PRIORITIES FOR THE NEXT EU COMMISSION (2024-2025)

Source: DGAP

Geoeconomics

The Commission must use trade policy as a strategic geoeconomic instrument. Current geopolitical developments present the EU with major challenges. These include Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, increasing strategic rivalry between China and the United States, and weakened structures of global governance. In this critical environment, the next European Commission must play an active geopolitical role – even if its power to shape foreign and security policy is limited. To this end, the European Union should make greater use of the leverage offered by its Common Commercial Policy, which is one of the most important and stable pillars of strategic relations between the EU and third countries. Based on the approach of “open strategic autonomy,” it should actively employ its trade policy to achieve its strategic objectives and to defend its interests and values. 

Technology and Cyberspace

The EU needs to make real progress on its doctrine in cyberspace and prioritize China’s cyber challenge. The EU lacks a doctrine in cyberspace and continues to strive to deter attacks through denial and punishment. This strategy ignores the fact that such measures have been largely unsuccessful in deterring malicious international behavior below the threshold of armed conflict. While the EU’s focus on gradually increasing resilience and reducing incentives for attack through sanctions and verbal condemnations is necessary, it is insufficient for fending off cyber operations. Furthermore, the EU’s current cyber posture mostly zooms in on Russia, which it mentions several times, while noting that close partnership is intended with Ukraine. At the same time, this cyber posture leaves out China’s cyber challenge entirely – although it clearly poses the greater long-term threat. 

Industrial Policy

The EU must stand up to China’s green industrial policy.  In October 2023, the European Commission launched an anti-subsidy investigation into electric vehicles (EVs) originating from China. This investigation provides an opportunity for the EU to go beyond rhetoric that identifies China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival. While the investigation has been met with dissatisfaction from the Chinese, the EU should not allow fear of retaliation to cause delay or inaction. It is no coincidence that China currently dominates green supply chains. Its preeminence resulted from an industrial strategy that aims to create asymmetrical technological dependencies vis-à -vis the mass export of subsidized overcapacity, resulting in much cheaper Chinese products. Amid ongoing competition, the EV market supply chain exemplifies the effect of Chinese capabilities to dominate new emerging markets. The European Commission needs to implement policies against Chinese subsidies swiftly and efficiently. If not, it risks losing out on more than just the EV sector in the coming years.

Energy and Sustainability

The next European Commission must square security with sustainability when setting the EU’s energy policy priorities. Energy policy will be top of mind for the incoming European Commission. Following the ambitious agenda of its predecessor, the EU’s new leadership must manage the competing demands of its constituents for an energy supply that is simultaneously affordable, secure, and sustainable. Reconciling these three dimensions of energy policy will require both sound policy and a strong network of global energy partnerships.  

Security and Defense

The EU must become a geopolitical player in security and defense. Expectations were high after newly elected Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proclaimed hers a “geopolitical commission” in 2019. Three years later, after Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell also spoke of Europe’s “geopolitical awakening.” Indeed, responding to the wars and crises with which the EU is currently confronted on several fronts requires geopolitical strategic thinking and action. Yet the EU’s reactions have been mixed. For the first time, joint orders for weapons and war material are being financed via the European Peace Facility to support Ukraine, and training courses for Ukrainian soldiers are taking place as part of the EU training mission EUMAM UA. Nevertheless, Europe has major deficits in military capacity and production, and there are also gaps in the joint procurement and supply of ammunition. Further, the EU has so far only had limited influence on the tensions between Kosovo and Serbia, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the Israel-Hamas war. 

