THE NEW COLD WAR ERA

A new cold War in Europe is basically unavoidable. Europe will have to deal with a potentially outcast, unstable and technologically isolated Russia. This new version of the Cold War in greater Europe is bound to be far less stable than the previous edition. Restoring mutual trust with Russia is going to prove extremely difficult, if it is even possible.

It remains to be seen, given the rivalry between the United States and China, whether it will be a single cold war where the world may be divided into two blocks.

We may also have to deal with multiple cold wars, each conflict with its own characteristics and based on different pairs of tensions. Europeans will be drawn even closer to Washington’s strategy on China. That is a direct consequence of Europe’s military weakness and its lack of a clearly annunciated – and executed – economic strategy. Both of these factors translate into higher dependence on the United States.

Irrespective of Russia’s deep-seated fear of NATO, if the West – and the idea of freedom itself – are to survive, then Europe, too, will have to confront Putin’s imperial designs.

At a minimum, the danger of the Cold War turning hot increases. There also is an added factor: Putin now has a Russian territory, Kaliningrad. This tiny enclave may be surrounded by NATO countries, but it offers access to the sea. All indications are that Moscow will take advantage of its location in military terms.

This new Cold War is going to lead to increased military spending in an EU that has felt vulnerable and at the same time more united.

Germany has taken a step forwards with the decision of Olaf Scholz’s coalition government to ramp up defense spending and procure cutting-edge operational armed forces. It is not alone. But what is new is that even its neighbors in particular Poland and France support German militarization, albeit this time within the European and transatlantic framework. At long last, Western Europe now seems to be committed to the strengthening that successive U.S. governments have been urging for some time. Amid this frenzy, NATO holds all the cards for outdoing the EU in military terms. In a new strategy of containment and deterrence, the rotating deployments on its eastern front may well become significant and permanent.

The EU, while it is proving crucial in terms of economic and political sanctions (although restricted by its dependence on Russian oil and gas), has not managed to acquire real military clout in time not to be completely dependent on the burgeoning role of NATO in this crisis.

For yet more evidence of NATO’s broadening role, the alliance has even suggested extending its collective defense principles to include possible cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, another new factor. And Finland and Sweden may join NATO before long.

Nuclear arms are back. While they had never left the strategic equation, they lay dormant. We could face the prospect of a new nuclear arms race and, if there is an escalation, possibly a new crisis akin to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Indeed, that could occur quite soon, not least because the twin elements of surprise and rule-breaking are all on Putin’s side. It remains to be seen whether the Europeans will unite or be riven if it becomes necessary to respond to a Russian deployment of new intermediate-range missiles, a type curbed by the 1987 INF agreement that Trump recklessly renounced.

More importantly, there is going to be an ideological battle – but not, as before, between communism and capitalism. Today’s threat is to the liberal democratic system as opposed to autocracy. Putin fears the EU for what it represents (notwithstanding cases such as Hungary) in defense of liberal democracy. And disinformation and support for extreme right-wing movements in the West will remain a weapon for Putin, however much Russia Today and other propaganda tools are banned.

The Russian regime has also muzzled Facebook in Russia to prevent dissent from spreading, although efforts will be made to foment dissent in order to undermine Putin.

The battle for liberal democracy is going to be crucial in the context of Putin’s Russia (much more so than in the case of China).

In order to make the new Cold War either gradually less cold or to overcome it at some point, the West will want to undermine the Russian President’s social base. The hard task this time around is that the value and effectiveness of liberal democracy needs to be nurtured from within.