AD-HOC ISSUE COALITIONS AND NEW PLATFORMS IN THE EU

Lobbyists need information on policy proposals, intelligence on policy developments, and knowledge of the positions of other advocates active on a policy debate. Much of this can be gathered from simply talking with other lobbyists and thus some level of networking is expected on every issue. But the question remains: why move beyond networking to build more formal ad hoc issue coalitions? An ad hoc issue coalition is a very specific type of coalition of groups, one which forms for a single discrete issue fight. Ad-hoc issue coalitions are characterized by low levels of formalization and high levels of autonomy for the coalitions’ members. They are established in the short to medium term for the duration of a single legislative or regulatory debate. While some issue coalitions may last longer, they remain a coalition of autonomous groups, they do not establish their own direct membership or organizational structure. There is usually a coalition leader organizing the efforts of the members, regular meetings of the coalition members, joint lobbying actions such as joint letters, advertisements or press conferences and very often an official name for the coalition and even letterhead and a secretariat acting as the headquarters of the coalition . Ad-hoc coalitions are most often composed of different types of groups or associations representing different sets of interests.

The concept of ad-hoc issue coalitions should not be confused with the concept of “Advocacy coalitions” which is a much broader theoretical construct than a discrete set of groups that have organized themselves for a single issue fight.

Groups can choose to work alone, or through their federation, or through an hired lobbyist but the ad-hoc advocacy coalition offers unique advantages. Coalitions can be beneficial to interest groups in a political fight in two regards: 1) The coalition can signal to policymakers that a policy position has the support of a large and varied group of interests; and 2) The coalition can provide a framework for more efficient use of resources. Policymakers look for signs that a policy proposal has broad support. In political systems where policymakers are elected, they will want to know whether a vote in favor of a provision could prove later to be detrimental to them in an election. If a large majority of the public is opposed to a proposal which a policymaker supports, he or she could pay for it in the next election . Thus coalitions can signal to policymakers where the bulk of support lies. Coalitions can also indicate that advocates have worked out differences among themselves before approaching government officials and thus their final position is one that can be supported by a the majority of the legislature and the public . A coalition can thus garner more political support for a policy position by indicating a large set of interests already support the position. From a resource efficiency standpoint, coalitions have the potential to pool the resources of their members, and thus coalition activity can be more economical. Almost all discussions of interest group coalitions refer to resource sharing as a benefit of coalition advocacy. If members in the coalition contribute some funds it lightens the burden on any one advocate. Moreover, if coalition members divide up the lobbying work among them they can more efficiently use the resources of the collective in the given policy fight. In addition, joining a coalition can be a relatively low-cost tactic and a rational lobbyist may incorporate this one tool along with many others in their advocacy strategy . Since coalitions send cues to policymakers about the desirability of a policy option and since they pool scarce resources, advocates have an incentive to join them. However there are also costs associated with coalition membership; some money and time need to be devoted to the coalition and a group may need to modify their position on an issue to be in line with the coalition position. In addition, groups in crowded advocacy communities have an incentive to differentiate themselves from other interest groups in order to attract membership. In short, there are also forces pushing groups to work alone.

 Factors Influencing the Decision to Join an Advocacy Coalition

Three critical streams of factors must be taken into consideration: the institutional structure in which the advocate is operating, the nature of the policy issue at hand, and characteristics of the interest group. At the institutional level, the democratic accountability of policymakers is a key institutional factor regarding  the decision to join a coalition. Ad-hoc issue coalitions have two advantageous qualities: they pool resources and they signal to policymakers the breadth of support for a policy position. All things equal, advocates have some base level of attraction to coalitions since they efficiently pool resources, but that attraction increases in political systems where policymakers are highly attuned to cues about public support for policy proposals, as they are when they are directly elected.

In the EU, the actors reporting on coalition activity focus more on resource sharing, rather than conveying the sheer breadth of support. Their aim is to share information and work out the details of their position before they approach policymakers. The aim is to find convergences and work out the technical details The highest percentage of advocates joining coalitions in the EU are doing so on issues that have opposing perspectives fighting against each other. In the EU, trade associations are the type of advocate most commonly active in coalitions. However, citizen groups are second most likely to engage in coalition activity but they must have some level of resources to foot the bill that coalition activity requires.

