysts. They advise and inform policy makers on alternative options and likely on the effects of those alternatives. A third group that influences decisions is the general public who elect the policy makers.

Three types of decisions can be discerned in the EU: history-making decisions, policy-setting decisions, and policy-shaping decisions. Decision-making dynamics vary between these types.

History-making decisions define the framework within which the EU operates, while policy-setting and policy-shaping decisions are about policy-making within that framework. History-making decisions are typically ‘high politics’, policy-shaping decisions ‘low politics’ and policy-setting decisions ‘high’ or ‘low’ politics depending on the issue. History-making decisions are characterized by negotiations between member state governments. During those negotiations, governments use different tactics, including coalition formation, persuasion and the ‘management of meaning’, challenging other member states, issue linkage and side-payments, and splitting the difference.

Policy-making in the EU is characterized by a large number of veto players. This has four consequences: (1) it makes it difficult to reach decisions, (2) decision-making in the Council revolves around the creation and dissolution of ‘blocking minorities’, (3) decision-making with institutions needs to take account of the acceptability of the outcomes to other institutions, and (4) actors within the EU operate under a culture of consensus and compromise.

Decision-making does not take place only between and within the EU institutions but also includes actors outside of the formal institutions, such as interest groups, member state civil servants, and academics. The interaction between actors within and outside of the EU institutions takes the form of policy networks.

EU policy-making is often described as ‘technocratic’. This means that decision-making takes place on the basis of expertise rather than bargaining or popular politics. This depiction is correct for many ‘low politics’ decisions but typically not for ‘high politics’ decisions. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that ‘technocracy’ is not the opposite of ‘politics’ but involves a political struggle that is fought with expert-based arguments. The joint-decision trap thesis argues that because of the complexity of and the direct involvement of member state governments in EU decision-making EU policies tend to become inflexible and inefficient. Although this argument holds true for some policies and decision-making processes, there are also examples of the opposite.

Public policy is not merely the result of independent policy-making institutions. Non-institutional actors also play a significant role: the public elects legislators and executives; the media influences policy through its inherent agenda setting function; political parties in their role in drafting and electing candidates, influence policy through influencing the composition of legislative and executive bodies; and, organized interest groups lobby elected officials and nonelected policy makers . Policy, then, is a result of institutional processes influenced by non-institutional actors.

Interest groups are a fundamental partner in policy making. Citizens participate in the policy process through communication with policy makers. Such communication takes place individually and collectively. Interest groups facilitate collective communication. In an open society all persons have the right to press their interests. To the extent others share these interests, collective pressure may allow greater policy influence. Those issues that have greater salience have greater interest group representation.

The interest group dynamic, however, is not so simple. While it may be true that many salient issues have interest group representation, the strength of that representation is not tied to the strength of the issue’s salience. Further, the salience itself may be a consequence of interest group action. When studying policy outcomes, it is necessary to identify the policy actors and the political resources they use. Maximizing policy requires specific political resources.

The most common resources include bureaucratic knowledge, a network of contacts, citizen backing (size of constituency), and an ability to mount a public relations (media) campaign. Clearly, no group utilizes all of these resources. But, the ability of an organized group to utilize one or more of these resources is critical for policy influence. Increasingly, political expertise is purchased by those with the need and the resources. It is virtually impossible to win at the policy game without the marketing skills held by consultants and strategists.