THE EU MUST NOT ABANDON UKRAINE: IT WOULD BE VERY UNREASONABLE AND UNWISE TO DO SO!

There is a strong consensus among government and opposition in Ukraine towards the “European destiny” of the country. The EU needs to avoid Ukraine being pushed into the arms of Russia, and that an independent Ukraine best serve European ambitions and EU geo-strategic interests.

The EU has made a significant political investment in Kiev over the years. Yet, Brussels’s policy and the instruments it has used have had little impact on Ukraine. The country is moving further away from the EU and into a gray zone of no reform.

The EU debate on Ukraine is rarely about Ukraine itself or the EU’s interests there. Instead, it is primarily about EU enlargement or Russia. On both issues, the positions of EU member states are irreconcilable. These issues are wrapped up with so much emotion and fear that the member states cannot talk about their foreign policy interests with respect to Ukraine in an objective way. But Ukraine is significant for the entire EU (EU28) in terms of political stability, security, and energy-related matters.

Politics and Security

Today’s Ukraine poses a security threat to the EU. Ukraine’s poor governance  may potentially lead to instability and public discontent that could negatively affect the EU. At the least, it may significantly increase the flow of migrants from Ukraine, which is already ranked fifth among non-EU suppliers of migrants to the EU28.

Ukraine’s democratic decline also has a negative impact on Eastern Europe and sends negative signals to other Eastern Partnership  countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova). For years, Kiev was a role model for the EU’s Eastern Partnership, and it remains a key partner in the initiative. A declining Ukraine casts a long shadow over the Eastern Partnership and undermines its value for the entire region.

Economics and Trade

Of the EU’s Eastern neighbors, Ukraine is the country with the second-largest joint border with the EU at over 1,300 kilometers . In 2011, Ukraine was the union’s 24th most important source of imports (accounting for 0.9 percent of imports from non-EU countries) and ranked nineteen on the list of countries receiving the most EU exports (accounting for 1.4 percent of EU exports). This compares with Russia, which is the EU’s second-largest import partner and fourth-largest export partner, and Turkey, which is seventh and fifth, respectively.

The potential for greater economic and trade links between the EU and Ukraine is significant. Ukraine offers a market of 45 million consumers, and 70 percent of its arable land is made up of some of the most fertile soil in Europe. But for this potential to be realized, and for EU businesses to be willing to invest in or trade with Ukraine, the country has to dramatically improve its poor business climate. It currently ranks 137 out of 185 countries in terms of the ease of doing business according to the World Bank’s Doing Business report and 73 out of 144 countries on the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013.

Energy

Despite Russia’s attempts to redirect its gas supply to the EU through the Belarusian gas transit system and Nord Stream pipeline, Ukraine remains the most important transit country for Russian gas going to the EU. Today, twelve EU member states receive gas through the Ukrainian transit system, which is in relatively bad shape and needs to be significantly modernized. Yet, the Ukrainian authorities have not asked the EU for the funds that were pledged by Brussels in 2009 to help modernize the system. The Ukrainian government is also reportedly holding negotiations with Moscow on the creation of a bilateral consortium to manage the Ukrainian gas transit system. While this may provide for the safe transit of gas to the EU in the short run, it does not guarantee modernization and hence security of transit for the EU in the medium term.

Ukraine also offers energy resources that the EU needs. It is one of the biggest producers of electricity in Europe. Its electricity systems are partially integrated with the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity, and the country supplies electricity to four EU member states (Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, and Romania). In addition, Ukraine has significant natural gas and shale gas resources that it is starting to develop.

The Russia Factor

A badly governed Ukrain that is, one that is corrupt and undemocratic is more vulnerable to Moscow’s pressure and thus has more chance of being absorbed by the Eurasian Customs Union over time. While this does not confront the EU with hard security threats, it may complicate trade and other relations with Ukraine.

WHAT SHOULD THE EU DO ?

Today’s Ukraine is a mixed bag for EU members. Kiev does not want to reform, and the Ukrainian leadership has taken numerous steps that move the country further away from the EU. In its current shape, Ukraine seems to matter only because of its size, its geographical proximity to the EU, and the host negative, problematic agenda items that it brings to the table. It has long had positive potential, but realizing that potential, especially in terms of economics and trade, is prohibitively expensive, and the EU has more to gain from engagement with other countries, such as Russia or Turkey.

