NATO-RUSSIA AGREEMENT AND U.S.-RUSSIA TREATY

Russian Proposals

NATO-RUSSIA AGREEMENT

Article 1

1. The Parties shall be guided in their relations by the principles of cooperation, equal and indivisible security. They shall not strengthen their security individually, within international organizations, military alliances or coalitions at the expense of the security of other Parties.
2. The Parties shall settle all international disputes in their mutual relations by peaceful means and refrain from the use or threat of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
3. The Parties shall not create conditions or situations that pose or could be perceived as a threat to the national security of other Parties.
4. The Parties shall exercise restraint in military planning and conducting exercises to reduce risks of eventual dangerous situations in accordance with their obligations under international law, including those set out in intergovernmental agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea outside territorial waters and in the airspace above, as well as in intergovernmental agreements on the prevention of dangerous military activities.

Article 2

1. In order to address issues and settle problems, the Parties shall use the mechanisms of urgent bilateral or multilateral consultations, including the NATO-Russia Council.
2. The Parties shall regularly and voluntarily exchange assessments of contemporary threats and security challenges, inform each other about military exercises and maneuvers, and main provisions of their military doctrines. All existing mechanisms and tools for confidence-building measures shall be used in order to ensure transparency and predictability of military activities.
3. Telephone hotlines shall be established to maintain emergency contacts between the Parties.

Article 3

1. The Parties reaffirm that they do not consider each other as adversaries.
2. The Parties shall maintain dialogue and interaction on improving mechanisms to prevent incidents on and over the high seas (primarily in the Baltics and the Black Sea region).

Article 4

1. The Russian Federation and all the Parties that were member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as of 27 May 1997, respectively, shall not deploy military forces and weaponry on the territory of any of the other States in Europe in addition to the forces stationed on that territory as of 27 May 1997. With the consent of all the Parties such deployments can take place in exceptional cases to eliminate a threat to security of one or more Parties.

Article 5

1. The Parties shall not deploy land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles in areas allowing them to reach the territory of the other Parties.

Article 6

1. All member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States.

Article 7

1. The Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not conduct any military activity on the territory of Ukraine as well as other States in the Eastern Europe, in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia. In order to exclude incidents the Russian Federation and the Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not conduct military exercises or other military activities above the brigade level in a zone of agreed width and configuration on each side of the border line of the Russian Federation and the states in a military alliance with it, as well as Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Article 8

1. This Agreement shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the Security Council of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security, nor the rights and obligations
   of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 9

1. This Agreement shall enter into force from the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification, expressing consent to be bound by it, with the Depositary by more than a half of the signatory States. With respect to a State that deposited its instrument of ratification at a later date, this Agreement shall enter into force from the date of its deposit.
2. Each Party to this Agreement may withdraw from it by giving appropriate notice to the Depositary. This Agreement shall terminate for such Party [30] days after receipt of such notice by the Depositary.

U.S.-RUSSIA TREATY

Article 1

1. The Parties shall cooperate on the basis of principles of indivisible, equal and undiminished security and to these ends: shall not undertake actions nor participate in or support activities that affect the security of the other Party; shall not implement security measures adopted by each Party individually or in the framework of an international organization, military alliance or coalition that could undermine core security interests of the other Party.

Article 2

1. The Parties shall seek to ensure that all international organizations, military alliances and coalitions in which at least one of the Parties is taking part adhere to the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 3

1. The Parties shall not use the territories of other States with a view to preparing or carrying out an armed attack against the other Party or other actions affecting core security interests of the other Party.

Article 4

1. The United States of America shall undertake to prevent further eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and deny accession to the Alliance to the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
2. The United States of America shall not establish military bases in the territory of the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, use their infrastructure for any military activities or develop bilateral military cooperation with them.

