WHY LOBBY ALLIED AND OPPOSING POLICYMAKERS ?

The question of why organized interests lobby allies rather than opponents, or vice versa, goes to the heart of what lobbying is about. Basically, two different approaches can be distinguished on how to conceptualize lobbying and both approaches have different implications for whether, why and how allied or opposing policymakers are targeted. On the one hand, one can conceive lobbying somewhat narrowly by focusing predominantly on the interaction between an organized interest and policymakers related to one single issue whereby the first transmits information to the latter in order to move a policy outcome closer to its ideal point. On the other hand, although lobbying will usually concentrate on a particular issue, in many instances the policy environment consists of multiple, often related, issues situated in varying policymaking stages. Moreover, on several issues the views of policymakers are not well-defined, for instance because they pay less attention to these issues and therefore lack information that allows them to adopt a well thought through policy position. This implies that the decision who to lobby on an issue is not only shaped by the need to realize a success on one single issue, but also by considerations that go beyond this particular issue, such as the need to develop long-term relations with a diverse set of policymakers .

When we conceive lobbying primarily as a strategic information transmission related to a specific policy issue, there might be reasons to lobby both opponents, uncommitted policymakers, on the one hand, and allies, on the other hand . The basic logic of lobbying opponents and uncommitted policymakers is that lobbyists aim to persuade policymakers to change their mind and adopt a position more in line with the lobbyist’s position. Often, such interactions are perceived as an exchange of specialized issue-specific information between a lobbyist, who possesses this information, and a policymaker, who lacks this information. In return the lobbyist gains some policy influence. Such a strategy sounds perfectly rational. Lobbyists will lobby those policymakers for which the probability that they will change their mind is the highest , which by definition, excludes policymakers that are the closest to the lobbyists’ position, i.e. strong allies, and those that are the furthest from their position, i.e. strong enemies. Rather, lobbyists will focus on policymakers that have not yet adopted a clear position and those that they can rationally expect to persuade.

Despite the logical consistency of this argument, much research shows that lobbyists target more often allies, i.e. policymakers that already agree with them.  Those who conceive lobbying primarily as a persuasive act to convince opponents explain such friendly lobbying as counter-active lobbying, namely if an opposing interest tries to convince a likeminded policymaker, a lobbyist will target their allies in an attempt to prevent these allies to change their mind . In other words, this reasoning suggests that only if other lobbyists try to persuade uncommitted policymakers or opponents (who are another lobbyist’s allies), lobbying allies becomes a rational activity. Yet, there are several problems with this argument. In highly competitive settings, where many interest groups seek to convince opponents, many actors would end up lobbying allies in order to construct walls against opponents. But if the policy environment is full of walls, lobbying opponents becomes a futile and costly enterprise. Therefore, the higher the number of lobbyists seeking influence and the more competitive the overall environment, the higher the likelihood that interest groups target allies instead of opponents. This means that in highly competitive settings lobbying allies may at some point prevail over lobbying opponents. The major problem is that the theory of counter-active lobbying does not explain why the lobbying of allies, which is generally observed as the most common strategy, may be intrinsically rational. This would imply that counter-action is not necessarily the only mechanism that drives the lobbying of allies. Especially a fluid policy environment provides a setting in which friendly lobbying makes sense. Due to the complexity and diversity of the policy agenda, many policymakers are forced to be ‘issue-generalists’. Politicians thus need expert information to accommodate for the loss of specialization and as they are not able to encompass the entire range of an issue, they rely on external input from other sources, for instance information provided by organized interest.  Moreover, policymakers need also information about the position of their voters and lobbyists are one of the sources to provide this information . The perpetual information scarcity that policymakers are confronted with makes them to seek external input. Therefore, many policymakers will rely on like-minded organized interests, i.e. organization that will be more trusted to supply reliable information .

In addition to this demand for lobbying, there is also considerable supply. Policymakers are invited by a large number and diverse set of organized interests. These organized interests are not necessarily each other’s competitors or opponents on the same policy issue – they might even be closely aligned in terms of general political views (for instance being liberal or leftist) – but they simply seek political attention on other issues. For example, a left-leaning group A seeks influence on a gender issue while another left-leaning group B seeks influence on an environmental issue from the same leftist policymakers. To put it different, instead of changing policy positions, lobbyist often seek attention and raise the awareness from like-minded policymakers for the issues the lobbyist is most concerned about. By providing allied policymakers with useful information and arguments, friendly lobbyists signal the political salience of issues and aim to keep allied policymakers focused on issues that are of a key importance to the lobbyist .

This broader conceptualization of lobbying leads to another view on why lobbyists primarily seek to lobby allies. That is, if lobbying opponents is primarily meant to change the mind of opponents, then this is a rather risky undertaking. Being successful in persuasive acts and convincing opponents is an uncertain strategy, especially when the opponents themselves are supported by well-organized policy communities. However, as said, not all lobbying is directly aimed at changing the position of an opponent on a particular issue. Interacting with opponents can also be seen as part of a broader strategy aiming to strengthen the overall network position of the lobbyist. Instead, lobbyists seek to enhance their social capital among a wide range of policymakers, including their opponents, as their opponents on one issue today may become allies on another issue (or in another field) tomorrow. Many lobbying practices consist of monitoring the overall policy environment, which also involves getting informed about the policy positions and arguments of opponents and trying to find out whether or not some compromises are possible (i.e. the supply side). Also policymakers invite their opponents to present their views (i.e. the demand side); by showing openness to a diversity of societal interests they aim establishing an image of not being dependent on one single type of interests. Such practices are particularly relevant in fluid environments which are characterized by long negotiations during which various adjustments need to be made and where policy decisions are mostly not clear-cut binary outcomes, but rather complex compromises.