THEY SUPPORT THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON RUSSIA

Seven Member States in the European Union want to support the lifting of sanctions imposed by the West on Russia. Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Hungary and Slovakia are reportedly in agreement on the matter.

1. Austria:  Austria was very sceptical of sectorial sanctions on Russia for fear of economic repercussions. There are many people in Austria who promote the lifting of sanctions on Russia at the earliest possible opportunity. In December 2014, the Foreign Minister ruled out further sanctions, despite the fact that Germany wanted to leave all options on the table to increase pressure on Moscow. Austria’s reluctant stance on an assertive European policy is purely economic. Austria imports about 70 percent of its gas from Russia. Furthermore, the state-owned energy company OMV invited Gazprom to invest in domestic infrastructure and hoped to become a Central European distributor of Russian gas. And Austrian banks and companies have invested heavily in Russia. Austria fears a collapse of the Russian market or retaliatory sanctions that could hit both the banking system and the state that would have to guarantee its survival. Last but not least, Russian tourists used to make up about 10 percent of total visitors to Austria, usually occupying the luxury part of the market.
2. Cyprus: Cypriot Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides has used words like “catastrophic” to describe the potential effects of a sanctions war on Cyprus economy.
3. Czech Republic: The Czech government supported the EU's imposition of sanctions, after Russia annexed Crimea, but over time it has grown lukewarm towards confronting Moscow. Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka and his Defence Minister have rejected any idea of stationing NATO troops in the country in response to the Ukrainian crisis. In September 2014, Mr Sobotka resisted EU moves to toughen sanctions, warning they could hurt Europe without affecting Russian behaviour. This leeriness towards provoking Moscow aligns the Czechs with Hungary and Slovakia, which are even more sceptical of tough sanctions. As far back as April 2014, Vaclav Klaus, the country's Former President, wrote an essay defending Russia's annexation of Crimea.
4. France: President Francois Hollande dangled the idea of lifting Russia sanctions if progress could be made in Ukraine. France does not want to “push Russia onto its knees,” There’s no way, of course, that Hollande would break ranks entirely until there was some sort of major game-changer in East Ukraine, which for the moment, still looks unlikely.
5. Hungary: Hungary has also become known as the country with the most pro-Russia policy within NATO and the EU for many reasons. Up until late 2014, Budapest had a pretty pragmatic balancing act between its strategic interests in the Euro-Atlantic area and the energy issues tying it to Russia. Practical economic cooperation with Moscow has always been part of Hungarian foreign policy ever since the loss of the Russian market at the end of the Cold War. This cooperation was fundamentally limited to the energy issue. Hungary’s Russian links are qualitatively different to those of other Visegrad countries. Energy dependency is not the most important issue; the €11 billion Russian loan in the Paks nuclear plant agreement comes to about 10 percent of Hungary's GDP. Futhermore, Russia is de facto an important buyer of Hungarian state bonds and thus finances Hungarian state debt, making Hungary much more financially dependent on Russia than other Visegrad countries are. This is quite surprising as trade relations are fairly limited – only 3 percent of Hungarian exports goes to Russia . But Hungary’s energy dependence on Moscow is unquestioned: 99 percent of its oil and 74 percent of its natural gas comes from Russia. Putin’s planned visit to Budapest in February 2015 will be the new high water mark of Russian-Hungarian relations and an event of practical and symbolic importance. As Hungary’s long-term gas supply contract with Gazprom is due to be renewed in 2015, it is likely that Putin will make a proposal during his visit for a very preferential gas price in exchange for Hungarian support on the lifting of European sanctions against Russia.
6. Italy: Italy has traditionally looked at Russia through an economic rather than a geopolitical lens. Rome has deep economic and energy ties with Russia. The Italian reaction to the crisis in Ukraine was slow and is largely inclined towards moderation and engagement rather than confrontation. As late as June 2014, the Italian body politic continued to view the Ukraine crisis solely from the perspective of its strategic partnership with Russia. The partnership had to be preserved at all costs and any solution to the crisis could only be found in the partnership. That position has now changed. Russia is still seen as a strategic actor that the European Union cannot afford to ignore. But it is no longer (or at least not for the time being) seen as a strategic partner. The Italian position on the eastern partner countries is quite eclectic. Power-sharing, constitutional reform, and recognition and respect for minority rights and minority views are seen as essential, especially in Ukraine. Italy is likely to follow Europe’s line on punitive measures towards Russia, although it would advise caution on the implementation of further sanctions. This caution is clearly rooted in Italy’s domestic economic interests, but it would be reductive to interpret it as entirely based on domestic concerns. Italy believes that although – and in fact, because – sanctions are having an effect on Russia’s economy, they may simply accelerate Russia’s turn to the east, diluting or severing the economic and societal contacts that bind Russia to Europe. This does not mean that Italy opposes sanctions, but rather, that it is carefully weighing the political pros and cons of punitive measures.  Italy believes that aside from negative measures like sanctions, some form of positive engagement with Russia must be sought. Once a solution to the Ukraine crisis is found, the EU’s priority must be to manage its relationship with Russia so as to minimise the risk of setting up new dividing lines in Europe. Italy’s position on Russia is not set in stone. Its instinct is likely to remain one of openness, exploring all possible avenues for cooperation and cherishing above all cooperation on issues that are close to Italian foreign policy interests.
7. Slovakia: Slovakia has already said that sanctions against Russia were meaningless and counterproductive

 Note: Even if Greece, Hungary, Slovakia and Cyprus all want to see an end to sanctions, the pressure from Brussels and Washington will be so great that they could still buckle under it and things will remain business as usual for the EU’s Russia policy.