UKRAINE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 2015

Major Ukrainian political institutions have undergone quite a considerable evolution:

President: The post of President remains the most influential post in Ukrainian politics. The President now controls:

• A growing and strengthening Army and Security Service of Ukraine (SBU);
• A strengthened Security Council that has become quite an influential agency having an impact not only on security issues, but on internal politics as well and the balance of power among the executive, legislative and judiciary branches;
• An Anti-Corruption Bureau, a new agency established to fight corruption at the highest level among public officials;
• Lustration processes with power to overrule decisions of lustration committees [Lustration is related to the process of “vetting”, which is, in general terms, evaluation and examination process in order to eliminate abusive and corruptive officials through due procedure. As a rule vetting is used as the tool in post-conflict situations in order to rebuild the society based on democratic values. Lustration (from Latin lustratio – “purification by sacrifice”) is presently being used as the “term meaning the “purification” of state organizations and it is mainly used in the context of public life of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe” . To define lustration very broadly, it is a measure barring officials and collaborators of a former regime from positions of public influence in a country after a revolutionary change of government];
• National Guard, a military agency directly subordinated to the President with over 60,000 personnel, etc.

As a political leader, Petro Poroshenko controls one of the biggest factions in the Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) as well as the Ministers belonging to his party (Blok Petro Poroshenko, BPP).

The President has also reinforced his control over Governors. In 2014, many of the Governors were appointed on the basis of an agreement with local elites. From August thru December 2014, many Governors were quite independent from their de-jure supervisor, the President. But from January thru March 2015, especially after the resignation of Ihor Kolomois'kyi, an oligarch and a Governor of Dniproppetrovs'k oblast, the President established full control over Governors.

In the spring of 2015, the President launched a campaign to limit the influence of the major financial-political groups. Thus far, Privat-Group, groups around Rinat Akhmetov and Dmitro Firtash are the main targets of this campaign. It is yet too early to assess the results of this campaign but the results will be critical for Ukraine's evolution as a democracy.

After 9 months in power, Petro Poroshenko remains one of the most popular politicians in Ukraine. In spite of economic and war problems, his support in March 2015 was 20% among Ukrainians (with closest competitor Yulia Tymoschenko gathering 6%).

Prime Minister and Cabinet of Ministers: After the parliamentary elections in October 2014, Arsenii Yatseniuk managed to remain Prime Minister. According to the Constitution, his authority is quite substantial in internal politics and the economy. Arsenii Yatseniuk and his party have slowly lost control over the Cabinet and major governmental agencies to some neutral foreigners, BPP and financial-political groups. By March 2015, he and his party's popularity (National Front) reached only 4% support. This is mainly due to the slow pace of reforms, disillusion with the reforms undertaken (viewed mostkly by the Ukrainian population as inflation, rise of process and high bills for communal services). The special impact of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet is connected to vast privatization plans in 2015-2016 and it is expected that in the second half of 2015, the Cabinet will be a battlefield of political-financial groups trying to get privileges in future privatization.

Judiciary: The judiciary branch has been under the biggest pressure upon itself. After Euromaidan, political and political-financial groups tried to establish control over different courts and bodies of judicial self-governance. On 8 April 2014, the Rada approved the Law 'On the renewal of trust in the judiciary in Ukraine'. This act was a compromise between different political and civic groups that would answer to Maidan demands of lustration. Politicians postponed the lustration of other categories of public servants, while judges would undergo a controversial monitoring of their behaviour. Later in 2014, the Venise Commission criticized the Law for its inconsistencies with human rights and EU norms. But the Law was used by different political groups, foremost by circles around the President and the Prime Minister to change judges and administrators with their loyal candidates. The peak of competition for control over the judiciary was in April-May 2015. This was the period for appointment of the members of the Supreme Council of Justice, an advising judicial and control-revisionary government body that advises on the appointment of the judges at the highest level, examines the cases of judges' infringement, and oversees the conduct of the judges of the Supreme Court of Ukraine and other high specialized courts. Presidential, Prime Minister's oligarchic and many other groups tried their best to have a majority of loyal members in the Council. There is no evidence of significant progress in the judiciary in terms of its independence and its adherence to the Constitution and laws in Ukraine in 2014-2015.

Parliament: Currently the Parliament has 422 MPs elected on 26 October 2014. Since November 2014, the Rada of Ukraine is ruled by a coalition consisting of five post-Maidan parties (National Front, Block of Petro Poroshenko, 'Samopomich' party, 'Batkivshchyna' party, and Oleh Lyashko's Radical party) with over 300 votes (constitutional majority) behind it. Even though there is a growing number of internal disputes in the coalition, it remains united by May 2015. Since it has a constitutional majority, the coalition is quite strong to support reforms. Parliamentary opposition is mainly represented by 'Opposition Block' (40 MPs), a weak union of ex-members of Party of Regions and associated political groups. It has a relatively a small impact on public opinion in spite of hardships for the population. The non-parliament opposition includes groups divided by their support to Maidan and anti-Maidan cases. Some of these groups- Communist party on the left side, and 'Right Sector' on the far right side- are slowly gaining support from those population that have lost the most from the current economic reforms. But thus far there is no evidence that such a support can bring those parties to the Parliament. Both parties are under pressure from ruling groups, along with the use of security forces. But the use of force seems legitimate since both organizations have radical sides participating in the war.

The current Parliament continues the practice of abuse of power by the majority and diminishing control by the opposition. By May 2015, out of 28 committees and special commissions, there are no committees that are headed by MPs from non-coalition factions or groups. The monitoring of voting for laws shows that the ruling coalition often approves legislative act in accord with the simplified procedure (i.e. without discussion between majority and opposition, without possibility to add changes etc.). Quite often laws are being approved without discussion within factions and coalition at large, just by deals between the heads of factions. Also, quite often draft laws are approvede without taking notice of the negative assessments provided by Rada's legal expertise. The quality of democratic processes in the current parliament is very low which also has a negative impact on the quality of legislation being produced.

Party System: Ukraine's party system has changed greatly after Euromaidan. All political parties in the Parliament are new or radically renewed politiacl organizations. After the recent parliamentary elections, most of them are temporary unions of political and economic players around popular figures such as Petro Poroshenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, and once popular Arsenii Yatseniuk. Some new forms of parties are represented by 'Samopomich' and 'Right Sector' parties that are very much interlinked with different Miadan networks and economuc groups. Although their leaders are quite popular, they cannot be called 'Leader's Parties'.