Conclusion

The characteristics of the advocate themselves determine if they will work closely with other organizations in an ad hoc issue coalition. Different types of actors engage in coalition activity at varying levels. Importantly, citizen groups see an advantage in banning together and, in the process, showing their solidarity and pooling their resources. Finally, coalition membership requires some threshold of resources in both polities, with advocates supported by medium and large offices more likely to engage in coalition activity. 

NEW PLATFORMS IN THE EU  

Platforms are structures where companies, associations or Institutions unite around a common project. There are  five main types of platforms:

1. Public/private partnership platforms,
2. Shop window platforms,
3. Counter balance platforms,
4. Classic industrial platforms,
5. Platforms created as lobbying tools.

Public/private partnership platforms

This is the most common at the moment, giving the European Commission the opportunity to promote dialogue with civil society on a given theme.

Examples

1. EU Platform for Action on Diet, Physical Activity and Health. Launched and financed by the European Commission, the platform unites an important range of actors: the food industry, retailers, advertisers, consumer associations, health NGOs, scientists and experts on obesity. This vast and learned assembly focuses on discussion rather than partnership: the role of the platform is to unite, exchange, experiment, and disseminate information; it is not about taking decisions.
2. The Photovoltaïc energy platform unites very complementary members: producers, universities, technology institutes. The Commission supports and finances it, but gives the members of the platform great freedom to put in place a dynamic and coherent strategy destined to ensure the rapid development of photovoltaïc energy in Europe.
3. European Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Platform,
4. Energy Performance in Building Directive (EPBD Buildings Platform).

Shop window platforms

Shop window platforms are  meant to inform, to communicate, and to disseminate information. They normally correspond to the desire of an industrial sector or company to improve its image in the eyes of the citizen or consumer.

Examples

1.  European Food Information Council (EUFIC), composed of the primary agri-food multinationals, who are also members of CIAA Confederation of Agri-Food Industries (Coca-Cola, Ferrero, Danone, Kraft, Masterfoods, Pepsico, Unilever…);
2. Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform (SAI Platform), also composed of large food companies, some of which are also members of EUFIC: Coca-Cola, Danone, Kraft, McCain, McDonalds, Nestlé, Unilever…

These two platforms are very professional, they have substantial budgets, good websites, excellent presentation, and the capacity to sensitise the consumer to the need for a balanced diet (EUFIC) and to convince them of the food industry’s scrupulous respect for the environment (SAI Platform). These two platforms are primarily communication tools and simple communication tools situated in the orbit of the CIAA (Confederation of Agri-food industries of the EU)

Counter Balance platforms

Counter-balance plaforms correspond to situations where, being unable to merge, small structures unite around a platform to try and create a counter-balance to a dominant structure.

Examples

1. European Initiative for Sustainable Development in Agriculture (EISA) which unites a series of dynamic associations from 7 Member States around the concept of sustainable agriculture.   
2. Platform for sustainable and united agriculture

Industrial platforms

Industrial platforms are usually composed of companies, often in association with universities, with the aim of promoting technological innovation and industrial development in their sector. These technological platforms are equally active in the EU’s Research and Development programmes.

Examples

1. Mobile and Wireless Communications Technology Platform (composed notably of Ericsson, Siemens, Nokia, Motorola, France Telecom and Vodafone, and in association notably with the University of Technology of Warsaw);
2. European Robotics Platform (composed of Acrobat Company Ltd, Philips, Bosch, Thales, Sagem Defence & Security, and Mitsubishi Electric Neuronics, in association with numerous European universities).

Platforms created as lobbying tools

Confronted by heavy lobbying dossiers and often represented by weak European associations, large multinationals examine the possibility of creating ad- hoc structures capable of flexibility (in their composition) and strength (in their actions).

Examples

1. The Platform for Ingredients in Europe (PIE) composed of around 15 companies (including ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Danisco, Roquette, Tate & Lyle …) in order to defend the food ingredients dossier together before the European Institutions;
2. The European Basic Foods Platform created by Lactalis, Bunge and Nutrinveste to defend the interests of the first transformation industry in difficult dossiers like nutrition labelling and health claims.

Platforms created as lobbying tools will see major developments in the years to come. Not only will they multiply, but they will also oblige the classical European associations to reexamine their structures, their membership, their actions, and their communication.