MAKE UKRAINE A NEUTRAL, NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY

Since hostilities broke out between Ukraine and Russia in 2014, the United States has provided $2.5 billion in security aid to Kyiv, with more than $400 million in the last year alone. U.S. security assistance has come in the form of training, equipment, and weaponry, including tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, night vision devices, sniper rifles, small arms, Javelin anti-tank missiles, high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles, and Mark VI patrol boats. The United States has also provided secure communications, satellite imagery and analysis support, counter-battery radars, and equipment to support military medical treatment and combat evacuation procedures. While these weapon systems and equipment increased the warfighting capabilities of Ukraine’s security forces, they failed to meaningfully alter the balance of power between Ukraine and the Russian-backed separatists or bring an end to hostilities. They also failed to stop Russian interference in Ukraine, ranging from direct military aid to influence operations and cyber-attacks.

Despite these continued military transfers from the United States, the conflict continues into its seventh year because the underlying causes of the war have not been sufficiently addressed—particularly Russia’s concern Ukraine will become a western bulwark by allowing U.S. and NATO forces to station there.

The Biden administration continues to rhetorically support Ukraine’s aspirations to join NATO. A joint statement released after the White House meeting in September declared “the United States supports Ukraine’s right to decide its own future foreign policy course free from outside interference, including with respect to Ukraine’s aspirations to join NATO.” Yet even as the administration voiced its support, it has, wisely, not formally extended membership. The reasons for the administration’s apparent hesitancy to extend outright NATO membership likely reflect an understanding of the dangers of admitting Ukraine into the alliance.

Rather than decrease the possibility of war, offering Ukraine NATO membership risks provoking a Russian military response which has the potential to instigate a larger war between the United States and a nuclear-armed Russia. Not only would such a scenario be devastating for Ukrainians, but it also could escalate to the nuclear level; therefore, avoiding this outcome should be a top policy priority.

Even short of war, protracted hostility between the United States and Russia over Ukraine could spill over into other areas, costing the United States time and resources better devoted to higher priorities.

Continued U.S. security assistance to Ukraine and dangling false hopes of NATO membership prolong the conflict in Ukraine and increase the risk of counterproductive war between the United States and Russia. The Biden administration’s current policy draws out the suffering of Ukrainians and prevents the possibility of establishing stable and constructive relations between the world’s two greatest nuclear powers.

Given the significant power disparity between Ukraine and Russia, U.S. military aid does little but prolong a civil war and heighten U.S.-Russia tensions. Modestly increasing the capabilities of Ukraine’s military forces by providing high-tech equipment and lethal weaponry provides a minuscule benefit at the expense of a vast risk.

Providing military aid risks a tit-for-tat escalation with Russia as Moscow can assist its proxies in kind, essentially canceling out any U.S. efforts. Security aid that provides Ukraine an opportunity to retake contested territory could escalate the conflict to the point where Moscow may commit overt conventional military forces in support of the separatists. Moscow has periodically moved tens of thousands of troops to the Ukrainian border, reminding Kyiv that it is outmatched militarily. A direct conflict with Russia would surely prove devastating for Ukraine.

Supporters of providing U.S. security aid might argue Ukraine need not defeat Russia in the event of a full-scale invasion. Rather, the goal should be to deter further Russian aggression by inflicting significant damage to Russian military forces. The United States provided Javelin missiles and Mark VI patrol boats explicitly with the intention of deterring Russian armor and naval threats. Besides being dismissive of the brutal consequences to Ukrainians, this line of thinking omits the reality that Moscow views the prevention of a pro-western Ukraine as a core strategic interest. Russia will therefore go to great lengths to prevent that outcome. Despite years of tough economic sanctions from the United States and Europe, Russia’s primary aims and its resolve in Ukraine remain unchanged.  Given Russia’s view of Ukraine’s significance to its security, one can reasonably expect Russian forces will bear a substantial burden to prevent a western-oriented Ukraine.

Moreover, U.S. and European leaders have naively strung along Ukraine with the notion it may one day join NATO. This would be a tremendous miscalculation—Russia has made it clear it views accession as a “red line” the West should not cross. Failing to rule out Ukrainian membership in NATO risks a sudden Russian attack on Ukraine, with the potential of igniting a major NATO-Russia conflict. With Russia already at war in eastern Ukraine, acceptance into the alliance could immediately trigger NATO’s Article 5 and bring the United States and all other NATO allies to militarily defend Ukraine. Such a scenario could quickly escalate to the nuclear level, making it imperative western policy makers honestly assess the devastating consequences that could follow such a misguided policy.

