SCENARIOS FOR A POST-PUTIN RUSSIA

A Dystopian Future for Russia

1. Aleksey Shaburov, editor of the PolitSovet portal in Yekaterinburg: If and when the Putin regime collapses, power will fall into the hands of “bandits,” whom he called Putin’s “pseudo-Cossacks.” According to Shaburov, these are state-armed groups over which the state does not have full control. He claims that these so-called Cossacks, which he distinguishes from real Cossacks, are situated on the border between two political groups: the official powers-that-be and ‘bandits.’” Shaburov expects that these groups will play a role in the transition of power, most notably by unleashing violence against minorities they do not like and furthering chaos in the country.
2. Alexander Dugin, an ultra-right-wing commentator is convinced that if Putin is further weakened, or when he is no longer president, the country will likely fall apart as did the Soviet Union in 1991. It is only thanks to Putin and his “tough line in the cause of Russian sovereignty” that the Russian Federation remains a unified state. To avoid a disastrous collapse of the country, Dugin argues, Russia will need a super-Putin “in which all his best heroic features will be continued, but his weaknesses and mistakes will be overcome.”
3. Russian analyst Kirillova worries that if Russia enters another “time of troubles” after Putin leaves the scene, radical-left populists, who are becoming more popular in the country, could emerge as a powerful force in the transition of power. With their Bolshevik-type ideology, repressive policies, opposition to pro-Western forces in the country, and “imperialist and isolationist vision of the world,” they could be instrumental in installing a leader who could be even worse than Putin “with regard to Russia and its relations with the West.”

A Bright Future for Russia

1. The economist Vladislav Inozemtsev argues that there is reason for long-term optimism. He bases his cautious expectation on the fact that the only limiting factor on the Putin regime is the lifespan of its creator. There is practically no chance that his system will be preserved after he is gone. Inozemtsev cites the deteriorating economic conditions in the country and predicts that they will continue to get worse. Demands for major change will increase. No one who replaces Putin will be able to continue his policies for very long. Once Putin is gone, the current ruling elite will rapidly disintegrate. Change at this point will become inevitable, and the compass of Russian history inevitably will swing towards democratization and rapprochement with the West. Inozemtsev concludes that this process may take some time and will not happen as quickly as many would like.
2. Political scientist Alexander Tsipko warns liberal-minded reformers and opposition leaders who aspire to transform Russia into a Western-style democracy in the post-Putin era.
3. Another expert Liik of Estonia is of the opinion that Russia can still democratize, but the sources and nature of that democracy would be different. It’ll spring not from a desire to emulate the Western model, but from the homegrown realization that to function smoothly, a country needs to have some rule of law, some separation of powers, some legitimacy among the powers that be. Its agents will be found not so much among the liberal intelligentsia as among various professionals who have come to the conclusion that they need some rules to successfully do their work: a growing, though not yet too vocal social group in today’s Russia. Such a democratic (or maybe semi-democratic) Russia will not be Western-friendly by default: it’ll examine all its relationships in a critical and cold-blooded manner. But it could quite pragmatically cooperate with the West, if and when its interests dictate.

An Uninspiring Future for Russia

This scenario promises some glimmer of hope for improvement, but essentially it forecasts a continuation of the uninspiring policies of the Putin regime.

1. Dmitri Trenin, head of the Moscow Carnegie office believes that a post-Putin Russia will be different from what it is now, but hardly too different; it will be ruled by a new monarchical president. He sees the nature of the economy as similar to what exists today with the Kremlin continuing to play the role of an arbiter among the principal vested interests. He anticipates that Russia’s society will mature but will remain focused on local issues and such socio-economic challenges as improving education and health care. Russia will not regain superpower status, but it will continue to resist what it perceives as pressure from the West and will play an important role in the world.
2. Gleb Pavlovsky, a former advisor to President Putin and now one of Russia’s most prominent political experts, offers two alternatives for Russia. One is based on Putin remaining in power at least until 2024, if not beyond, but to do so he would have to “adopt revolutionary changes akin to a more classical dictatorship—mass mobilization and repressions, purges of the elite classes, intimidation of society, and much more severe conflict with the external world.” As we look at the increased repressive steps currently being taken by the Putin regime, it is quite apparent that the Kremlin is moving in this direction, whether for the purposes Pavlovsky argues or for other reasons. In any case, such measures, Pavlovsky insists, will demand an enormous price on both society and the elite that have been supportive of Putin over the many years he has been in power. Pavlovsky’s second alternative focuses on Russia surviving while Putin’s power wanes. Pavlovsky does not explain how this would happen, but he does argue that the increasingly conservative nature of the regime will somehow facilitate the process of distancing itself from Putin and learning to function without his everyday involvement, thereby accelerating the transition to a post-Putin Russia. Over time this process will accelerate, “even sometimes against the wishes of powerful political players. In the end, Putin will have to leave—to allow the system to move forward on its own. Which of the two alternatives will prevail, Pavlovsky concludes, “we’ll see by 2024.”

The Vision of a Dreamer: A Post-Putin Russia as Imaged by Mikhail Khodorkovsky

Khodorkovsky begins with the premise that all authoritarian regimes always come to an end because everyone commits critical errors. In a democracy, errors can be corrected, and democracy can learn from these errors. In an authoritarian regime, the result of a critical error is a change of government. Under authoritarian rule, it is the end of the regime as we know it. If one accepts this premise, then there is hope that the authoritarian regime established by Putin will at some point come to an end. Khodorkovsky argues that Russia today finds itself at a crossroads. Society, the opposition, and even the authorities understand that the country cannot go on as it has, but no one understands what comes next. The regime does not have much time left five, maybe 10 more years but nobody knows how it will end. Khodorkovsky proposes building a solid democratic foundation for the first time in Russian history. This new democratic foundation is based on what he calls a three-dimensional system: a pyramid based on the key elements of strong local self-government; mega-cities as regional centers; and a strong central government. If one of these elements is not present, the entire system will invariably collapse, either into traditional authoritarianism or possibly the total disintegration of the state itself. He sees local self-government, which has historical roots in Russia, as the primary check against any backsliding of Russia towards the chasm of authoritarianism. Khodorkovsky believes in the decentralization of power and argues that the development of federalism will supplement this as an additional driver of decentralization. Moreover, he is convinced that it is much easier to ensure public control over state structures if they are within walking distance. Russia’s citizens must learn to solve problems at the level at which they arise. No democracy anywhere in the world can exist without this basis. There is no doubt that civic activism on local issues is becoming more widespread in Russia. In some instances, particularly on environmental issues, local communities have been successful in their causes. But in many other cases, citizens have failed to achieve their objectives due to rampant corruption and the exercise of arbitrary power by the authorities. Khodorkovsky recognizes these problems and admits that change will not be coming soon. Most likely it will take several generations to build a new Russia. Khodorkovsky is convinced that revolution in Russia is inevitable. He argues that the regime is slipping deeper into repression, driven by the desire to retain power at any cost. Having done much to turn the idea of revolution into a bogeyman, it is now reaping the backlash: many have begun to perceive a revolution as the most desirable outcome of the growing crisis. He admits that revolution is a very heavy price for society to pay, but it will be inevitable if life under a regime becomes unbearable and refuses to change. For Khodorkovsky, a revolution in Russia is only a question of where and when (and to a lesser degree, how). He warns that revolutions should not be used as instruments of settling scores and looting resources. He concludes that the democratic movement must do everything possible so that the revolution does not become an end in itself. Finally, Khodorkovsky reminds the Russian people and all those who wish the best for the future of Russia that it is impossible to stop despotism and violence with more despotism and violence. The main goal of revolution should be to make society more humane, more tolerant, more free. It should be the work of all those who, having passed through the revolution, are morally cleansed and liberated and such a revolution, despite all its costs, is beneficial to society.

Possibilities

1. Putin decides not to run for president in 2024. He selects his successor from among the most trusted political technocrats. His successor is duly elected, and the country continues along the same general path of Putinism and stagnation. Putin retires and does not play an active role in politics.
2. Putin decides not to run for president in 2024. He selects his successor from among the most trusted political technocrats. His successor is duly elected, and the country continues along the same general path of Putinism and stagnation. Putin becomes head of the State Council and plays a rival, perhaps dominant, role in the political life of the country. This complicates the political power structure and exacerbates instability in the country.
3. Putin decides to run for president in 2024 and is re-elected. When his term ends in 2030, he faces the same dilemma about running again for re-election by extending his term to 2036, at which time he would be 84 years old. At this point, conditions in the country have further deteriorated because the Kremlin has failed to implement major political and economic reforms to address the deep-seated problems facing the country. As stagnation deepens, unrest grows. This forces either a dramatic change in government policy (less likely), or pressures Putin not to run for re-election in 2030 (more likely), or leads to a coup d’état reminiscent of the failed coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 (not out of the realm of possibility), or erupts into a violent revolution—a modern-day version of 1917 (highly unlikely but not impossible).
4. Putin’s power base weakens and the elites surrounding the president become increasingly more independent and powerful. Putin is less able to act as an arbiter between the rival factions. The Kremlin as a center of power becomes less consequential. Power devolves to emerging regional centers that are in alliance with individual members of the power elite. Putin remains as a convenient figurehead and is allowed to run for re-election, in 2024 or 2030, depending on the timing of this scenario. The centrifugal forces that have always been present in Russia, but often in the background when power is concentrated in the center, become dominant. The power dynamic splinters. The center holds together but only in a weakened fashion. Separate regional power centers emerge, potentially in concord or conflict with each other. The possibility of Russia following its predecessor the Soviet Union by fracturing into autonomous or even independent entities cannot be excluded.