EU-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP AND MEMBER STATES' BILATERAL RELATIONS

Bilateral relations: Obstacles and Catalysts for the EU-Russian relationship

EU policy-making towards Russia has always been characterized by the push and pull factors of diverse national (i.e. domestic) and EU-level incentives and constraints. Two points are important to make, and which are important to understand the way in which the EU’s common policy towards Russia has developed.

First, different domestic priorities and differences in power between the Member States have, since the EU’s eastward enlargement, resulted in internal conflicts about the most appropriate course of action to be taken regarding Russia.

Second, the large Member States, in particular Germany and France (but also the UK), have often been most influential in the EU-Russian relationship, but they do not share the same history with Russia as the Central, East European and Northern member states. Germany’s relationship with Russia is also very different from the French-Russian relationship, due to historical, economic and domestic political reasons. The same is true for the Central, East European and Northern states: different incentives and constraints have produced a range of different approaches and responses to Russia, despite many similarities that they share due to their comparable historical experiences with Russia. The point is therefore that it matters which EU countries take the lead on a specific issue concerning Russia, how their bilateral relations with Russia have developed, and how the other Member States’ interests align with theirs.

Russia has made clear that only a small group of EU Member States, notably Germany, France and Italy but also Spain, Finland and Greece are deemed to be a particular “resource for advancing Russia’s national interests in European and world affairs and that cooperation with these states contributes to stabilization and growth. Among the twenty-eight Member States, Germany and Italy are the two that maintain by far the largest trade volumes with Russia. France, and to a lesser extent the UK and the Netherlands are important strategic partners for Russia concerning the transfer of modern technology in the energy sector. Despite distinct differences in their relations with Russia, these countries have in common that they on occasion prevented or slowed down the EU’s policy making on difficult issues, advocating a ‘softer’ approach to Russia and concessions, rather than a harder line.

The Russian view of these relationships as ‘special’ and ‘a resource for advancing Russia’s national interests,’ and the fact that EU Member States with privileged access to Russia were in most cases very happy to reciprocate the special treatment they received, has hampered the EU’s ability to pursue a strong common policy. It made it also difficult for the EU to exert pressure on Russia regarding human rights violations, problems with judicial practices and to address discriminatory Russian trade practices more effectively (as many Member States chose to settle these bilaterally). It is certainly no coincidence that the countries that have most frequently been blamed for the EU’s inability to punch its weight in relations with Russia include Germany, France, Italy and Greece. Their support for a ‘softer’ EU policy on Russia used to be attributed to their ‘special’ bilateral relations.

Special relations as a driving force for the EU-Russian ‘partnership’

However, rather than just being a hinder to the EU’s relations with Russia, the countries that were considered special partners of Russia played also a productive role in the development of the EU’s Russia policy. At key junctures in the evolution of the EU-Russian relationship, and often together with France, Germany setting the tone and agenda of EU initiatives towards Russia. 

A group of Member States, among them also Hungary, Cyprus, Italy and Greece has received increasingly positive attention by Russia.

The most prominent argument about the EU’s many failures regarding Russia is that divisions among the Member States undermine the EU’s credibility, bargaining position and effectiveness. If the Member States just managed to speak with one voice, the EU’s policy towards Russia would be much more effective.

The EU’s failures can be attributed to its special structure, composition and nature which is neither conducive to quick decision-making nor to the adoption and pursuit of fast and powerful responses. The Russian President has central control over the Russian state apparatus, its intelligence services and key economic actors and he has the capacity and willingness to quickly take decisions and implement them. This places the EU, as a different kind of actor, in a difficult position.

Conclusion

The approach towards Russia that governs the EU’s and different Member States’ engagement with Russia, and the political and practical difficulties associated with the EU’s nature as a special kind of international actor, help explain why and how the EU-Russian relationship hit ‘rock bottom’ in a way that many policy-makers in the EU did not anticipate.

When it comes to foreign affairs EU institutions cannot bypass national policies. The problem lies not with weak EU institutions, but with competing national foreign policies which cannot be easily overridden clearly, it would be desirable for the EU to agree a common policy on Russia and execute it accordingly. However, simply asserting this will not make it happen. Due to their different cultures and historical experiences, EU Member States have different and sometimes competing interests and approaches to foreign policy. It is not enough for Member States to decide whether a given issue would be better resolved at the EU level, they also have to agree what the ultimate objective is and how it ought to be achieved, and this is where it gets problematic.

Putting in place an elaborate bureaucratic structure at the EU level in the form of the EEAS has not miraculously consolidated 28 foreign policies into one. Where EU Member States can agree both on what they want to achieve and how they want to achieve it, the EEAS can facilitate this process. On Russia however this is far from the case.

Countries Mentioned

1. Germany
2. France
3. Italy
4. United Kingdom
5. Netherlands
6. Greece
7. Hungary
8. Spain
9. Finland
10. Cyprus