Article 5

1. The Parties shall refrain from deploying their armed forces and armaments, including in the framework of international organizations, military alliances or coalitions, in the areas where such deployment could be perceived by the other Party as a threat to its national security, with the exception of such deployment within the national territories of the Parties.
2. The Parties shall refrain from flying heavy bombers equipped for nuclear or non-nuclear armaments or deploying surface warships of any type, including in the framework of international organizations, military alliances or coalitions, in the areas outside national airspace and national territorial waters respectively, from where they can attack targets in the territory of the other Party.
3. The Parties shall maintain dialogue and cooperate to improve mechanisms to prevent dangerous military activities on and over the high seas, including agreeing on the maximum approach distance between warships and aircraft.

Article 6

1. The Parties shall undertake not to deploy ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles outside their national territories, as well as in the areas of their national territories, from which such weapons can attack targets in the national territory of the other Party.

Article 7

1. The Parties shall refrain from deploying nuclear weapons outside their national territories and return such weapons already deployed outside their national territories at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty to their national territories. The Parties shall eliminate all existing infrastructure for deployment of nuclear weapons outside their national territories.
2. The Parties shall not train military and civilian personnel from non-nuclear countries to use nuclear weapons. The Parties shall not conduct exercises or training for general-purpose forces, that include scenarios involving the use of nuclear weapons.

Note

Politics, as the saying goes, is the art of the possible. At the center of Russia’s draft treaty are three unconditional demands by Moscow: an end to NATO expansion; no more NATO infrastructure—in particular, offensive weapons—to be rolled out in Europe; and the withdrawal of military infrastructure deployed to Eastern Europe after 1997.

Moscow’s main demand—no further NATO expansion onto the territory of the former Soviet Union—is de facto being implemented, since the United States and its allies are not prepared to take responsibility for the military defense of Ukraine and that is unlikely to change. Since the United States is not prepared to go to war with Russia for Ukraine, Ukraine will not  be accepted into NATO as long as Russia is able to prevent it. The threat of Ukraine being in NATO is, therefore, in fact a phantom one for the foreseeable future. The question of whether we might see NATO in Ukraine—in the form of offensive weapons, military bases, military advisers, arms supplies, and so on—is trickier. Having what would amount to an unsinkable aircraft carrier controlled by the United States on Moscow’s doorstep, on hostile territory, even if Ukraine is not officially part of NATO, would be far more serious than the Baltic countries’ NATO membership. This isn’t a full-fledged threat just yet, but it certainly could become one, and what happens then?

There’s a chance that an agreement could be reached on the issue of not locating U.S. missile stations in Ukraine. The establishment of missile bases is not a military priority for Washington, and their hypothetical appearance around, say, Ukraine’s Kharkiv area could be countered by equipping Russian submarines coasting the U.S. mainland with Zirkon (Tsirkon) hypersonic missiles.

It’s also possible that an agreement could be reached on U.S. and other NATO members’ military bases in Ukraine. Right now Western countries are keen to avoid sustaining any losses in any fighting between Russia and Ukraine, and are therefore currently planning to evacuate their advisers from the country.

It will be harder, if not impossible, to agree on ending military and military-technology cooperation between Ukraine and the United States/NATO. The most that can be hoped for here is restrictions on the nature of arms supplied to Kyiv by the West. For that to happen, the United States will insist on a de-escalation of Russia’s military preparations on Ukraine’s borders. Any de-escalation, however, will have to be accompanied by restrictions on NATO maneuvers close to Russia’s borders in Europe.

Moscow’s demand for the withdrawal of all military infrastructure deployed to NATO’s Eastern European member states is as impossible as it is largely unnecessary in terms of Russia’s security. The several thousand U.S. soldiers located on the territory in question don’t exactly pose a serious threat to Russia. NATO battalions in the Baltics are, if anything, simply there to placate the three host countries: their presence on former Soviet territory may leave a bad taste in Moscow, but is hardly cause for alarm.

There is other infrastructure, of course, which really does pose a threat: first and foremost, U.S. missile defense components in Romania and Poland; air bases that could house planes capable of carrying nuclear weapons; naval bases; and so on. The issue of missile defense system launchers that could be adapted for intermediate-range missiles could be resolved as part of a new INF agreement. Other issues come under the umbrella of regular arms control in Europe, which has been shelved since NATO countries refused to ratify the adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.

