REFORMING THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

The views expressed here after are those of Professor Roland Vaubel, a member of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and not those of AALEP

Reforming the European Parliament

The European Parliament ought to be reformed in three ways. First of all, the Parliament ought to conform to democratic principles. Second, its costs must be controlled. Third, the European Parliamentarians must not be entitled to legislate on the division of labour between the Union and the member states. Issues of subsidiarity are better decided by members of the national parliaments or citizens themselves.

In a Union of 28 member states, it would be too cumbersome to involve all national parliaments in ordinary EU legislation. It is enough that they or their citizens decide about the ratification of treaty amendments. A second chamber comprising delegates of the national parliaments ought, however, to be added to the European Parliament. The second chamber would be responsible for all legislation potentially affecting the role of the member states, and it would decide whether there is such an effect. Draft legislative acts not taken up by the second chamber would go to the first chamber. Both chambers and the Council would have the right to propose legislation.

The national parliamentarians in the second chamber would lack a vested interest in centralisation at the EU level. Being members of their national parliaments at the same time, they would not gain power by legislating in favour of the European Union. Nor would they be biased in favour of national legislation.

There may still be a self-selection problem, however: parliamentarians who adore the European Union are more likely to specialise in EU affairs and to aim at being sent to the second European chamber. To avoid such self-selection, the delegates ought to be chosen by lot in each parliamentary group. Selection by lot is a good old constitutional practice going back to the republics of ancient Athens and medieval Venice.

The first and the second chamber should be entirely separate. They should not collude. Ideally, they should assemble in different places. The first chamber could be located in Brussels and the second in Strasbourg

Reforming the European Commission

Two types of reform seem to be necessary. The Commission ought to be stripped of its non-executive functions. Too many powers are concentrated in the hands of a single institution. The Commission should give up its monopoly on, indeed its right to, legislative initiative. It must not determine the legislative majority requirements in the Council. It should not have to be consulted about pending legislation at all.

Competition policy ought to be delegated to an independent competition authority. The same is true for anti-dumping policy, if it is to be kept at all. A European public prosecutor should replace the Commission as guardian of the treaties. These reforms would diffuse power and permit specialisation. They follow from the classical-liberal principle of the separation of powers.

As the non-elected branch of a European executive, the Commission also ought to become an ordinary civil service. Each Commissioner should be subordinated to a minister elected by a parliament. The Commissioners would become state secretaries.

Who would be the ministers? The Commissioners ought to receive their instructions from those who have appointed them: the members of the Council. Each Council of Ministers would elect one of its members as EU minister for its affairs (and another member as deputy). Each EU minister would at the same time be responsible for the corresponding ministry in his or her home country. This is how the Presidency of the Council has worked in the past. But it is not necessary that all councils of ministers are chaired by ministers from the same member state. The Council has experience in supervising civil servants who execute EU policies. In the past, the presidency has rotated among the member states every half year.

In an ordinary national civil service, there is no need for a collective body comprising the state secretaries of all ministries. Hence, the college of Commissioners might be dissolved.

These changes in the administration of the European Union may seem revolutionary if compared with the status quo. But they merely reflect the normal role that a civil service plays in a classical liberal democracy. A civil service must not have other than executive functions and it should not be independent.

There is more room for doubt as to who ought to supervise it. Why should the European civil service not be subordinated to ministers elected by the European Parliament? Why should the college of Commissioners not become a cabinet of ministers, the government of the Union, as many seem to think?