RUSSIAN LOBBYING IN THE EU

Author: Pavel Kanevski, Lomonosov Moscow State University

Original Text edited by AALEP

Russian interest groups have been constantly learning how European policymaking works, using lobbying as an instrument of direct and indirect influence. However, fusion of business and government often makes it difficult for Russian interest groups, foremost business, to exercise influence abroad independently.   

The energy sector was and still remains probably the most influential voice of Russian corporate community in Europe despite the political turbulence caused by the Ukraine crisis. It is also an example when business interests coincide with the governments’ political and security goals. Energy pressure groups’ tactics is a vivid example of how Russian mechanism of international lobbying generally works in the EU.

It can be divided into three categories:

A) Influencing policy makers and leadership in the European countries and the European Union institutions;

B) Hiring lobbying firms;

C) Interaction within the organizations representing business interests: chambers of commerce, trade associations, industry unions etc.

Influencing policy makers and leadership directly might be the most difficult, but also the most effective way to reach ultimate goals. Gazprom, for instance has an established network of contacts with many top officials and business communities in Germany, Italy, Austria and other countries.

As the Russian government and business see the EU decision making as a complicated and bureaucratized process, they often find it more efficient to build “bypassing” influence networks using close ties with the stakeholders in major European capitals, especially those having ramified contacts across the region. Gazprom follows the European law framework, but when it comes to lobbying new projects or changing the legislation, it would rather use its extensive connections beyond the official cabinets.

Before the Ukraine crisis, Russian energy interests had more space for maneuver because there was an institutionalized mechanism – the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue. It gave a possibility to organize meetings between the European Commission, Russian energy corporations, state officials, diplomats and experts from both sides. Despite the fact that the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue is not functioning, Russian energy interests are still well represented in Europe.  

Hiring professional lobbyists and acting through associations are rather seen as additional layers aimed at spreading a wider image of Russian corporate sector or Russian government’s actions abroad. Russia’s interests in Brussels are very narrow, mainly relating to energy and some infrastructure projects. The same refers to professional organizations. Russian companies are members of a number of organizations, including BUSINESSEUROPE, FuelsEurope, CONCAWE, CEFIC, European Energy Forum etc. But these also usually relate to energy interests. Prospects to build a wider industrial cooperation didn’t fulfill the promises.

Russian lobbying in the EU heavily relies on top-down approach, individual ties between the major decision makers. At the same time it has a relatively poor communication with the key policy making centers, experts and the public opinion. Russian tactics of influence comprises of narrow short-term interests and is aimed at generating a more favorable environment for its big businesses. It coincides with the government’s intentions to the extent that Russia heavily relies on commodities exports and its economic security is largely connected with the big energy corporations’ potential to extend their networks of influence and supply markets.  

There are several reasons why current mechanism has only limited influence on European policy making. A top-down approach depends on high-profile decision makers who are ready to be mediators between different sides. To some extent, Russia still has sympathizers, but there are much fewer of those who represent mainstream centrist politics; many derive from non-systemic, often populist forces. It is still not clear to what extent it helps Russia politically, but it is obvious that it doesn’t help Russia to spread its rational economic interests. A decisive factor of Russian weak lobbying capabilities in Europe relates to inability to build strong coalition networks, including NGOs and the media. Many policy makers in Russia, including representatives of the business and diplomacy circles, see European lobbying system either as a very simple (“big business decides everything”), or as a too complicated one (“alignment of interests is beyond understanding”). Corporate sector might indeed possess majority of resources in most of the policy areas, but still it doesn’t explain why corporate interests often lose to public interests. Decisions made in the EU depend not only on resources, but also on public interests. Public policy can be a dangerous water for many interest groups, because it  involves the public opinion and those who formulate it – politicians, media, NGOs, civic leaders etc.

While Russia may be strong in maintaining narrow corporate and governmental interests, it has much less impact on public policies.

One of the biggest weaknesses of Russian attitude towards Europe, especially for the last decade, was to consider the government as the leading actors in bilateral and multilateral ties. In the end it led to simplified model of interaction where lobbying serves interests of the few and doesn’t engage wider public both in Russia and in Europe. Russian government couldn’t overcome its negative attitude towards NGOs, furthermore, it did a lot to eradicate and limit NGOs influence inside the country, not to mention their possibilities to be active actors in the West. Spread of allied Government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) that translated governmental position into policy making areas, was a continuation of top-down approach. Their potential proved to be weak when it came to confronting politicized issues relating to security or sanctions.

As a result, Russian lobbying efforts in Europe have a very limited capacity. They can be overcome using remaining communication within the big business networks and some key policy makers, but it will almost be impossible to rebalance the overall situation towards business as usual, especially until sanctions are in place. Yet Russia didn’t waste all of its possibilities to build a better communication network, but it has to engage into public policies more systematically, using societal, while diplomacy has to become more sophisticated and rely more on second and third track support, including expert networks and public diplomacy. In addition, there are areas that will remain relatively immune to geopolitical instability: science and innovation, academia, small and medium enterprises  all of which could add to bottom-up approach and lead Russia-EU relations away from the enclosed circle.

In sum, international lobbying model used by Russia lacks diversification and participation of more actors representing wider societal interests. In a certain sense, Russia repeats many mistakes made by the Soviet Union, restricting pluralism and independence of its own interest groups. However, there is a bigger problem for Russia that concerns the very nature of decision making. Since the late Soviet era informal personal and group ties have been the basis for understanding how lobbying works. Lobbying in Russia is a process hardly regulated by the government or the civil society. Since the early 1990s, Russia went through five waves of discussion on how to formalize lobbying, every time ending with a law draft that never saw approval by the parliament.

For Russia Europe remains the most important source of investment, modernization and energy supply region, while Europe is interested in exploring the vast potential of the Russian market. So far, Russia and the EU have managed to preserve their key interests in mutually beneficial areas, such as trade, energy and investment, despite the political turmoil in the region and loss of trust. Russian and European interest groups continue to influence policy makers on both side notwithstanding the more aggressive political rhetoric. To what extent will interest groups remain intact and will they be able to counter security issues that dominate Russia-EU relations discourse, is an open question. But it is obvious that as long as Russia continues to follow top down approach, limiting number of participating non-governmental actors and avoiding public policy issues in Europe, its capacity will not be sufficient to promote its long-term strategic interests.