WHAT PUBLIC COMMUNICATION CAN AND CAN’T DO ?

Author: Carme Colomina Associate researcher, CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs); Professor of International Journalism

The EU has a communication problem and it’s not a new one. Communication has been the handy scapegoat for every political crisis between governments and EU institutions and the one to blame after every Eurobarometer confirming public disengagement with the EU. But is it really a problem with the messenger – the media – or is it the lack of a strong message? Is this “communication gap” (acknowledged by every EU institution) the only cause of the degree of frustration felt by a large majority of EU citizens? Citizens are  very frustrated about their interaction with the European institutions. The EU has a long way to go to recover citizens’ trust and communication has to be a key tool in this process and neither the guilty party nor the sole miracle solution. Communication cannot make the European Union function better, nor solve its economic, social, political and environmental problems. However, it can help in raising awareness and mobilising people. Communication can be a leading tool for improving understanding and confidence, for building identity, integration and democracy.

However, European complexity is also present in the field of communication. The European public sphere is made up of more than 500 million people, 28 countries, 23 official languages and many more considered as “minority” languages, 25,000 journalists and about 3,600 TV channels that operate throughout the whole EU territory. The world’s largest transnational community, connected politically, institutionally, economically and even socially and culturally, has no media that can be considered a media of shared reference by the majority of the European population. They still function according to national media systems and policies and when they inform, they do so mainly from the point of view of their readers and listeners, that is to say, from a national perspective. There is no doubt that the media has a role to play in informing public opinion. But the different understandings of Europe’s leadership and the differences between EU members about the reasons behind the every crisis shows how difficult it is to build a common narrative. Over many years, political decisions have been taken increasingly frequently not by nation states but by EU institutions, while reporting to the public has remained bound to the national sphere . So the national political debate did not move to Brussels at the same speed as decision-making process did. Nor did the narratives of the media discourse. The communication gap widened. Do we too often confuse “media opinion” with “public opinion”? We normally stress the role of the media in the formation of public opinion. They are “the conveyors of the information” but also “active participants in the political debate” . But even if they do much more than assume the role of mere observers, they are not the only ones tailoring a narrative to explain what the Europeans are going through. Building a narrative is much more complex than that. Especially in the EU sphere, where communication is a particularly important, strategic means of connecting with every stakeholder, with every public dimension: journalists, citizens, civil society organisations, companies, civil servants, member State governments, international organisations and non-EU governments. For EU institutions, the number of potential publics is extremely large due to its multi-level nature (supranational, national, and local) and different types of actors involved in the policy-making” (governments, administrations, experts, civil society organisations, associations, etc.). Besides this, there are serious problems with the visibility, transparency and coordination of the different communications emerging from every EU institution. There is no one single agenda or common message between them. The media have been caught in the crossfire of all the different senders talking on behalf of the EU and between the national narratives and the EU institutional speeches. These are not the only public layers to manage in such a confusing public sphere. Different parts of the continent, different governments and different citizens also have different European histories, experiences and expectations, and these might alter the image and the values they associate with the European Union. Even if during the euro-crisis the percentage of published information about the EU has increased dramatically, the absence of this common narrative and the national perspective of the media mean the communication gap between citizens and EU institutions was not bridged. More information didn’t bring increased confidence. The polyphony of voices on the EU side (European Commission, European Parliament, European Council, Eurogroup, Troika, European Central Bank, and national governments [notably Berlin]) talking about the crisis contributed to a deeper disenchantment with the idea of Europe, “a malaise about its vocation within our political imaginaries as European citizens and about the future of the EU as a global actor . A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center gathered the dominant negative stereotypes most mentioned by European citizens when describing the EU: “inefficient” was the most-used word in the UK; “intrusive” in Germany, Poland, Greece and Spain; and “out of touch” in France and Italy. Very few think the EU listens. Communication can create emotions and attachments, but the wording and the frames used to communicate − as we saw during the financial turbulence shaking the euro − can also discourage trust and support. Words are never neutral and this crisis had its own dictionary and a very biased narrative.

The European Union has gone through a deep economic, political and social crisis without having a common and convincing narrative to explain to the citizens what the EU was doing to solve it. A new narrative for Europe is needed. Fear and mistrust have been shadowing any European discourse since the crisis was provoked. Popular disengagement with the EU is a consequence of the sort of cultural community Europe is, and also a consequence of the sort of political regime the EU is: elite-driven integration, corporatism (interest groups and associations co-govern with elected politicians and the bureaucracy) and diplomacy (which demands some degree of secrecy in order to reach a consensus). Therefore, the problem with Europe is not one of communication, it is about the paradox of wanting a European democracy without a European nation. Thus the communication gap can’t be solved without solving the democratic deficit in the EU institutions.

 Conclusion

The European Union has gone through a deep economic, political and social crisis without having a common and convincing narrative to explain to the citizens what the EU was doing to solve it. A polyphony of voices among EU actors and national perspectives driving media and local political debates eroded the image of Europe as a “we” community of shared problems and hopes. The interpretation of ‘European’ as foreign in most of the public debates meant that the blame for what was going on could be apportioned to the ‘others’ – the Europeans whom we were not. The more media and policy-makers used this discourse, the more it gained momentum, eroding trust in the EU project and showing “Brussels” more as a trouble maker than a solution facilitator. However, necessity strengthened the European public space. The crisis brought a new and deep awareness by the citizens of the new powers of Europe. The EU gained media presence. Public debates were Europeanised by the knowledge of other member states’ realities. What is still probably missing – or lacking conviction – is what the Euroidentities project calls a “European mental space” , “the construction of an imagined and defined European we-community”. The scars of the crisis are still there: erosion of the democratic process in European decision-making; loss of social cohesion and a widening distance between EU members; emergence of radical discourses and loss of confidence in the traditional party system; and the weakening of the idea of Europe as a territory of benefits and solidarity. “Blaming the media and national politicians (suggesting a communications gap) leaves in the dark the two real deficits which prevent Europe from enjoying a vibrant public sphere: a lack of identity (Europe is always 'out there') and a lack of conflict (deficit of politicisation)” . European integration from above must be accompanied by a Europeanisation of public communication in order to overcome its lack of legitimacy and popular involvement” : this is still missing. Crisis brought more political integration, a widening of the European public space and a clear Europeanisation of the news coverage and, nevertheless, the legitimacy of the European project remains damaged. Media and public communication can help to heal the distance and mistrust, but without a political overhaul of the European project ready to address citizens’ fears there is a big risk of losing people’s backing, meaning losing democratic legitimacy