CONSEQUENCES OF A EUROSCEPTICS SURGE IN THE NEXT EP

According to polls, Eurosceptics are likely to be the strongest political party in four countries: Poland (Law and Justice, 32 percent of votes); Greece (Syriza, 25 percent); Czech Republic (ANO, 25 percent); and the Netherlands (Freedom Party, 17 percent). Eurosceptics are also likely to be as strong as the traditional mainstream parties in the UK (UKIP, 25 percent); Denmark (Danish People’s Party, 24 percent); Italy (Five Star Movement, 21 percent); Austria (Freedom Party, 21 percent); France (National Front, 21 percent); Lithuania (Order and Justice, 20 percent); Hungary (Jobbik, 19 percent); and Finland (Finns Party, 18 percent).

In the European Parliament, the fragmentation of the parties, the low attendance, and the absolute majority criteria for passing legislation mean that crafting a majority usually requires a large number of MEPs. A Eurosceptic surge could therefore complicate life for pro-European parties especially when they split alongside national lines  as they often do on issues of eurozone economic governance or on ideological (in other words, left–right) lines.

Of course, the impact that the Eurosceptics have in the new European Parliament will depend not just on their overall numbers but also on their cohesiveness as a group and there are some reasons to think that they will struggle to achieve this cohesiveness. However, none of this rules out the possibility of tactical co-operation among Eurosceptics. In particular, the Eurosceptics could do three things:

1. First, they could try to spoil, block, slow down, or delegitimise the selection process for the European Commission president. Although the Eurosceptics are unlikely to succeed in this, they may be able to block individual commissioners and thus weaken the new Commission.

2. Second, the Eurosceptics may seek to damage the European Parliament’s reputation on a day-to-day basis. They are well aware of the fact that their strident speeches are immediately picked up by the media, and will likely attempt to capture the attention of the public and damage the image of the European Parliament. The danger is that, precisely when the European Parliament needs to be seen to be as efficient as possible in order to regain legitimacy, it will be portrayed in the media as a house of fools in which mainstream European forces are under popular siege.

3. Third, the Eurosceptics will make it harder for mainstream parties to argue for free movement within the EU and for fiscal transfers and solidarity within the eurozone. If they are weak at home, mainstream pro-European parties and governments may be tempted to appease the Eurosceptics on key issues. This might, for example, make it harder to pass free trade agreements. Some members of the parties in the S&D group, for example the French Socialists, may also find it difficult to swallow the disciplinary elements of eurozone governance that have been approved in the last legislature or to support austerity measures. Equally, the EPP is likely to break ranks when it comes to defending the free establishment and movement of workers, thus undermining the single market and strengthening the Eurosceptics.

The real danger is that the populist parties do not need to command a majority in the parliament to impose their agenda. Rather, the real danger of the Eurosceptics is the way that they may influence the agenda of the mainstream parties, both in Europe and at home. The Eurosceptic surge in the European elections could reduce even further the appetite for “more Europe” of some key member state governments. This is a particular problem on the crucial issue of eurozone governance. Plans to complete Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) require strengthening EU powers and even a new treaty, but the strength of the populists at home may deter policymakers from ceding more sovereignty or from embarking on treaty change, which in many EU member states will require a referendum. The more progress is made in completing EMU, the more we are likely to find governments succumbing to the temptation of compensation for more European integration with stronger measures to restrict freedom of movement.

Thus the biggest impact of the European elections could be on the national politics of member states. In the past, Eurosceptic forces have successfully managed to have quite an impact on legislation at home, either entering into coalition governments, supporting governments from parliament in exchange for anti-immigration policies, or threatening weak or coalition governments which do not have sufficient majorities in parliament. This is the game they know well and they want to play. After May, the European Parliament could be used to enhance their power at home. This could also change the role of the European Parliament in European policymaking.

The European Parliament has steadily increased its powers since 1979. But if the community method becomes more difficult, pro-Europeans are likely to focus ever more on delivering highly sensitive political integration through emergency powers and intergovernmental treaties, thereby excluding the European Commission and the European Parliament even further. In other words, integration will be by stealth – that is, through the back door provided by the European Council – rather than in the open. This could fragment the EU, erode the acquis communautaire, and create tensions between the institutions and between euroins and euro-out countries.

While the European Parliament and the European Commission expect to be the winners of these elections, the truth is that national governments might use the results of the elections to strengthen their grip over both of them by increasingly resorting to the European Council and turning it into the de facto government of the EU. They may seek alternative sources of legitimacy at home, especially by further strengthening the role of national parliaments in overseeing the European Parliament and the European Commission. The next phase of European integration will involve even more transfers of sovereignty from national capitals. But although the European Parliament could help legitimate these steps, the combination of falling turnout, increasing Euroscepticism, the cartelisation of political competition, and a loss of appetite for further integration could make it less rather than more relevant.