WHAT A MACRON PRESIDENCY WOULD MEAN FOR FRANCE?

Author; Therese Raphael

On the surface, a Macron presidency would seem to offer something for everyone: a pro-globalization, pro-immigration, pro-European, pro-reform candidate who appeals to both the left and right, who is both populist and a member of the educated elite. He is a darling of the mainstream media and the hope of many voters from both the Socialist camp and the center-right.

But the Cult of Macron would face a rude awakening if their leader gets all the way to Elysee Palace, which would be his first gig as an elected leader.  

On paper, President Macron would have powers over foreign affairs: He can negotiate with foreign powers, ratify treaties, and decide to go to war -- all without consulting parliament. The globalist and former banker would be immediately welcomed by Western nations as a partner who could get things done.

The domestic front is much trickier. The French president appoints the prime minister and other senior administration figures -- a straightforward process if the parliamentary majority is from the president's party; he then controls the legislative agenda. But Macron's En Marche party has never fielded candidates for election, including Macron himself. It's possible a number of existing deputies from the embattled Socialist Party will change flags. Even so, France's mainstream parties are fracturing and this election is likely to yield a fragmented and obstreperous parliament rather than one committed to his agenda.

Even if he manages to bend parliament to his will, the bigger question is whether Macron's program can live up to the hype. It's hard to overstate the challenge facing the next French president. Unrest is never far from the surface in many areas: Youth unemployment is a blight on the social fabric, and a decades-long, systematic failure to create jobs and to assimilate immigrants, combined with frequent revelations of public corruption, has driven a large chunk of voters away from mainstream politics. Many educated professionals and entrepreneurs have fled to London, Brussels and other global cities.

In short, the French model of inclusive growth funded by a massive state sector has been broken for a long time. A cyclical upturn has helped France's economy look a bit better, but that's deceptive. The state comprises a larger share of the economy than any other major country, but delivers less in the way of opportunity and social mobility than ever before.

France tops OECD nations for government spending as a percentage of gross domestic product.

These aren't problems that will be fixed by tinkering. Macron released his economic policy two months before the first round of voting. A frenzy of policy proposals has followed, yet it's hard to see how they form a coherent picture. He wants to create a single tax of around 30 percent for all income from capital, bringing France's high taxation of capital closer to the EU average. The corporate tax rate, which has been coming down, will be reduced to the European average of 25 percent of the five-year period. He's pledging a 50 billion euro public investment program and 20 billion euros of tax cuts to be shared between individuals and businesses. That would be paid for with 60 billion euros in spending cuts and low-interest borrowing. He has also pledged to get the budget deficit down to within the 3 percent EU limit. There is more flexibility for employers but also some extensions of the welfare state.

Some of his ideas hold promise, but they fall short of the radicalism that his rhetoric would suggest. Fundamentally, Macron is a centrist who has built his following by discrediting the (centrist) establishment of French politics. The result is yet more centrism, albeit wrapped in a more glamorous package.

In wanting to satisfy the right of the left and the left of the right, Emmanuel Macron would deliver a very unambitious program which is likely to be a continuation of Hollandism.

In some ways, the Elysee is a poisoned palace. Given sweeping constitutional powers and a seat of such extraordinary opulence and grandeur, it's hard for a French president, so far only ever a man, to live up to the hype. And French voters are easily disillusioned; the fall can be as quick as the rise, as both Nicolas Sarkozy and Francois Hollande learned.

Macron the candidate has so far enjoyed an almost charmed ride. But Macron the president will not: If he can't deliver change from the top, it will be imposed from the streets.

Final Note

On current projections Macron is expected to beat Le Pen by 60-40 in the second round, and come a very close second to her in the first round, with Fillon a distant third. Markets and political commentators now believe the most likely outcome is a traditional French election scenario, in which enough mainstream voters of left or right vote for the other second round candidate to keep out the National Front.

But there are a number of other points to consider. For one, Mr Macron’s voter base is much less solid than Ms Le Pen’s. While over 80 per cent of Le Pen supporter say they are certain to vote for her, one in two Macron supporters may change their minds between now and election time. This could reflect the fact that many voters still do not know what Mr Macron stands for. One of the harshest criticisms levelled at the former Rothschild banker is that he has no distinct policy agenda of his own, and merely deploys empty centrist slogans as a means of poaching votes from both sides of the French mainstream. Unless he can outline how his policy agenda is a radical new way forward for France, he risks becoming a ‘teflon’ politician in the eyes of voters, depressing turnout in the second round and increasing the chances of a Le Pen presidency.

There is also the matter of the second round being a new ball-game – a binary choice between two policy visions which is quite different to the unruly free-for-all of the first round. True, there are only two weeks between the first and second round votes, but Ms Le Pen will use them to turn the election into a referendum on the status quo. France is a country of high unemployment, sluggish growth rates and spectacular levels of political disillusionment. Some 50 per cent of French people believe globalisation has been bad for them (compared to roughly 40 per cent who believe it has been good). French attitudes to immigration are also hardening against a backdrop of recent terror attacks and unemployment.

These statistics suggest that while many voters may dislike Ms Le Pen personally, they also harbour sympathies with many of her hardline views. By contrast, her likely rival Emmanuel Macron is an unabashed globalist who is liberal on migration and in favour of more rather than less European integration.

As a skilled orator, Ms Le Pen will be able to attack these positions in a head-to-head debate, while presenting policies which are arguably more in tune with French public opinion.  If she can successfully portray her rival as a vote for the same cosy French establishment which has failed to address the country’s social and economic fears, she will succeed in increasing her own vote while reducing mainstream voter turnout at the ballot box.

A couple of other reflections should not be overlooked. The likely third-place contender Francois Fillon has broad support among Catholics, a sizeable swathe of the population which is liberal on economic issues but conservative on social ones. Polls indicate that a small majority of these voters will vote for Mr Macron in the second round, but this balance could be upset if Le Pen lands some knockout blows against his liberal inclinations, such as his outspoken defence of Islam and gay marriage.

Ms Le Pen is also reaching beyond her traditional ‘law and order’ voter base by courting the anti-capitalist and environment votes, which is already increasing her appeal among hard-left voters. Any revelations of donations to Macron’s party by unsavoury corporations between now and the election could further reduce his support among the centre-left.

Mr Macron is clearly the favourite in the upcoming election. But this theory rests upon the assumption that a mainstream majority of voters will cast their ballots for him. A bad couple of weeks in the media and some well-packed punches by Ms Le Pen could dent the already lukewarm second round support from mainstream voters which he desperately needs in the second round. Political pundits should beware. Marine Le Pen is not down and out just yet.