LOBBYING AND COALITION BUILDING AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL

Traditional political coalition building and victories are not sufficient to bring about immediate results in the European context. Even a political force with a clear cut majority in the EP cannot be certain of delivering completely on its manifesto commitments, due to the inter-institutional dimension of the EU. Even a winning force, with a significant majority in the EP, would further need to convince: the policy-makers within the different institutions; the Commission; and the majority of Member States in the Council.

It also has to take into account a large number of existing agreements - plus initiatives that have already been approved, committed to and financed. The consequences of the inter-institutional dimension of decision making in Brussels reduces the weight of political parties or political Groups in the EP compared to the national level. Coalition building is less stable, less ideological and more related to projects. The European "adhocracy" is taking decisions based on compromise between winning ad-hoc coalitions in Council, Commission and EP.  Even if influence and feed-back exist, coalitions within the Council and the EP are never exactly homothetic to coalitions between Member States in the Council. In every institution, the geometry of coalitions remains highly variable according to issues and group politics. As a result, the outcome of EU policy making is much less predictable than in the national arena. Some view this complexity, and the weak role played by pan-European political forces, as a factor for the lack of interest in European elections. Other consider that the greater independence enjoyed by MEP compared to the strict discipline that prevails in many national Parliament is rather creating a democratic surplus in the European Parliamentary life: discussions and options are more open; consensus based on substance is more frequent than frontal opposition based on ideology; green lines are given to the Executive with less automaticity. Hence there is the need for more complex coalitions in the European context to develop between political and administrative elites, different political groups, and representatives of different nation states.

"External" forces exerted on the decision making system play the role of a catalyst in  building heterogeneous coalitions. These include private companies, law firms, NGOs, trade unions, and foreign lobbies - including representative of Member States. They all  try to bridge gaps in information and use contacts to build up consensus, set an agenda, reach the decision and obtain the type of implementation aimed for. Together, those different and heterogeneous actors are building "policy networks" in Brussels. They help in preparing decisions with the Commission and the relevant Committees of the EP, they help in the legislative process to convince reluctant political groups or Member States. They help in creating compromises when the decisions come to comitology for implementation. Yet the activity of policy networks goes beyond Brussels. They create a bridge between institutions and interested citizens, businesses and NGOs in Member States: Policy networks are  coordinating the authorised institutions inter se and with their most identifiable policy addressees . Policy networks plays a part of the role that large political parties with their specific policy departments (foreign affairs, agriculture, industrial affairs, economic affairs) used to play and are still playing at national level. The involvement of private interests remains yet to be adequately understood by the public and be put in check by the institutions: The networks in which so much of the European Union decisions are made involve an implicit bargain actors in which the latter trade their co-operation in the realisation of policy for the benefit of a pan-European regulatory framework and a measure of public legitimation at that level. Coalition building are well be on the move with increased demand of citizens organizations to be part of policy networks as well as increased demand of non EU companies to have a voice share in it. The EP is becoming more and more the public forum for complex coalition building on EU regulatory frameworks. The EP with its elected members, national and pan-European political forces, numerous contacts with foreign governments and Parliaments, structured relations with business associations, NGOs, trade unions, collaboration with national Parliaments and regional authorities is the place where coalition building become public.

Coalition building  indeed has to be more open, more public and contested. For such a process to be efficient and to gather democratic support, one has to be careful in:

• giving a real role in agenda setting for the political forces present in the EP - alongside European Council heads of governments, and members of the Commission and Council. This role can be secured by inter-institutional arrangements and framework agreements as well as by a more intensive use of the legal initiative procedure;
• centring EP rapporteurs as key for coalition building, in close cooperation from the earliest stage possible with the Commissioner responsible;
• keeping the role of lobbyists secondary to the political initiatives in order to avoid regulation capture.