MEP RE-ELECTION AND PERFORMANCE

After each European election nearly half of the outgoing Members of the European Parliament re-enter the EP for an additional legislative term.

To ensure re-election, MEPs need their party leaderships to re-nominate them as MEP candidates, and, holding other parameters equal, a rich activity record in the EP may give them an advantage over alternative candidates. MEPs with little EP-related work to show may find it more difficult to climb the EP hierarchy ladder. Consequently, MEPs who aspire for a long-term career in the EP may wish to prove to their peers they have been active and worthy parliamentarians.

Re-election in the EP depends on three essential and a number of facilitating conditions. The first essential condition is that the outgoing MEP should desire their re-election in the EP. The second essential condition is that their party should re-nominate them and place them on an electable position, a process which may be more or less open and democratic depending on the party’s decision-making system . The third essential condition is that the MEP candidate’s national party has to perform sufficiently well in the elections. Although the candidate’s own responsibility for re-election may be a bit more pronounced in countries where preferential voting is allowed (open list), the electoral fate of the candidate and their party coincide to a large degree. If meeting the first essential condition is a matter of personal choice, the other two conditions depend on factors beyond the candidate’s direct control

The best they can do is to try to prove to their party that their re-nomination is commendable and to the electorate that their re-election is worthwhile. Past performance in the EP may be important in this respect. MEPs with a richportfolio of work in the EP may have an advantage over candidates who performed poorly during the last term. Internal party balances and developments aside, the party leadership may take into account, for example, that an MEP has produced a significant number of reports, asked the EU institutions many written questions and tabled a sufficient number of motions for resolutions. A rich EP work profile suggests, though it certainly does not guarantee, increased ability, expertise and familiarity with EP and EU affairs. Since the EP has far from negligible political powers, the national parties may wish to re-nominate candidates who already have sufficient experience with EU affairs and can achieve the most in the EP.

Taking into account that ‘the European Parliament is beginning to attract delegates who serve long European careers’ , MEPs may wish to boost their parliamentary output, in order to prove their worth also to their peers and start or continue climbing the EP hierarchy ladder. But there is yet another reason why MEPs may be concerned about their parliamentary productivity. In an effort to boost its transparency credentials the EP has made public all the reports, questions, speeches, motions for resolutions, written declarations, opinions and reports amended of all the MEPs . In addition, the EP website names the committees each MEP is participating, gives a short biographical note and, since the beginning of the plenary attendance rate of each MEP. In short, what MEPs do in the EP, and especially how much of it, is easily accessible to every citizen and can be used for a variety of purposes.

It is safe to assume that relatively few voters know what their MEPs vote or how, what kind of reports they produce, what they say in their speeches in the plenary, or what is the content of their questions to the EU institutions. In other words, the content of their work in the EP remains largely unknown to the wider public, despite the fact that this information is easily accessible. National media rarely report on the quality of the MEPs’ output, and the majority of European citizens do not bother finding out themselves. In contrast, both voters and the national media may pay greater attention to sensationalist accounts related to the work, or lack thereof, of their representatives.

Empirical findings on the relationship between MEP activity level and re-election show that the link between performance and the electoral fortune of the MEPs is more pronounced than what is generally assumed. Even if the European citizens have no direct say on policy choice at the European level, and even if the European elections attract limited interest compared to the national ones, there is a connection between MEPs’ work and their re-nomination and re-election.

In the run up to the European elections citizens are more likely to hear about the quantity of their MEPs’ work rather than the quality. This in turn is the result of the inexpensive processing of EP data on MEP activity by a number of websites and, more importantly, by the national media. MEPs who have very little to show in terms of number of reports, questions, speeches, written declarations, opinions, motions for resolutions and who have a poor record of attendance in the EP plenary sessions may be labelled by some national media as ‘lazy’ and ‘under performers’. The second reason why quantity of MEP activity is important is because it serves as a rough indicator of political experience and capital. National parties have an obvious interest to send their best men and women in the EP to serve and promote their interests and views. To the extent that past numerical performance reflects, however crudely, expertise and familiarity with the EP affairs, national parties may choose to nominate candidates with a richer EP work portfolio. More active MEPs are more likely to be re-elected, EP attendance and rapporteurships are particularly important for MEPs of the two largest European political groups and MEPs from closed party list electoral systems, and open party list MEPs, deputies in smaller EPGs and non-attached MEPs are more likely to focus on parliamentary questions or speeches.  Voting loyalty may be more important in some national parties than in others. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that activity level is more important for predicting re-election than roll-call voting loyalty. While there is a connection between MEP activity level and re-election, increased activity in the EP does not necessarily lead to candidate re-nomination and electoral success. It remains unclear what exactly the leaderships of national parties think of the work of their MEPs, and how much they value it. Similarly, electoral success depends also on a number of micro and macro level variables that may have little, if anything, to do with the work that takes place inside the EP. This is no reason, however, to dismiss a priori a potential connection between MEP performance and re-election which is both theoretically and empirically defensible.