EP DRAFT REPORT ON FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

Date: 18.10.2021

1. Two countries are particularly active in the field of elite capture and cooptation, namely Russia and China, with, for instance, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and former Prime Minister of Finland Paavo Lipponen having both joined Gazprom to speed up the application process for Nord Stream 1 and 2, former Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Karin Kneissl appointed board member of Rosneft, former Prime Minister of France François Fillon appointed board member of Zaroubejneft, former Prime Minister of France Jean-Pierre Raffarin actively engaged in promoting Chinese interests in France, and former Czech Commissioner Štefan Füle having worked for CEFC China Energy
2. The EP calls on the Commission to encourage and coordinate actions against elite capture, such as complementing the cooling-off periods for EU Commissioners with a reporting duty after the period, and structured rules to tackle elite capture at EU level;
3. The EP is concerned about integrated lobbying strategies combining industrial interests and foreign political goals, in particular when they favor the interests of an authoritarian state;
4. The EP calls for the EU institutions to reform the Transparency Register, including by introducing more stringent transparency rules, mapping foreign funding for EU-related lobbying, and ensuring an entry which allows for the identification of funding from foreign governments; The EP considers Australia’s Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme to be a good practice to follow;  
5. The EP calls on the Member States to consider the establishment of a foreign influence registration scheme and the creation of a government-managed register of declared activities undertaken for, or on behalf of, a foreign state, following the good practice of other like-minded democracies;  
6. The EP is concerned by the attempts to control the diasporas living on EU soil by foreign authoritarian states;
7. The EP points out the crucial role played by China’s United Front, which is a department reporting directly to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and tasked with coordinating the external interference strategy of China through the strict control of Chinese individuals and Chinese companies abroad; the EP points out the experiences of Australia and New Zealand in dealing with the United Front;
8. The EP underlines that the efforts of the Kremlin to implement so-called compatriot policies, particularly in the Baltic states and the Eastern Neighbourhood countries, are part of the geopolitical strategy of Putin’s regime whose aim is to divide societies in the EU, alongside the implementation of the concept of the ‘Russian world’, aimed at justifying expansionist actions by the regime;
9. The EP is alarmed by the extraterritorial application of coercive measures stemming from China’s new National Security Law, combined with the extradition agreements that China enjoys with other countries, enabling China to implement large-scale deterrence actions against critical non-Chinese nationals, for example, in a recent case, against two Danish parliamentarians;
10. The EP is worried about the number of European universities, schools and cultural centres engaged in partnerships with Chinese entities, including Confucius Institutes, which enable the theft of scientific knowledge and the exercise of strict control over all topics related to China in the field of research and teaching, thus constituting a violation of the constitutional protection of academic freedom and autonomy, and over the choices of cultural activities related to China; regrets, in particular, the decision taken by the museum of Nantes to cancel the exhibition on Genghis Kahn in 2020, following strong pressure from China opposing such an exhibition ;
11. The EP condemns the decision taken by the Hungarian Government to open a Fudan University branch while, at the same time, closing the Central European University in Budapest;
12. The EP is concerned about the increasing financial dependence of European universities on China and calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure proper budgetary allocations for European universities;
13. The EP calls on the Commission to propose legislation on increasing the transparency of the financing of universities, such as through mandatory donation declarations;
14. The EP is concerned about the increasing number of Confucius Institutes established around the world, and in particular in Europe, which are closely linked to the Chinese state; remarks that the Confucius Institutes changed their name in 2020 and are now known as the ‘Center for Language Education and Cooperation’; the EP points out the Confucius Institutes’ lack of legal status;
15. The EP calls on Member States and the Commission to support independent Chinese language courses without the involvement of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese state;
16. The EP believes that the recently established National China Centre in Sweden could serve as an important asset in giving context to the actions and communications of the Confucius Institutes;
17. The EP considers, in addition, that Confucius Institutes serve as a lobbying platform for Chinese economic interests and for the Chinese intelligence service and the recruitment of spies;
18. The EP recalls that many universities have decided to terminate their cooperation with Confucius Institutes because of the risks of Chinese espionage and interference, as did the universities of Dusseldorf in 2016, Brussels (VUB and ULB) in 2019, and Hamburg in 2020, and all universities in Sweden;
19.  The EP observes that foreign interference can also be pursued through influence in religious institutes, such as Russian influence in Orthodox churches, in particular in Serbia and Montenegro, including sowing division among local populations, developing a biased writing of history and promoting an anti-EU agenda, and Turkish influence through mosques in France and Germany;
20. The EP calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure better coordination on protecting religious institutes from foreign interference;

Summary

1. The European Parliament report is calling on the European Commission and EU countries to take a tougher stance on revolving doors and foreign-funded lobbies.
2. The draft report condemns the technique of co-opting top-level civil servants and former EU politicians used by foreign companies with links to governments actively engaged in interference actions against the EU. It also laments the “lack of tools and enforcement needed to prevent these practices.”
3. The draft report asks the European Commission to take action to combat “elite capture” — the quick turn of officials into lobbyists. It suggests “complementing the cooling-off periods for EU Commissioners with a reporting duty after the period, and structured rules to tackle elite capture at EU level.”
4. The draft report calls for a reform the of EU’s Transparency Register, the creation of a database to better track Brussels lobbying activity. It calls for “introducing more stringent transparency rules, mapping foreign funding for EU-related lobbying, and ensuring an entry which allows for the identification of funding from foreign governments.”
5. The draft report also recommends EU capitals to “consider the establishment of a foreign influence registration scheme and the creation of a government-managed register of declared activities undertaken for, or on behalf of, a foreign state, following the good practice of other like-minded democracies,” citing Australia’s system as “good practice to follow.”