Unlike Russia, the United States does not have a strong security interest in Ukraine that would provide an impetus for U.S. service members to fight and die over it. The United States does, however, have a strong incentive to lower the risk of war with Russia and work toward improved U.S.-Russia relations. On humanitarian grounds, it would also be good to avoid prolonging the suffering of Ukrainians.

Ending the conflict requires a political settlement that accounts for the geopolitical anxiety of Russia. One need not agree with Russia’s concerns, but accounting for them is necessary to ensure a prudent Ukraine policy. U.S. and European leaders should pursue a policy that would see Ukraine become a neutral buffer state, neither aligned with Russia nor the West. A neutral Ukraine would not seek integration with western or Russian security institutions, nor would it allow either side to utilize its territory for military purposes. Rather, it would tactfully reflect its precarious geographical reality—being a large but relatively weak state situated on the border of a great nuclear power. The United States has two main levers to incentivize Russia and Ukraine to bring about this resolution: Ending the possibility of Ukraine becoming a NATO member and halting direct security aid to Ukraine.

A neutral status would not preclude Ukraine from establishing stronger trade ties with the United States, other European countries, and Russia; however, it would require taking NATO expansion off the table. Preventing Ukraine from joining NATO enhances U.S. security by reducing the risk of war with nuclear-armed Russia over a territory with little geopolitical significance to the United States—keeping Ukraine out of NATO also happens to be Russia’s primary objective. Even without a formal membership action plan for Ukraine to join NATO, rhetoric of potential membership from U.S. and European leaders counterproductively incentivizes Russia to continue its interference in Ukraine. Such rhetoric should stop, otherwise Russia will seek to keep Ukraine divided to prevent NATO accession and will maintain the possibility of further escalation, if needed, to do so.

The United States should cease direct security aid, and in particular lethal aid, as it has protracted the conflict, can be equally matched by Russia, and risks further escalation. Given the imbalance of power between Russia and Ukraine, the United States cannot realistically provide enough security aid to tip the scale in Ukraine’s favor at an acceptable level of cost and risk. Security aid may also have unintended escalatory consequences should Ukrainian forces gain an acute military advantage over the separatists. Moscow may commit overt military forces should it believe Ukraine will attempt to retake contested territory. Moreover, U.S. security aid makes Ukraine more dependent on the wherewithal of the United States to continue the conflict, shifting Ukraine’s security burden to American taxpayers.

Providing hope to Ukraine that NATO will come to its defense, including by continuing U.S. security aid, allows Kyiv to avoid making difficult political accommodations necessary to end the war. A political settlement will likely necessitate that Ukraine accepts its unique role as a neutral buffer state in Eastern Europe. The prospect of being protected forever by the United States lets Ukrainian leaders avoid pressing for a resolution to the conflict.

A settlement could result in Russia ending its support for separatist groups in the Donbas region, allowing Ukraine to work toward national reconciliation. Russia and European countries should take responsibility for providing significant humanitarian and economic aid to help those affected by the conflict. War-torn areas will need assistance rebuilding vital infrastructure to allow displaced citizens to return home and normal economic activity to resume. Since the civil strife has been partly fueled by ethnic and cultural tensions, a neutral Ukraine should also be encouraged to protect minority rights and increase local autonomy for the Donbas region.

The Ukraine crisis has poisoned U.S.-Russia relations for the last seven years, a dangerous status quo given the importance of avoiding conflict between nuclear weapons states. Sympathy for Ukraine’s unfortunate geopolitical circumstances is natural; however, current policy undermines U.S. security and exacerbates the suffering of Ukrainians. Working toward a realistic resolution in the form of a neutral, non-aligned Ukraine could provide an avenue for the United States and Russia to form a constructive and predictable relationship. As the United States shifts its focus to the greater threat of China, détente with Russia should guide U.S. policy.

Note

Russia’s most likely course of action would be to launch a limited offensive from Donbas. This would not fundamentally alter the stakes in the conflict and the operation would be swift. This would signal to Kyiv that it cannot hide behind its army or Western support: either Ukraine would accept Russia’s conditions or risk further escalation. And, if the West put up little resistance, Russia could always switch to conducting concerted air and missile strikes on Ukraine.

 

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