There is a suspicion that the third key demand—effectively, a return to 1997—was put forward so that it could later be retracted, thereby demonstrating Moscow’s readiness to compromise. More potential for reaching agreements could lie in the unbundling of Russia’s raft of proposals and demands, and willingness to pursue parallel tracks—but only if there is confidence that agreements can be reached that would satisfy Russia’s security interests.

The chances of the United States implementing Russia’s demands in the format and timeframe set out by Moscow are non-existent. Agreements are theoretically possible on two of the three key issues: non-expansion and non-deployment. But any such agreements will be of a political, not legally binding nature.

Various Russian commentators have discussed the possibility of retracting the provisions of NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration that stated that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO.” Yet this is unlikely to happen at the alliance’s summit in Madrid this year: there may be no real substance to such symbolism, but renouncing it would probably be too much of a loss of face for the United States and NATO.

That is not the only option, however. NATO could, at the initiative of the United States, announce a long-term moratorium on new members, for example. Biden has already said that Ukrainian membership of NATO is unlikely to be approved in the next decade, while some U.S. experts are talking about twenty to twenty-five years. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov was more specific in his choice of words: “never ever.” For the vast majority of today’s politicians and officials, however, “never” may well mean “not in my lifetime.” A figure of sixty-nine or even forty-nine years would work just as well.

It’s also possible to agree on not deploying intermediate-range missiles and other offensive weapons: not as part of a treaty, but as an intergovernmental agreement between Russia and the United States, which wouldn’t have to be ratified in the latter. It could also be possible during negotiations on the issue to address the sides’ concerns about, respectively, U.S. missile defense launchers and new Russian cruise missiles.

Finally, it would be possible to select specific areas of concern with regard to infrastructure on NATO’s eastern flank and to resolve them through confidence-building measures.

None of the measures outlined above comprise either security guarantees or legally binding documents, but, as previously noted, Russia has long had the former via its nuclear arsenal and armed forces, while the latter are effectively impossible and would in any case not be absolute. Still, they would at least provide Russia with written assurances.

For now, no agreements are in sight on the issues that concern Russia. For President Putin, however, a negative result also counts as a result. The Kremlin needed to express itself with full clarity on its security concerns in Europe, and it has made itself abundantly clear.

It’s important to understand that Moscow’s demands of the United States and NATO are in fact the strategic goals of Russian policy in Europe. Their aim is not to restore the Soviet Union, as some suggest. Rather, the idea is to reframe security in Europe—particularly in Europe’s east—as a contractual relationship between the two principal strategic actors in the region, Russia and the United States/NATO, thus turning the page on an era when it was the business of the United States alone. This is regarded as a vital national security interest. If Russia cannot achieve its goal by diplomatic means, it will need to resort to other tools and methods.

Russian officials have said that if the talks fail, Moscow will take military-technical and even military measures. Those measures have not been specified in advance—unlike the Western sanctions that have been threatened in the event that Russia invades Ukrainian territory—but they are being widely discussed. A range of measures is likely to be proposed to Putin by his advisers, from keeping up the pressure with the threat of force and deploying new weapons systems to sensitive regions, to much closer cooperation with Russia’s ally Belarus and Chinese partners.

It’s important, however, that these measures be a response to existing and likely future security threats to Russia, rather than a provocation that would elicit new such threats. There’s no point in seeking to punish the West for its intransigence using military technology or military strategy. The main thing for Moscow is to maintain a robust policy of deterrence under any conceivable military, technological, and geopolitical conditions. Credible national security guarantees are not based on non-aggression pacts with a potential enemy, but on effective deterrence of any adversary.

Still, agreements can also be useful, if the terms are acceptable. The recent flurry of negotiations is just one round of the complex strategic game currently playing out before the world’s eyes. The United States and NATO have promised to present Russia with their own counterproposals (read: counterdemands). Backstage, the U.S. Congress is discussing new sanctions, the Kremlin is compiling a raft of countersanctions, and the Russian Defense Ministry is carrying out a joint exercise with the Belarusian armed forces. Major power relations remain essentially a power play.