LOBBYING LANDSCAPE IN THE NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands is not only a country with a high population density, but also the population of organisations and groups for interest representation and advocacy is comparatively large. There are an estimated 2000 interest organisations of all kinds and sizes making their way to the centres of government and parliament in The Hague, where the interest traffic flow takes place. Existing structures and institutional rules on interest representation and decision-making in the Netherlands make it semi-open (but not truly open) to access for public and private stakeholders. The country has a corporatist tradition; what is called the ‘polder model’ in policy-making entails strongly institutionalized relationships between government and organisations for economic, social and other interests. In different formal venues, governmental actors and those of organised interest sit together and negotiate policy decisions. This tradition of accommodation politics involves selective access, summits among leaders of intermediary organisations, and a level of secrecy to facilitate conflict management and agreement.

The intermediary organisations included in the process however are under heavy pressure – trade unions, organisations representing interests of specific economic sectors, associations of public organisations (municipalities, provinces and so on), as well as political parties are facing declining membership and function loss. Although the practice of negotiating agreements in the policy process is still very much alive, the shrinking support base of most of the individual organisations involved in this traditional mode of interest representation and decision making has meant that more actors need to be involved in order to assure legitimacy and implementation. At the same time, NGOs and citizen groups engaged in grass roots lobbying have become important players in setting the agenda and portraying problems. Purposive interest groups have expanded their mobilization capacity via the old and new media. They acquired veto power as political decision-makers face increased risks of public accountability for taking the ‘wrong’ decisions.

The Dutch system of interest representation thus contains different or even disjointed spheres of interest articulation and representation. This has consequences for the way in which claims are converted from input to output, for the legislative process and its results. Interest groups do not all have the access or resources for entering the stage of policy preparation, softening up staff at government departments. When they do have access after the agenda is set, the political transaction costs for changing or reversing proposals have risen. The relative poverty of open consultation in the Dutch system has been criticized.

Hundreds of fulltime lobbyists ply their trade in the Netherlands and their numbers are growing fast. In addition, thousands of people are lobbyists in their free time. The Netherlands has a centuries-old tradition of associations which, over time, began to engage in lobbying. In the healthcare sector alone, there are more than 300 lobby groups, employing about 6,000 people. These groups do not just comprise pharmaceutical companies; they also include the Orde van Medisch Specialisten (the medical specialists interest group), the Nederlandse Patiënten Consumenten Federatie (Dutch Patients Consumers Federation) and the Health Inspectorate which all have major interest groups to represent.

The Netherlands has an open lobbying culture and MPs are easy to approach. However, the growing army of lobbyists means that effective techniques are vital. More than half of the MPs spend over ten hours a week talking to lobbyists. Only one in ten refuses all contact with the lobbying sector

In the Netherlands, the past decade has shown a steady rise in attention to public affairs with a growing number of practitioners and the establishment of the BVPA- the Dutch Professional Association for Public Affairs. The association represents the interests of all public affairs professionals in the Netherlands. The BVPA aims to increase the professional standing of its members by providing them with knowledge, skills, and information on recent developments in public affairs and now counts 600 members. In 2007 the BVPA designed a voluntary code of conduct. For enforcing the code of conduct, there is a procedure for filing complaints and sanctioning noncompliance, which in 2013 was applied for the first time. In the past years the Association has expanded its scope from regular member meetings and a bi-annual conference to a series of master classes because there is a constant demand for courses for professional learning based on scholarly and experiential knowledge.

While Dutch practitioners do not consider public affairs to be at tension with openness and transparency, they show little support for statutory regulation. Since 2012, a lobbying register is in place that requires all lobbyists with a pass for parliamentary entry (without needing an official meeting) to register their name and organisation. This information is publicly available. Forms of lobbying that go beyond entering the parliament – via email, phone, conferences, external meetings etc. – are not covered by the register. There has been talk about proposing a mandatory lobby register and legislative footprint but this has not yet been put forward in the Dutch parliament.

In the Netherlands, some form of a legislative footprint is sometimes included in a law proposal. Mostly this is a short paragraph on the consultations that have taken place. However, this is not mandatory and it is not a standard procedure. During the law-making process, the government might ask for input through a public consultation. These are often available online. Submissions are published after the consultation closes, but only if the contributor gives his permission, which is not mandatory. The existing transparency in the Dutch law-making process is based on a purely voluntary and seemingly ad hoc system.

Recommendations

1. Make mandatory the practice of a legislative footprint in Dutch law proposals that specifies which parties have been involved in drafting the proposed law. The legislative footprint should, at a minimum, include all organisations that have been consulted or that have offered their input, and the content of their consultation.
2. Policy-makers and supervisors should report on planned personal meetings with regards to policy-making (who participates in those meetings and which subjects are discussed).
3. The government should introduce a mandatory lobbying register that requires all organisations to register the persons that carry out lobbying activities targeted at Dutch members of parliament, the amount of money spent on lobbying activities and the subjects of their lobbying efforts.