INTEREST GROUPS REPRESENTATION: YOU CAN'T BE STRONG AT EU LEVEL IF YOU AREN'T STRONG AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

The notion of political representation of interest groups is clearly related to functional rather than territorial representation. Interest groups are generally defined as organisations that are separate from government that attempt to influence public policy. They provide institutionalized linkage between the government or the state and major interests in society.

That interest groups matter for political representation is a given. There are, however, differnt positions whether their impact on policies is for the better or worse. The dominant view, however, is that their influence is positive in terms of macro-economic outcomes. Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that people by and large do feel to be represented by at least one interest group. As a matter of fact, there are more people in Europe that feel they are represented by an interest group rather than by a political party.

The model of interest groups is that they are embedded in the representational structure and the structure of the intermediary systems itself is of crucial importance for the impact and the representation by intererest groups. Research studies indicate that national pattern persist and define clear constraints for the formation of European interest groups.

Political representation without the participation of interest groups cannot develop even within the boundaries of nation states. Considering European integration, it goes without saying that organised groups need to be taken into account. However, the sheer number of people being represented by members of the European Parliament, for example, as compared to the numbers within the EU member states, makes clear that a representational linkage between electors and representatives at the European level is much more difficult to achieve.

European integration and representation cannot be based on political institutions alone. In general, the institutionalization of an intermediary system at the European level has much more in common with the development of interest groups at the nation state level. The formation of interest groups at EU level has been the result of the growing competence of the 'European state'.

The emergence of European interest groups is not only related to the growing competence of the EU but also whether supranational organisations can build on national interest groups with a high degree of centralization and concentration. This brings us to the problem of heterogenity and diversity of interest group systems within the nation states of Europe. Given the problems to create representative linkages at the national level, it is clear that these problems are even bigger at the transnational level of the EU. This has not so much to do with the degree of pluralism in Europe but with the diversity of structures and cultures. The implications are manyfold:

1. European interest associations are weak federations of federations, often unable to agree and act upon meaningful common positions. There are, however, some examples of such super federations which show that coherent and decisive action is possible, for example, pharmaceuticals. But it is obvious that representation of interests at the European level still depends to a high degree on national interest groups.
2. Representation of interests is unequal. Those showing some of the necessary conditions of firm organization (high homogeneity of interests, high organizational concentration at the national level have greater chances to be heard at the European level.
3. Representation of organized interests of different countries is unequal. This can be shown by looking at the distribution of memberships in advisory boards and committees at the European level among peak associations. Since any peak association is called to have a seat, national systems with several peak associations in one sector, for example, trade unions or business associations, cannot gain the centrality in the networks of policy formulation as in national systems with unitary federations.

Where organized interests are fragmented at the national level, communication capacities at the European leevl are reduced. The linkages which can be provided by interest groups in order to facilitate political representation at the EU level is anything but easy to achieve. This will be so as long as national federations play a major role in linking interests in European societies and the EU level and as long as there is a defense again EU wide politics in order to protect national interests. Obviously, this must not contradict political representation at the European level. It makes it, however, a much less smoooth task as promoters of functionalist integration theory would acknowledge.

Conclusion (Recap)

The mode of representation by interest groups is to a high degree dependent on the decisions of legitimized political institutions in two aspects. Political competences and intervention of the government/state is in many cases the reason for the founding of interest groups. This point is of central relevance in particular for representation at the European level by interest groups since it assumes at least in part some kind of co-evolution of governmental institutions and interest groups. The role of existing interest groups in political representation is to a high degree defined by governmental institutions. In normative terms, interest groups can only speak for themselves and their members. In cases where their role goes further, they need external legitimation or approval by democratically legitimized political institutions. The mode of representation then is clearly defined by the state. Subsidiarity, delegations, as well as coporatism are modes of political representation by interest groups which the state chooses and only the state can choose since they rest to a certain degree on the allocation of some kind of formal authority. The mirror of this is that the representative institutions can only make a choice in the limits that the structure of organized interests fits the one or another mode.

Of importance for the role of interest groups at the European level is that the modes of representation by interest groups and the structure of interest group systems show a high degree of diversity across Europe. This has several implications. First, the ability of interest groups to form European federations differs not only between different sectors. It also differs between EU member states. The more homogeneous and centralized interests are organized at the national level, the easier it is to come up with a European solution. The more the degree of homogeneity and centralization differs between the member states the more difficult it is to develop a strong European federation. Secondly, on the European level not only European federations have a voice but also national federations are formally integrated in decision procedures. Since the fragmentation of interests in one sector differs between countries, their impact also differs at the European level. The more fragmented a national organizational culture, the less powerful interest groups can act at the European level. Thus, the representation of the same interests is unequal among EU member states. Thirdly, since interest groups are so deeply rooted in national cultures they cannot avoid to bring in the territorial dimension of interests. Thus, the idea and hope that representation with the help of interest groups is easier at the European level than the traditional political representation dealing with the territorial dimension cannot be confirmed.

It is obvious that political representation is not possible without interest groups, in particular  at the European level. The question is, however, that political representation does not become less complex by this but more complex. But this is probably the price for the improvement of the quality of democratic representation at the European level and hence the launch by AALEP of 2014 as the YEAR OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION!