WHY NOT A TWO-SPEED EUROPE?

Under a two-speed Europe, those that want true political and economic integration may forge ahead unfettered by the skeptics on the sidelines. Outsiders can always stay linked though the single market, but without the power to prevent greater unity in the core.

Multispeed Europe already works in the EU’s most important policies. 9 EU nations are outside the eurozone. Britain and Ireland are happy beyond Schengen’s borders. Denmark shuns Europe’s Common Security and Defence policy. The Poles joined the Brits in opting out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights while the Czechs keep them company outside the Fiscal Compact. Institutionalizing a two-speed Europe would merely recognise a reality that works.

All EU nations cannot be squeezed into the same policy framework. The German and Greek economies do not move at the same speed, nor should their economic policies. A two speed Europe would be adaptable to members’ specific problems. If Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy were not locked into a German-designed straight-jacket of euro rules they could have devaluated their way out of the crisis long ago.

Getting all 28 members to agree on policies quickly is near impossible. By allowing like-minded nations to push ahead waiting for everybody to climb on board, a two-speed Europe would give the EU the flexibility it needs to deal swiftly and decisively with economic and political crises. Think how much time and energy could have been saved if small nations that reject EU treaties could be quietly parked in the Union’s second-class waiting room.

Not all EU member states are on the same page. There are deep divisions within the Union regarding what deeper integration actually means and how far it should go. Alongside the age-old intergovernmental-versus-federal, new fault-lines are developing regarding the sequencing and nature of integration. Some member states are pushing for an urgent cessation of member state competences first, followed by institutional arrangements to cater for more democratic accountability at EU level. Others insist that a “political union” should precede the loss of national sovereignty.

A two speed Europe  assumes and accepts that not all member states will integrate in the same way and to the same degree, but rather that sub-sets of members may go further than others.  ‘Outsiders would continue to be bound to the EU by the single market and the existing acquis communautaire. Outsiders would not be allowed to pick and choose which aspects of the acquis to comply with, but neither would they be called upon to follow the tighter federal rules of the core. They would be free to move into the core, provided they met the conditions, but could not cherry pick from the core and would have to choose to be either in or out of it. Noncore citizens would not need to be persuaded about the benefits of more Europe, because their member state would have chosen to do without it. The need to address the EU’s political deficit would simply not be felt as starkly in this looser circle of EU members.

A two-speed Europe could ultimately be beneficial for its member states. It would benefit members supporting a deeper economic and political integration as they would have opportunity to progress with common policies. However the “outsiders” would not have as much power to prevent greater unity as they do now. The strongest argument for two-speed Europe is that one size does not fit all. It is impossible to allocate all EU states into one policy framework as all the differences have to be considered. The economies of the EU member states do not move at the same speed nor do their economic policies. Thus a two-speed Europe would be more adaptable to member-specific levels and interests. Finally, a two-speed Europe would provide more flexibility on making decisions upon policies quicker than it is at the moment where 28 members are struggling to find consensus.

The idea of a two-speed Europe would be beneficial for its members and for the European Union itself. States that are ready for deeper integration of their strong economies would be able to move forward by creating a strong union which could be based on federalism. On the other hand, members like UK or Denmark who are not willing to join the Euro-zone would remain in the EU within a second group with less powers but benefits from the single market.