POLITICAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE EU

Policymakers, observers and the media have referred to a vast number of divisions in crisis-torn Europe. The EU is divided between north and south or creditors and debtors. Some have emphasised the emerged division between anti-EU and pro-EU forces. Significantly, these divisions are also manifested within the eurozone, in the form of the current differences between the French and German views, and the increasing role of the populist movements in many euro countries. Yet others have highlighted the boundary between the eurozone and the rest of the EU, and suggested that the euro countries now form the core of the Union. Relatedly, some of the non-euro members are distancing themselves from the EU – most notably the UK – while many others aim to secure their influence in the Union, even if euro membership may have been put on the back burner.

The extraordinary political decisions taken to tackle the financial and economic crisis, and to reform and reinforce the EMU have opened up some old wounds and created new political dividing lines in the EU. The EU has witnessed the re-emergence of the north-south divide as a key marker of distinct political and economic visions and imperatives within the EU. At the same time, the division between the east and west is diminishing. The importance of the political dividing line between euro and non-euro EU members has also increased, yet it is not clearly defined. The uneven burden-sharing between euro and non-euro countries in providing financial means to tackle the crisis is, however, shaping the contours of EU politics. Despite the British reluctance to join the current political processes propelling a deeper economic integration, no other profound preconditions for the EU’s future development have been established by the member states. Yet the depth of the reinforced EMU is currently under consideration in many member states.

The strengthening of the populist and Eurosceptic political movements has led to the resurrection of the anti-EU and pro-EU political dividing line in many member states. This is increasingly reflected at the EU level, and might constrain the EU’s future development. Populist and Eurosceptic political movements have been on the rise in the EU member states during the financial and economic crisis. While their political power base and objectives are diverse, they share some commonalities. In short, many of them are anti-EU and anti-immigration. The re-emergence of the Eurosceptic populist movements in several EU member states has been largely seen to reflect European electorates’ dissatisfaction with the EU, as well as the increasingly limited capabilities of national governments to manage their economies in the light of deepened European integration and globalisation. The anti-immigration tendencies of many of these movements have also contributed to the perception that they are intent upon reversing the European project and globalisation, and restoring national sovereignty. Such elements in the current wave of Eurosceptic populism vary over time and space, however.

The resurrection of the anti-EU and pro-EU political dividing line in several old EU member states is a significant development which is likely to shape the EU’s future development to some extent. These movements are also increasingly operating transnationally, which may serve to increase their power base in the future. While Euroscepticism appears to unite the majority of the populist movements in Europe, their ability to form a united front in EU politics is in doubt. First, due to the EU member states’ electoral and political systems it is rather unlikely that populist parties would be able to take control over several member states’ governments. Those who make it into their national governments will be constrained by political responsibility and coalition partners. Second, even if the populist parties are on the road to a landslide victory in the next European Parliament elections, their ability to work towards a joint political agenda or form a coherent political group or groupings in the Parliament is likely to prove rather difficult given their different political objectives. Finally, the populist and distinctive Eurosceptic movements have expanded particularly in the creditor countries and in the UK. In the debtor countries, the political protests have been channelled through loose anti-globalization movements as well as the radical left and extreme right. The stance that these movements adopt on the crisis and the current plans to deepen European integration draw on a rather different political milieu than that found in populist movements in the creditor countries. Concurrently, the centre-right and centre-left parties seem to be increasingly better prepared to face the challenge of political protest and populism. Yet dissatisfaction among the EU member states’ electorates cannot be overlooked. The years of crisis, related extraordinary developments and current plans for deeper economic integration have already led to a critical evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of the EU and the nature of the political union needed to guarantee it.

Europe today does not need inspirational leaders who can whip up a populist frenzy. Instead, it needs locally respected leaders who are capable of working in a complex and multi-dimensional political world