1. EU member states should agree to pause the EU enlargement debate and deliver a clear message to Ukraine. The sad truth is that the EU does not have the institutional capacity or will to enlarge beyond a few Balkan countries. It is also clear that the enlargement carrot will not work in Ukraine as it did in Poland. Erasing the issue of enlargement from the Ukraine debate will help the EU be more pragmatic and less emotional about Ukraine. It will tame Kiev’s bloated sense of self-importance and help it understand Ukraine’s interest-based relevance for the EU28.
2. The EU should end its unnecessary rhetoric about competition over Ukraine with Russia. Toning down the rhetoric does not mean that the EU is giving Ukraine away to the Eurasian Customs Union. Rather, it means stopping Kiev from playing Brussels against Moscow and letting Ukraine decide its direction independently. Brussels should remain open to signing the Association Agreement if Kiev shows signs of real interest in such a relationship. Such a move would also reinforce the value of what the EU has to offer rather than fueling comparisons with Russia.
3. EU member states should also discuss EU28 interests in Ukraine and find relevant instruments for engaging with Kiev. Today’s EU is better equipped for this discussion than it has been in the past. There are fewer illusions about Ukraine, and the EU is no longer afraid of losing the country.

The EU’s natural approach is most likely to wait for the situation in Ukraine to improve. Over time, the EU may consider a policy of containing Kiev. But that would make the EU a mere observer of developments in the region and would go against the EU’s interest of building a stable and well-governed neighborhood, a goal that is still very valid. Therefore, continued engagement with Ukraine is key. However, the EU may need to reconsider a few things to be more successful in its endeavor.

The EU’s primary interest in Ukraine is putting an end to the negative agenda. While the EU’s general objective toward Kiev may remain, the EU will have to rethink its instruments of engagement. Democracy is a bottom-up process, as recent events in the Arab world have demonstrated. The EU cannot impose it from above. Brussels should gradually engage in comprehensive outreach to the grass roots—a process that is not well-known to the EU. Tripling the number of scholarships for Ukrainian students of all levels and increasing the number of possibilities for professional training and exchange beyond government officials coupled with support for grassroots movements will be key. Providing visa-free travel to the EU for ordinary Ukrainians can help significantly facilitate the learning process and may contribute to change in Ukraine.

This is a long-term investment that will require creative solutions from the EU to overcome Ukraine’s rather messy politics. However, it is clearly in the EU’s strategic interest. Once the EU28’s interests in Ukraine are clarified and its instruments have been fine-tuned, member states can move on to discussing the relevance of and approach to the entire Eastern Partnership region.

Conclusion

Ukraine is the largest European country, with significant natural and mineral resources and is of strategic significance for the EU in terms of security. It would be very unreasonable and unwise for the EU to lose Ukraine and other East European countries (Moldova, Georgia, Belarus) to Russia which would strengthen Russia as an empire and only create more rivalry and threat/danger to the EU from Russia. The EU must not wait until Russia succeeds in domination over those countries.
 

Today 27 July 2013, President Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kiev is applying pressure (once more) on President Yanukovych, to dissuade him from signing the association agreement with the EU suggesting instead a customs union and economic integration of Ukraine with Russia.

Russia has sought to keep Ukraine in its orbit by exploiting Kiev's differences with the West. Kiev has steadfastly resisted pressure from Moscow which wants to gain control of Ukraine's gas pipeline network in exchange for cheaper gas.

Many present-day Russians still consider Ukraine to be part of Russia, historically, culturally, and even spiritually. So pervasive has been the myth of Russo-Ukrainian unity that any attempt at asserting a Ukrainian identity has been viewed by many Russians as betrayal or as foreign intrigue. Despite the persecution of Ukrainian culture in both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, Ukrainians have developed the idea of a distinct Ukrainian nationhood. Many of the current misunderstandings between Russia and Ukraine have as their base a fundamental clash over the historical role of Ukraine. There is an ambiguity to the Russo- Ukrainian encounter from its very inception in the seventeenth century. At that time, both Ukraine and Russia were quite distinct. They differed greatly in political terms: Moscow was an absolutist autocracy, with little notion of regional or personal rights; Ukraine, on the other hand, was influenced by the political order of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which had an elective monarchy, an autonomous nobility, and well-developed corporate and regional rights. Even the shared Orthodox faith was somewhat different, for Ukrainian Orthodoxy was influenced by Western cultural trends and the Catholic Counter-Reformation.

From their very first encounter, both sides “did not say what they thought and did what they did not wish to do.” In these encounters both sides found it convenient to overlook differences and concentrate on areas of real or imagined unity.