STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS 2013

In its State of the Union Address 2013, the President of the European Commission Mr. José Manuel Durão Barroso makes a reference to what he said last year  i.e. to present before the European elections, further ideas on the future of the Union and how to best consolidate and deepen the community method and community approach in the longer term. That way, he says  they can be subject to a real European debate. And Mr. Barroso to add ‘they will set out the principles and orientations that are necessary for a true political union.

This is indeed key for the future of Europe. We know where we’ve been. We know where we stand. But do know where we want to go? Some Member States e.g. The Netherlands would like to see a more modest, more sober but more effective EU starting from the principle "at European level only when necessary, at national level whenever possible."

One thing is certain the EU needs to improve its democratic accountability. The European Commission and the European Parliament are rightly concerned about enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the governance of the Union. And they want to push for a general revision of the Treaty of Lisbon by way of a Convention opening in the spring of 2015 .  In our opinion , it is crucial for EU citizens to fully grasp how the EU plans to improve its democratic accountability, not after but before European elections in 2014 and they should be participants in the thinking process. While democratic legitimacy in general has a significant effect on outcomes in governance, voice and deliberation have a much stronger impact than political accountability. Let us listen to and hear what EU citizens want the EU to be!

On February 2013, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) published a very interesting article on the changing landscape of decision-making and political accountability within the European Union with the following conclusions:

1. While the eurozone is emerging as the centre of a drive for enhanced integration of economic policymaking within the Union, it is not a foregone result that the broader EU-wide framework will be relinquished. The gradual extension of EMU to most Union members remains as a paramount political goal, significantly influencing and shaping the design of EMU institutions under way.

2. The centralisation under way in executive powers for economic policy-making cannot be seen as a temporary device to deal with the crisis, which can be expected to recede once the crisis is resolved. On the contrary, the crisis has exposed systemic design flaws in the institutions of EMU that therefore require systemic changes in order to be fixed. This is notably the case for the new rules and institutions developed to ensure the consistency of national economic policies with economic and financial stability in EMU.

3. The European Council is likely to remain the top executive power in the EU, with the European Commission playing a central role in the implementation of common policies, rather than initiating or deciding them. The community method is likely to stay as the main legislative technique of the Union, but it is not likely to be extended also to economic policy decision-making.

4. Finally, and as consequence of the above, the mechanisms and institutions that will be needed to restore adequate legitimacy and accountability to economic policy decision making will have to involve, on the one hand, a stronger role of national parliaments in legitimising national governments’ commitments in Council deliberations; and on the other hand, some forms of direct accountability of the European Council to the European Parliament, as difficult as this may appear today. Direct participation by national parliaments in decisions taken at EU level must be resisted as an institutional short-circuit, as it would in all likelihood engender decisional paralysis. The direct election of the Commission president, in this context, does not seem a very good idea, in view of the Commission’s increasing role as the implementing arm of common policies. This function seems incompatible with its politicisation. As an alternative, one may have to consider mechanisms to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the presidency of the European Council.

Some elements of political union are already being put in place, for instance in financial and fiscal integration. In other cases, new decisions must be taken, and some treaty changes may be required to increase Union competence in the economic policy field, to adapt institutions to a multi-level system, to increase democratic legitimacy. This is obviously a considerable challenge. The exercise would be meaningful and worthwhile if it contributed, as it could, to a sense of purpose, a new confidence, a glimmer of hope. These ingredients are needed for growth and prosperity. They are essential to the life of a democratic society. They are clearly and sadly missing in much of the Union at present, including in the recent debate on financial perspectives. It must surely be the main task of political leadership to restore them.