WHAT NEXT FOR UKRAINE AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Over the years, the European Union’s relationship with Ukraine has been undermined by a split on both sides. On the European side, some wanted a reform-minded, western leaning Ukraine, either as a good thing in itself, or in order to eventually transform or at least contain Russia. Others, meanwhile, were less interested in Ukraine and might even have been secretly relieved to see Ukraine stagnate because it kept the thorny question of enlargement off the table. On the Ukrainian side, some saw their future lying in Europe, while others wanted to move closer to Russia. In the scope of the EU’s eastern frontier, it is no secret that certain cohorts exist among the 28 member states: ranging from pro-Russia Greece and Cyprus, to the pragmatic and strategic France and Germany, to the generally anti-Russian Poland and Lithuania, with the remaining member states fitting in between the two extremities. Unsurprisingly, the member states that have driven the EU’s Ukrainian policy have been Poland and Lithuania, in conjunction with Sweden, which have used their presidency terms to heavily push the Ukrainian agenda.

Sadly,the EU did not come forward to help Ukraine solve the many problems it faces – political instability, energy dependence on Russia, a deep economic crisis and a security vacuum. It certainly was a mistake not to factor Russia into the equation. If the EU were to support Ukraine as it reaches out to Russia in some areas, the EU could help Ukraine push back in others.

The EU thus needs a new twin-track approach of encouraging Kiev to engage with it and with Russia in trilateral formats in areas where the EU and Russia have common interests, while using the good will this generates to push Kiev more strongly in areas where interests diverge.

The question Europeans should therefore ask themselves is not “What can the EU do to help Ukraine?” but “What can the EU do to help Ukraine help Europe?” The EU should consider how to structure incentives to show that it is willing to work with Yanukovych to help Ukraine become more policy-coherent and more capable of policy delivery.

We can't solve Ukrainian problems without or against the Russian interests. Since German-Russian relations are much better than the relations between the EU and Russia in general, Germany needs to convince other European countries that we need some kind of triangle dialogue or triangle talks, may be negotiations, not on Ukraine in particular, but on the whole Eastern Partnership involving Russia. That could be the beginning of a truly workable and functional Eastern Partnership, rather than the partnership, which we've seen before in the past five years, which was more designed to distance Russia from Europe, to isolate Russia. It was more oriented on Ukraine and Moldova than on a cooperation with Russia. That has to be changed. Germany has always had a specific view of Russia and was always interested in building up pragmatic, real political relations with Russia unlike other parts of the EU, which now have too many conflicts with Russia. Therefore, management of the Ukrainian crisis calls for a strong German political role vis-à-vis its European partners.