TRANSATLANTIC TENSIONS

European trust in the United States has declined sharply since U.S. President Donald Trump took office.  During Trump’s first three years in office, many of his policies seem designed to undermine transatlantic solidarity. Trump withdrew from the Paris climate agreement, questioned the sanctity of NATO’s Article 5 defense guarantee, withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, pulled U.S. troops from Syria without consulting European allies, carried out the targeted killing of an Iranian general in Iraq again without consulting European allies, undermined U.S. soft power in Europe by attacking democratic institutions, making many aggressive statements about Europe and declaring that Europe has been treating the US badly and that the European Union was really formed to treat the US badly, threatening to pull the U.S. out of the World Health Organization etc…

According to the Pew Research Center, three in four citizens from several European countries (including France and Germany) lack confidence in his administration’s leadership. U.S. diplomatic relationships with key allies like Germany are in shambles, and many European diplomats cannot name a time in recent history when the transatlantic relationship was in worse shape.

Washington and European capitals have clashed over several policy issues including tariffs, defense spending, and foreign policy. But on top of these policy disagreements, this latest bout of transatlantic discord is different, marked by a lack of European trust in Washington’s intentions, unpredictable U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking, a dearth of U.S. diplomatic decorum, and a sense of ideological drift across the Atlantic.

The lack of consistency between the White House and working-level professionals in the Trump administration remains puzzling to many European diplomats.

Citing his America First slogan, Trump has doubled down on U.S. retrenchment from its traditional leadership role in the world. This includes its role in Europe, where it has been evident for a while that Trump is unenthusiastic about or even hostile toward European integration.

A Democratic victory in the U.S. election in November would create opportunities to reverse trends. Former Vice President Joe Biden is a longstanding proponent of transatlantic cooperation and has said he would seek to place the United States back at the head of the table, in a position to work with its allies and partners to mobilize collective action on global threats. But Biden’s commitment to transatlantic relations will not magically reverse the trends that contributed to Trump’s election in the first place- populism, anti-globalization, and resentment of the costs of U.S. leadership- and that have driven the two sides of the Atlantic apart in recent years. A President Biden will need to walk a fine line between providing more support for European allies and insisting that they take on greater responsibilities - for defense, for security in their region, and for internal European cohesion.

If Trump is re-elected, the prognosis for the relationship is clearer and darker. If returned to office after the way he has governed and conducted foreign policy for four years, Trump will conclude that he has a mandate to move forward even more boldly with an America First agenda and to apply it to Europe. America’s European allies will conclude from the election result that the American people solidly support that approach and assume it reflects a new reality that will continue into future presidencies. The type of special relationship the United States has maintained with Europe for some 75 years will be over. There will be a new one, but there will be little special about it. Although it is still too early to assess the impact of the coronavirus on the U.S. presidential campaign, a second Trump term would most likely sustain or even accelerate these trends. If so, European disaffection with U.S. leadership would only increase, and transatlantic ties would further diminish. There is a considerable risk that more and more European leaders will conclude that Washington is a fundamentally unreliable partner and that Europe should instead seek to carve out a middle role between the United States and China in a multipolar world order.