A PROPOSE CHOREOGRAPHED DE-ESCALATION BY THE CRISIS GROUP

1. First, the U.S., European powers and Russia would strike a quiet deal - discreet enough that no government needs to appear weak before the public- that they will refrain from the military activities that the other side finds especially provocative. For Russia, such a deal would mean not just pulling its troops well back from the Ukrainian border but also dismantling the infrastructure and equipment that it left in place after its earlier mobilisation. For both sides, it would mean dialing down deployments and exercises in the Black and Baltic Sea regions. The West could curb naval exercises that challenge Russia’s claims there. NATO and its member states might also agree to curtail their rhetoric about the possibility of Ukraine’s (and Georgia’s) accession.
2. Secondly, and in parallel, the U.S. should work with Russia to restaff their respective diplomatic missions, which have suffered from mutual rounds of punitive expulsions and limitations. At present, the U.S. has only a skeleton staff in Moscow. Reportedly, the Kremlin and Washington have quietly agreed on a plan for getting U.S. diplomats back to Russia, but they will need to do more to restart normal diplomatic relations and consular services, including visas.  Not only would this step remove a major irritant in relations, it would facilitate discussions going forward, on this and other topics.
3. Thirdly, all involved should commit to restarting Ukraine peace talks, maybe with new incentives on the table. The U.S. should play a bigger role, for example by appointing a new special envoy. Moscow, which believes that only Washington can persuade Kyiv to move on difficult matters, would value this step.  Moreover, Western powers should – as Crisis Group has argued before – prepare to trade sanctions relief for de-escalatory measures by Russia and its proxies. They might offer measure-for-measure relief once the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) gets full access to the Ukraine-Russia border and other non-government-controlled areas; upon disengagement of forces along the Donbas front lines; after local elections in Donbas have been scheduled; or following the disarming of separatist forces. The gradual lifting of sanctions in return might begin with those on borrowing conditions for Russian banks and companies and on individuals and end with the total removal of sectoral and personal sanctions after Ukraine regains control of its border. The risks to using sanctions relief as an incentive along these lines are real but still worth taking. Critics of putting sanctions on the table before the Ukraine talks have progressed much further tend to highlight the danger that Russia will backslide and the West will struggle to rebuild the consensus that got sanctions imposed in the first place. But that risk has to be weighed against the perils of the moment. There seems to be increasing recognition in European capitals and Washington that the sanctions policy needs an overhaul.  Russia itself appears ready to have such a conversation if the U.S. takes the lead. As a Russian expert on sanctions told Crisis Group, “Russia will not discuss sanctions in the abstract because that would be tantamount to recognising itself as a party to the conflict in Ukraine, but if the U.S. presents a specific plan to lift sanctions, Russia will of course consider it carefully”.
4. Fourthly, at the reformatted peace talks, the parties would need to take a somewhat different approach to Minsk. For all their flaws, the 2014 and 2015 agreements are, at least formally, something all parties have agreed to, and they were endorsed by the UN Security Council. They are also at the core of Western governments’ stated policies regarding Ukraine and Russia. Rather than creating additional uncertainty about whether Ukraine ever intends to fulfil the agreements, Washington, Kyiv and their European partners should show a new seriousness about implementing them – including the difficult steps of affording some autonomy for separatist-controlled Donbas, holding local elections there and granting a broad amnesty for separatists who lay down their arms. In so doing, the parties could explore creative options for addressing Ukraine’s concerns about holding elections before it assumes control over its border. Possible solutions include involving a third party – likely the OSCE or the UN – to monitor the border and the region as a whole while elections are held.
5. Fifthly, the European Union could begin discussing a special format for negotiations with Russia to address the Kremlin’s concerns regarding EU relations with third countries. This format can be based on the declaration by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany in 2015, at the time of the second Minsk agreements, which affirmed the leaders’ “support [for] trilateral talks between the EU, Ukraine and Russia in order to achieve practical solutions to concerns raised by Russia with regards to the implementation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and the EU”.  Thus far, the parties have used this format only to discuss Russian gas transit through Ukraine.

Finally, because immediate de-escalatory steps will be insufficient to assuage Russia’s long-term concerns about European security – and even the approach to Ukraine peace talks and Minsk will fall far short of what Russian wants – it will be necessary to begin laying the groundwork for additional steps that will put relations between Russia and its Western neighbours on a steadier footing. The measures cited above are a starting point, but they will need to be solidified and in certain cases expanded, some quietly and some more formally. For example, NATO members are unlikely to walk away from their open-door policy, and the declaration from their 2008 Bucharest summit, which promised eventual Ukrainian and Georgian membership, but they can reach an understanding with Moscow that they will tone down their rhetoric. A quieter approach would not imply the alliance’s willingness to cede a sphere of influence to the Kremlin. Rather, it would be consistent with the reality that NATO’s membership is not likely to include additional countries on Russia’s Western flank any time soon.

As regards more concrete commitments, Moscow and Brussels should look to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, by which NATO affirmed to Russia that it had “no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states” and no plan to “permanently station substantial combat forces” there.  Today’s threat of escalation risks upending what is left of the second promise. The two sides could agree to deepen these commitments (for instance, by defining “substantial”).  The alliance could also commit not to station permanent combat forces in non-NATO members of the OSCE, including Ukraine.  They could discuss limiting temporary visits of NATO member state and Russian troops and instructors to these countries. Such steps would be explicitly contingent on reciprocal commitments by Moscow not to use force or support its use against OSCE states – and also to refrain from stationing forces on the territory of non-allies. Because such a mutual commitment implies resolution of the Ukraine war, it would be possible only after Russian-backed forces in Ukraine disarm and Kyiv regains sovereignty over breakaway areas.

In addition, Russia, Ukraine and Western states would be well-served by beginning negotiations to define express limits and transparency commitments regarding conventional force deployments, exercises and other activities in potential flashpoint areas, especially in and around the Black and Baltic Seas. These discussions will surely take time, but they are crucial to prevent future crises and manage what will likely be a conflictual relationship for some time to come, given the disparity between Moscow’s security goals and those of Western states.