U.S.-NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DIPLOMACY (2017)

1. April 6, 2017: U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet and agree to cooperate more closely on achieving denuclearization of North Korea.  
2. April 17, 2017: Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Susan Thornton, tells reporters about the U.S. policy toward North Korea, which officials describe as "maximum pressure and engagement." Thornton said that Washington is looking for a "tangible signal" from North Korea about its seriousness in engaging in talks and there is not a "specific precondition." 
3. April 26, 2017: The Trump Administration briefs Congress on its North Korea policy and releases a statement that calls for increasing sanctions pressure on North Korea and working with allies and regional partners on diplomacy. 
4. April 27, 2017: Secretary of State Rex Tillerson says in an interview with NPR that the United States is open to direct talks with North Korea on the "right agenda." He says that denuclearization is still the goal for any agreement. 
5. April 28, 2017: Secretary of State Rex Tillerson chairs a special meeting of the UN Security Council. In opening remarks he says that North Korea must take "concrete steps to reduce the threat that its illiegal weapons programs pose" before talks can begin.
6. June 1, 2017: The United States imposes sanctions on individuals and entities linked to North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.
7. August 5, 2017: The UN Security Council unanimously passes  Resolution 2371, which imposes additional sanctions, including a complete ban on the export of coal, iron, seafood and lead, on North Korea in response to the July ICBM tests.
8. August 8, 2017: In response to North Korean criticism of the United States, President Trump told reporters that "North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States.... They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen."
9. August 10, 2017: Trump told reporters that his previous threat of "fire and fury" should North Korea continue to threaten the United States may not have been "tough enough".
10. August 11, 2017: Trump tweeted: "military solutions are now fully in place, locked and loaded, should North Korea act unwisely. Hopefully Kim Jong Un will find another path!"
11. August 28, 2017: North Korea tests its Hwasong-12 missile, which flew over 2,700km and overflew Japan. In a statement the next day, President Trump claims "all options are on the table."
12. September 11, 2017: The UN Security Council passes a resolution imposing additional sanctions on North Korea.
13. September 19, 2017: Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly, Trump said the United States may have to "totally destroy" North Korea if the country refuses to back down from its nuclear rhetoric. "Rocket man is on a suicide mission for himself and his regime.
14. September 21, 2017: Trump announced a new executive order targeting individual companies, financial institutions and entities doing business with North Korea, including its shipping and trade networks and praised China central bank for ordering Chinese banks to stop doing business with North Korea.
15. September 23, 2017: B-1B Lancer bombers from Guam and F-15C Eagle fighter escorts from Okinawa, Japan, flew in international airspace over waters east of North Korea. It's the farthest north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that US fighters or bomber aircraft have ever flown this century.
     

According to Experts

1. The language used at the UN will reinforce the North Korean leadership’s position that the United States is hostile to North Korea.
2. The demonization of Kim personally will inflame the situation. Slander against the supreme leader in front of an international audience is going to cause the Foreign Ministry to have to leap to the defense of Kim, whether or not Kim orders it.
3. If Trump’s words are aimed at forcing Kim to stand down, they will almost certainly backfire. Pyongyang will have an excuse or incentive to redouble its nuclear and missile development, which means more testing. The whole rationale of deterrence is to persuade the opponent not to carry out an intended action because the costs outweigh their benefits. 
4. North Korea is, however, likely to glean one clear message from Trump’s speech analysts said: there’s no point signing a denuclearization deal with the president because he won’t honor it.

Diplomatic Options (The views of Experts)

