THE NEED FOR AN EU STRATEGIC NARRATIVE

At the recent Malta Summit, Chancellor Angela Merkel rightly pointed out  that “ The more strongly the EU is clear about how it defines its role in the world, the better it can tend its transatlantic relations.''

Indeed, the EU need to develop a clear strategic narrative based on straightforward principles that it can act upon. Such a narrative should transcend the notion of a ‘security strategy’ and cover the whole array of closely intertwined EU foreign policy matters, including trade. It needs to sketch out a credible European vision of global governance for the 21st century, which clearly articulates what the EU wants to achieve and with whom as well as how it can achieve its objectives — for its own benefit and that of the planet. This narrative needs to resonate with other players and has to be accepted as a valid vision of the (future) world order.

The Union’s narrative should be based on both internal and external considerations. On the one hand, it needs to rest on objectives that reflect the Union’s interests, values and goals in a coherent and non‑redundant manner. On the other hand, it needs to demonstrate context‑awareness, and base itself on comprehensive analysis of the evolving global order, and the interests, values and objectives of other state and non‑state actors. It should be clear, for example, which role the EU foresees for a body such as the G20 in the future world order.

The Union’s strategy should moreover be designed in a forward‑looking manner. Rather than grounding its strategic approach solely on past experience, the Union stands to benefit from anticipations of future political developments across various policy areas.

In designing it strategic narrative, the EU needs to prioritise its objectives and operate with varying time horizons, separating the long term from the short term. Although the Union’s ultimate objectives and underlying values are to be maintained, smaller steps and compromises with third parties may be needed to effectively attain them. In this context, it should also strive to integrate existing strategies on certain issue areas or for specific geographical zones, which often come with short- or medium-term objectives, into the overarching strategy.

The fluctuating global order requires the EU to opt for an adaptive, ‘liquid strategy’. Whereas its narrative must provide the necessary guidance, the Union also needs to empower itself to become more flexible in its day‑to‑day operations.

The EU needs to act in sync with other actors: if they want to put their interests in line, their interests need to be addressed; if they argue on a value basis, the EU can try to persuade them of its own values. Instead of swimming against the stream, the EU needs to adopt a behaviour that is appropriate to the context.

 Greater consistency between rhetoric and activities is key: the EU’s credibility with external actors suffers whenever it acts out of line with its principles and declared values. In this context, the EU needs to put its money where its mouth is, or it will face challenges to its own legitimacy.

In the multilateral sphere, if multilateralism is really changing, so should be the EU. In a ‘multilateralism 2.0’ context, it needs to take greater account of non-state actors and do more to address the legitimacy demands that its own citizens and third country citizens have vis-à-vis its foreign policy activities.

In similar vein, in bilateral relations, it should be able to listen to partners and address their interests and values instead of imposing its own ideas. This is especially true for relations which are supposedly asymmetrical and in which the EU is considered as the stronger partner — not just in the neighbourhood, but also beyond. ‘It will need to become more convincing with its arguments and positions, and more willing to engage with third countries on an equal basis — less hectoring, and more collaboration to pursue jointly agreed goals’.  This also implies that the EU needs to be more modest in its foreign policies: it will need to scale down ambitions and focus on what is attainable.

Regarding the U.S.A.

The key question is whether the EU will retain enough cohesion to speak with a single voice on a wide range of international issues, or remain a limited grouping defined by its members’ different national identities, political cultures, and foreign policies.

But European unity faces significant limits. National identities remain stronger than a common European identity. Right-wing populist parties have included EU institutions among the targets of their xenophobia.

For US diplomats, however, the danger is not a Europe that becomes too strong, but one that is too weak. When Europe and America remain allied, their resources are mutually reinforcing. Neither a strong US nor a strong Europe threaten the vital or important interests of the other. But a Europe that weakens could damage both sides.