WHAT ABOUT THE SPLITTING OF UKRAINE INTO TWO ?

The western and northern half of the country has a strong Ukrainian cultural identity, mostly Ukrainian-speaking, with nationalist and pro-Western leanings. The eastern and southern half of the country on the other hand is culturally strongly Russified, largely Russian-speaking, with pro-Russian candidates having regularly won elections in this half of the country before 2014. Speculations on Russia aiming to split the country creating a pro-Russian puppet state of the eastern and southern half under the name of “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”) have been widespread ever since the pro-Western turn in Ukraine in 2014. Russia could push till the line of a desired “Novorossiya,” and when reached, only then offer negotiations. In case of any kind of Russian attempt to split the country in two, the long-term outcome depends on two main factors: One is whether the Western half of the country that remains out of Russia’s reach formally recognizes this outcome or not, and the other is whether if the population of the eastern half cooperates with Russia enough to consolidate its’ rule there. If the Western half recognizes the split and the Eastern half cooperates, then this could be a manageable scenario for Russia; however, if substantial guerilla activity rises in the Eastern half, supplied by Stinger and Javelin missiles by a Western half that refuses to recognize the split, then this can still end up in an Afghanistan-like war of attrition from which Russia will have to back off sooner or later. This largely depends on the attitudes of the population of the eastern half of the country. While up to until 2014, that half of the country regularly voted for pro-Russian candidates, and when starting the present war, Russian leadership seems to have expected them to greet Russian troops as liberators, there’s not much sign of anything like that discernible at present, which seems to make the scenario that’s favorable to Russia less and less likely. Also, as of this time, Russia still controls less than half of the territory of the eastern and southern regions that regularly voted for pro-Russian candidates, and as even in these areas, the civilian population does not seem to support the invading Russians, it is uncertain how much of these regions can Russia actually conquer. However even if Russia cannot take control of all of the eastern and southern half of the country, it can still choose an intermediate solution of simply grabbing as much of this territory as possible, and then during negotiations, insisting on holding onto those areas.

Why the partition of Ukraine would not be a solution

1. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians wan the preservation of the unity and independence of their country.
2. The hypothetical creation of a pro-Western democratic and oriented Ukraine cannot be a solution for the EU because this new state would constitute a crushing burden.
3. Institutionally, partition would force the EU to quickly welcome this new state, first into an emergency partnership as costly as it is close, then under the status of member state in order to permanently protect it from Russia.  It would call into question an essential principle for the EU, the supremacy of law. Because partition would consecrate the idea that European borders could be modified by force. It would eventually destabilize the States where Russian speakers live such as the Baltic countries: educated by the Ukrainian partition, the pro-Russian minorities would see that their future is not integration within the existing States but secession obtained with arms in hand. Economically, the Ukrainian divorce would be costly: who would want a new bankrupt state at the expense of the EU? Geopolitically, it would place the EU in a tense face-to-face with Russia for a long time. Far from being an eastward extension of European democracy, the partition of Ukraine would create for the EU a political, economic and diplomatic burden for at least a decade.
4. Western and Eastern Ukrainians know well that partition would deprive the west of industries and the east of agricultural supplies. Before the agricultural west can export enough to the EU to offset its losses in Russia, significant investment will be needed. Far from being rescued by the partition, Ukraine would emerge durably marginalized.
5. Partition would make Western Ukraine a beggar and Eastern Ukraine a satellite. Both parts of the country would lose all room for action in the face of their respective protectors.
6. Partition is not inevitable. It would not be the solution but the beginning of new difficulties much greater still.
7. The federalization of the country is a credible and effective alternative to partition for Ukraine and for Europe, even if it is not without risk. It would preserve the integrity of the Ukrainian territory and sovereignty, that would relieve all regional powers; it would open the possibility of dealing differently with the margins of autonomy of the eastern regions and the special status of Crimea, which would reassure Russia, it would trace a new path to the unity of Ukraine between disastrous partition and impossible unanimity.