GEOPOLITICS AT PLAY

There are only three countries in the world that are rightly regarded as primary powers- the U.S., Russia and China. These three are the only superpowers. All others are secondary powers (Australia, Canada, Germany, France, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom) or tertiary powers (India, Iran, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates).

Geopolitics

United States versus Europe

For the U.S., with Europe in the grip of a political, economic, and financial identity crisis, this situation allows Washington to ‘manage’ the U.S. economic recovery especially now that the traditional British ally, thanks to Brexit, is released from the obligations that tied it to Brussels. Moreover, at a geostrategic level, the continuing European crisis allows the U.S. to gain time in making costly decisions and responsibilities in financial terms in the theaters of North Africa and the Middle East.

United States versus China

China is the greatest geopolitical threat to the U.S. because of its economic and technological advances and its ambition to push the U.S. out of the Pacific sphere of influence. The United States still holds a technological record, but it will have to deal with the growing Chinese and Russian interests in the sector. As for regional influence in Asia, even there the U.S. will have to deal with the growing and divergent interests not only of China, but also Japan, Vietnam, and South Korea. The U.S. and China have a long-running rap sheet of geopolitical problems that at any moment could cause a spike in tensions and possibly an armed conflict in the future. From the East and South China Seas to Taiwan, the fate of which controls Asia’s commons and waterways and straits, both nations seem set to face off over who will not only dominate Asia, but the much larger Indo-Pacific region.

United States versus Russia

Russia may be a threat to some of its neighbors, but it is far less a threat to U.S. strategic interests.

Russia versus Europe

For Russia a weak European Union would be more malleable in relation to the Ukrainian issue and the sanctions regime that has influenced the Russian economy since 2014. A European Union weakened in the medium and long term is at the mercy of the strategic interests of the U.S., since the EU is the eastern periphery of the U.S. geopolitical system, built at the end of the Second World war. Ultimately, in the absence of a political EU, the true European ‘glue’ consists only of NATO’s military-diplomatic device.

Russia versus China

Russia, while it might not want to admit it at the moment, has its own China problem. For now, both Moscow and Beijing talk of a close partnership, growing economic linkages, energy deals, and even robust sales of Russia’s most advanced military equipment. At least on the surface, all seems well between the two great powers. But not for long. Over the long term, Moscow especially has much to be concerned about when it comes to Beijing’s intentions. First, there is China’s massive one belt, one road initiative that will help interconnect large sections of the old Soviet Union’s Central Asian assets into China’s orbit. Combined with massive energy deals between these former Soviet republics and Beijing and greater economic advantages in working with China than Russia, Moscow must be concerned that parts of what it likes to call its “near abroad” could slide firmly into Beijing’s near control over time. Next, there is the unfavorable balance of military arms that, as the years go on, will not favor Moscow. As China continues to receive some of Russia’s most advanced pieces of military equipment, China will most likely pilfer and reproduce such technology as it has done in the past-only to include it in indigenous weapons systems or sell it for far cheaper prices, competing directly against Russia in the lucrative arms sales market. Even more dangerous is that Russia’s own military technology could be used against it if a clash between the Russians and Chinese ever occurred—and history shows that is not out of the question. Lastly, Russia and China have had a contentious past and Beijing might someday seek payback for perceived past historical wrongs. When Chinese officials speak of a century of humiliation, many consider that to be a result of unequal treaties and dealings with Western European powers. However, some Chinese look to parts of Asiatic Russia as part of classic China and may someday, when much stronger, make claims to this area like Beijing does now to various islands and waterways in the South China Sea. With China claiming Okinawa, Vladivostok, when Beijing is far more powerful, could be the next outlandish territorial prize.

China versus Europe

A fragmented Europe, unable to have a coherent and unitary policy of infrastructural development, does not have to use force to negotiate with China. For this reason, a weak Europe is convenient for China. For Beijing it is easier and cheaper to negotiate with individual EU countries, and in some cases with regional administrations. Moreover, the absence of a truly European foreign policy allows China to operate in Africa without real competitors apart from the U.S. and Russia.

Europe versus Russia

Europe does not have a Russian policy instead the EU is divided between national and mercantile interests and positions of principle. The economic stake that many EU member states have in relation with Russia makes it difficult to come up with a coherent, coordinated Russian Policy. Russia is so big and diverse that states as different as Cyprus, Estonia and Portugal will never agree a single Russian policy. The European Union is not yet a strategic unit, and the most of what it can so in terms of traditional foreign policy- economic relations are excluded- is to coordinate the actions of its member states on a particular set of issues and for a limited period of time. This fully applies to the EU’s approach toward Russia. Moreover, Russia for Europe is also a military security issue, and this falls under the mandate of NATO, where leadership has always belonged to the United States. Russia presents a special challenge to the EU countries. Those countries’ national interests, historical experience, and emotional attitudes toward Russia vary widely. Those with the least interest in and the most grievances against Russia, such as Poland and the Baltic States, are pitted against those with stronger interests and historical affinities linking them to Russia, like Italy and Greece. The countries between those two extremes, including France and Germany find it hard to lead on formulating a long-term strategy and forging a common approach. Europe needs to leverage its own way into a more substantial relationship with Russia and start convincing Moscow it is a serious partner.

Conclusion

A logical balance of power in the world would be for the U.S. and Russia to find common ground in the containment of China and to jointly pursue the reduction of Chinese power.  This would not be done out of wishful thinking but as simple matter of geopolitical necessity. In any three-party struggle to gain global control, the dynamic is simple. Two of the powers align explicitly or implicitly against the third. The two-aligned powers refrain from using their power against each other in order to conserve it for use against the third power. While it might not happen right away, there is the very real possibility that the stars could align for Russia and America to take on China in the future. Stranger parings have occurred in the past. Tomorrow Moscow could be a partner in containing a common foe.