1. Jarrett Blanc, Senior Fellow in the Geoeconomics and Strategy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: The United States needs to return to the difficult business of building and tending diplomatic partnerships in the region while maintaining intelligence and law enforcement operations. This way, Washington can slowly build leverage to negotiate toward a less provocative situation.
2. Ian Bond, Director of Foreign Policy at the Centre for European Reform: If it is too late to stop North Korea having useable nuclear weapons, then the focus should shift to managing the situation. Western powers should work on China to slow North Korea’s progress, at least, by ensuring that no nuclear or missile technology, from whatever source, reaches it. But the West should also think creatively about talking to Pyongyang about issues such as nuclear doctrine. If there is one thing worse than North Korea having nuclear weapons, it is a situation in which the United States and North Korea misjudge the other’s criteria for using such weapons.
3. Eric Brattberg, Director of the European Program and Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Besides intensifying international diplomatic efforts and further toughing up UN Security Council sanctions against Pyongyang, strengthening regional deterrence must be a top priority. Ultimately, U.S. credibility as a global leader depends on Washington’s ability to protect its East Asian allies.
4. Fraser Cameron, Director of the EU-Asia Centre: There is no military solution regarding North Korea. What is imperative is that the UN Security Council (plus the EU, Japan, and South Korea) start talking seriously about all options, rather than leave next steps to the US. Ultimately, China has to be persuaded that a peaceful, stable, prosperous, neutral, united Korea is in its own long-term security interest.
5. Malcom Chalmers, Deputy Director General at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies: If North Korea becomes a nuclear, ICBM-armed state, further significant investment in strengthening nuclear defense and deterrent capabilities—by both the United States and its Asian allies—would be required. Yet the long-term risks and costs involved in such an approach remain preferable to the near certainty of catastrophe if the United States were to launch a new Korean War without the agreement of those it is committed to protect.
6. James W. Davis, Dean of the School of Economics and Political Science at the University of St. Gallen : Solving this crisis is not a matter of applying hard power, but rather smart diplomacy. For diplomacy to work, the United States needs to be clear about what it is asking for: a denuclearized North Korea, a suspension of weapons tests, or an end to the regime’s provocative rhetoric? Compelling Pyongyang to relinquish an existing nuclear arsenal will be more difficult than deterring the regime from using of a nuclear weapon. But as long as the international community places a higher value on a nuclear-free North Korea than Kim Jong-un demands as compensation for ceding his nuclear capabilities, there is room for an agreement on denuclearization. Such a deal will include both carrots and sticks, the latter perhaps more symbolic than material, and contingent on Pyongyang having first “delivered the goods.
7. Paul Haenle, Director at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy: Attempts to eliminate Pyongyang’s capabilities, or change the regime, would come at catastrophic costs to the Peninsula. Rather, it’s time for China to exercise its soft power in North Korea to create the conditions for a productive dialogue between Pyongang and relevant parties on denuclearization. While China cannot “solve” the North Korea problem alone, it maintains significant influence over the Kim regime. More than ninety percent of North Korea's trade is with China, and China hosts significant numbers of North Korea laborers, whose remittances help prop up the Kim regime. It’s time for Xi Jinping to use China’s economic leverage and influence to pave a path toward a denuclearized Peninsula. Doing so would lead not only to a more stable and peaceful region, but also to a stronger U.S.-China relationship.
8. Douglas H. Paal, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: The United States has multiple audiences to address in dealing with the growing threat from North Korea. These include the leaders and people of South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia, as well as North Korea itself.
9. Jonas Parello-Plesner, Senior Policy Fellow at the Hudson Institute: The United States has fewer workable options for genuinely curbing Kim’s nuclear and ballistic ambitions. Tighter sanctions are an option and should be called for. An oil embargo or U.S. secondary sanctions on companies trading with North Korea are the most promising. Yet both options pass through Beijing, whose support is needed for international condemnations in the UN Security Council. China, although annoyed with its troublemaking northern neighbor, will not support strangling the DPRK completely.
10. Gianni Riotta, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations: It’s high time for the United States to rally its allies—Japan, Australia, even Europe—in a strategy of attrition to extenuate the North Korean regime. This strategy will require strength, patience, national unity, and the ability to double cross the enemy while keeping the international coalition together. Instead, Trump and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley are baffled by North Korea’s exploits and China’s silence. Their public tantrums reinforce Kim’s stance and are a parody of a serious American approach.
11. Stephen Szabo, Resident Senior Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies: The current course of sanctions approved by the UN Security Council should continue to be followed. It is no small matter to have both Russia and China agree to this route and Western cohesion depends on the continuance of the sanctions path. Beyond sanctions, diplomatic efforts need to be enhanced as rhetoric that only threatens an already isolated state is counter productive.The United States should be deescalating its military role rather than increasing it. Negotiations should be opened with the goal of a long-term withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, in return for an acceptable settlement that ends the still simmering Korean War.
12. Beyza Unal, Nuclear Weapons Policy Research Fellow at Chatham House: First, all options need to be exhausted. This includes convincing China to strengthen sanctions against North Korea, expanding sanctions to new revenue streams, expediting the ballistic missile defense system in South Korea, and deploying military power to deter North Korea. If the aim is to halt North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, then hard power (meaning limited military strikes against strategic assets, nuclear facilities, and missile launchers) won’t succeed in the long run. Currently, North Korea puts higher value on its nuclear weapons program than the costs associated with it. The only way to change this equation is by increasing the costs while curbing the strategic value of nuclear weapons. The latter is a difficult but not impossible task that requires a security solution on the Korean Peninsula.
13. Pierre Vimont, Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe: All current statements about calling on Pyongyang to end its proliferation race and stop its endless violations of international rules miss the point. They will continue to fall on deaf ears as the North Korean leadership is fighting what it considers to be a battle of survival. The international community must come to grips with this reality. It needs to engage in a meaningful dialogue with less provocative statements and a more palatable narrative for Pyongyang. The time now is to scale down the tension. Discussion on the set of international principles and rules that this new military nuclear reality requires can come later.