EU Enlargement

The next Commission needs to accelerate EU enlargement – also by reforming the accession process. EU enlargement has become critical to the EU’s future and security. In Brussels, Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine was rightly understood as an attempt by Vladimir Putin to restore dominance over Eastern Europe, not only over Kyiv. Hence, the current Commission was tasked by the Council to mobilize an enlargement policy that – as Balkan candidates can attest – has been dormant for almost a decade. Another key priority is to provide a framework for Ukraine’s survival, future reconstruction, and transformation into a European state. The same goes for Moldova. Meanwhile, the group of aspirants has grown to nine countries and become more diverse. Farthest along in their accession negotiations are four Balkan states – Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia. Then come Ukraine, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina who were just upgraded to this stage. They are followed by Georgia and Kosovo who are catching up from lower stages of the accession process. In contrast, this process is effectively frozen with Turkey. The EU’s fundamental shift into strategic gear brought important policy adjustments with it. Now, the emphasis is not only on rule of law and the democratic fundamentals of aspirants, but also on foreign policy alignment. This has put Serbia – the largest Balkan candidate, which has autocratic tendencies and special relations with Russia and China – under more scrutiny. Accelerating enlargement also confronts the EU with internal challenges related to budget, governance, and the core policy areas of cohesion and agriculture.
 

Eastern Neighborhood Policy

The EU needs a new approach for its Eastern Neighborhood Policy. Russia’s war on Ukraine, which began with its large-scale invasion in 2022, has changed the security and geopolitical landscape in the EU’s Eastern neighborhood. As a result, the EU made the geopolitical decision to offer a membership perspective to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia that fundamentally changes relations between them and the EU. This has called the whole architecture and purpose of the EU Eastern Partnership policy into question. As Belarus has suspended its participation, this policy now only remains relevant for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia is interested in deepening its relations with the EU through its Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and, considering growing tensions with Russia, potentially a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). Azerbaijan is interested in trade and investments in energy and infrastructure, but not in EU norms or any integration. The EU has already reacted to this new situation by developing its connectivity and security agenda. Yet this policy has limits and falls short of being able to shape the neighborhood. In Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, new regional orders are emerging. Increasingly, the EU is competing for influence with actors like Turkey, China, Iran, some Gulf countries, and Russia.  

Sahel and Western Africa

While the EU looks to Eastern Europe, it should not lose sight of Western Africa. Ukraine is under huge pressure on the battlefield, and US support for Kiev is at increasing risk. Consequently, the EU is being forced to concentrate political and financial resources on the war to its east. Some argue that this momentum will be helpful for the next Commission. It could be used to strengthen instruments such as the European Peace Facility or Defence Fund and to institutionalize policies such as common acquisitions of ammunition. Further, such a “crisis” could once again deepen integration. Yet the EU and its member states have lost significant traction elsewhere in the world. For example, in Western Africa, a blind spot of media attention and public debate, European states have long been on the back foot. While for decades Western Africa was arguably the only region where Western presence meant the European Union first and the United States second, Western influence is now dwindling. France, the United States, and others were forced to leave Mali, Burkina Faso, and, finally, Niger. Recently, a new president was elected in Senegal: 44-year-old Bassirou Diomaye Faye. He is part of a new generation of leaders that want to break with the post-colonial legacy and seek new partnerships – outside of the West, if need be. Russia, China, Turkey, and the Gulf monarchies have gained ground in the Sahel, offering support and resources without any conditionality, human rights, or other strings attached. Iran is fueling anti-Western sentiment and forming ad hoc alliances with leaders of the pan-African movement. Furthermore, Jihadists in the region are gaining ground, forcing populations to flee the violence and challenging what little remains of historically weak states. Most are at risk of failing or of becoming “ungoverned spaces.” 

Global Health

The EU must bring its Global Health Strategy to life. While the European Commission had not originally defined health as a priority for the period 2019 to 2024, the Covid-19 pandemic catapulted the topic to the top of the EU agenda. Consequently, the European Health Union and a Global Health Strategy were established. This rapid, crisis-related prioritization of health issues cannot, however, hide the fact that there are deficits in health governance both within the EU and at a global level. The pandemic made it clear that more sustainable structures are needed to be prepared for future health crises. As recently as mid-February, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), emphasized at the World Governments Summit that the next pandemic is only a matter of time. This makes it all the more problematic that, since the waning of the Covid-19 pandemic, global health has increasingly fallen out of focus and instruments are losing government support. The pandemic treaty proposed by EU Council President Charles Michel in summer 2023 is emblematic of these developments. Although the adoption of this treaty by the World Health Assembly, which would make it binding under international law, was originally considered a formality, negotiations have stalled. Hence, the new Commission has no time to lose and should quickly make adjustments before the momentum on global health slows even further.