MINSK II STALEMATE: WHO IS AT FAULT???
Thus far, the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) has not carried out a single reform stipulated by the Minsk II accords.
The first three points of Minsk II deal with the ceasefire and the withdrawal of Kiev and Donbass forces from the line of contact. Both the ceasefire and withdrawal were achieved last spring. To be sure, both sides have occasionally broken the ceasefire with small-scale fighting but the original full ceasefire has largely held and withdrawal of weapons was implemented by both sides.
The fourth point in Minsk-2 stipulates: “On the first day following the withdrawal a dialogue (between Kiev and Donbass representatives) is to begin with respect to the modalities of the local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine ‘On the temporary order of local government in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions,’ as well as with respect to the future operation of these areas on the basis of the Law.” Kiev did not fulfill this pivotal step –the first in the agreement with a specific deadline. A full year after the agreement and nearly a full year since the ceasefire and subsequent troop pullback, Kiev has refused to engage a dialogue with the Donbass rebel regions’ representatives: (1) either on the modalities related to conducting elections in the Donbass, (2) or on the Ukrainian law to be adopted according to Minsk-2 ‘On the temporary order of local government in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions,’ or (3) ‘with respect to the future operation of these areas on the basis of the Law,’ or, for that matter, (4) on any other subject related to the crisis.
Thus, Kiev was the first to violate and has been in violation of Minsk-2 since the second day after the implementation of the mutual troop withdrawals last year.
This means that Kiev also violated Minsk-2’s fifth point or article, which reads: “Immediately, and not later than 30 days from the date of signing of this document, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is to adopt a resolution with the specification of the territory covered by the special regime provided for in the Law of Ukraine ‘On the temporary order of local government in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions,’ (such territory) to be based on the line set out in the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014.” The stipulation that Kiev consult—i.e. negotiate—in dialogue with Donbass representatives on the law ‘On the temporary order of local government, etc. is reiterated in Minsk-2’s article 12. Instead of dialogue on the temporary local government law, on 17 March 2015 the Verkhovna Rada passed unilaterally a corresponding resolution, having failed to consult with the Donbass rebels’ representatives in a “dialogue,” as stipulated in the Minsk agreement.
Article 11 of Minsk-2 requires Kiev to adopt a new constitution “with entry into force by the end of 2015 of a new constitution, which shall incorporate decentralization as a key element (taking into account the characteristics of certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions, to be agreed upon with the representatives of these areas), as well as, before the end of 2015, adoption of permanent legislation with respect to the special status of certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions in accordance with the measures specified in the Note.” Minsk-2’s ‘Note’ mandates that the new constitution and any corresponding laws for decentralization provide for: (1) “linguistic self-determination” (to allow Donbass and perhaps other regions to use minority languages such as Russian); (2) participation of local governments in appointing the heads of prosecutorial bodies and the courts in certain areas of Donbass (Donetsk and Lugansk); the possibility for the central executive authorities to conclude agreements with authorities in the Donbass on economic, social and cultural development in certain regions; the establishment of People’s Militia by order of local councils for maintaining public order in Donbass; and several other clauses. Neither a new constitution or a law on decentralization and the other issues listed in the Note have been adopted by Kiev.
Neither has Kiev lifted the blockade to the separatist Donbass regions, reopened Ukrainian banking in those regions, nor issued the across-the-board amnesty for the rebels required by the agreement.
Thus, from 17 March 2015 Kiev has been in violation of no less than seven articles and nine obligations it signed on to under the Misnk-2 accord.
On the other side, Russia has still not handed control over the border to Kiev. Although there is no recent evidence of Russian troops in the Donbass, there likely are military, intelligence and other advisors working on the Donbass side. However, the latter issues fall under the radar of the agreement and would be unenforceable without the reassertion of Kiev’s sovereignty over the breakaway territories. Both Kiev and Donbass have exchanged prisoners on an equal, negotiated basis. Both Kiev and Donbass occasionally violate the ceasefire, but both have generally complied with the withdrawal of heavy weaponry to the distance from the front line imposed by the agreement. Except for the ceasefire and withdrawal of weapons, none of these other points were assigned time frames or deadlines, so they are more difficult to define as violations.
In sum, Kiev is significantly more in violation of the agreement than the Donbass rebels and/or Moscow
Until the West pressures Kiev to address its neo-fascist problem and stop supporting the radicals’ ideological orientation as state ideology, the Poroshenko administration and any successor will fail to comply with Minsk-2.
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