THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS ON EU POLICIES

Three key factors are determinant in national parliaments’ influence on EU policy. Availability of information, Availability of time, Ability to bind their government’s position in the Council of Ministers.

To keep up with and engage in EU Affairs, national parliaments have set up European Affairs Committees (EACs). Since parliamentary structure and influence in the Member States vary in accordance with their particular political cultures and history, EACs differ. The number of committees in a country differ. There may be one or two depending mainly on the parliamentary structure of uni-or bicameral nature.

Size and composition obviously differ according to the various members of parliament (MPs) involved in these committees. Furthermore, although in most cases MEPs can attend European Affairs Committees by invitation only, in some countries they play a more active role.

The various EACs enjoy different levels of competency and ability to influence their governments. They vary from mere information exchange bodies to entities which have the power to bind their government’s position in the Council of Ministers. Areas over which they have competence are also important and subject to differences. All EACs have competency over EU matters. However, when it comes to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs issues, jurisdictional powers are limited to only approximately half of all the Member States’ EACs.

Bodies more concerned with information exchange simply pass on documents deemed relevant to specialized standing committees, leaving the latter with the more reflective tasks. Others, take a more predominant role in the whole scrutiny process. The first group tends to concentrate on issues relating to the EU’s long term agenda, the second, having to analyse each incoming proposal meets more frequently. This frequency also depends on the stage at which committees consider the EU policy cycle. Committees which enter the cycle at an early stage, play a proactive role by anticipating EU legislation and consequently they meet more frequently than those which remain more reactive and deal mainly with legislation already adopted.

Committees on EU Affairs of EU National Parliaments (984 Members are involved)

Austria (56)

• Nationalrat: Main Committee on EU Affairs (26 Members); Standing Subcommittee on EU Affairs (16 Members)
• Bundesrat: EU-Committee (14 Members)

Belgium (30)

• Chambre des représentants and Sénat, Federal Advisory Committee on European Affairs (30 Members composed of 10 Senators, 10 Members of the Chambre des Représentants and 10 Belgian Members of the European Parliament)

Bulgaria (18)

• Narodno sabranie, Committee on European Affairs and Oversight of the European Funds (18 Members)

Croatia (17)

• Hrvatski sabor, European Affairs Committee (17 Members)

Cyprus (10)

• Vouli ton Antiprosopon, Committee on European Affairs (10 Members)

Czech Republic (26)

• Poslanecka snemovna, Committee for European Affairs (15 Members reflecting the proportional strength of all political parties in the Poslanecka)
• Senat, Committee on European Union Affairs (11 Members representing the political caucuses in accordance with their proportional strength in the Senat)

Denmark (29)

• Folketing, European Affairs Committee (29 Members)

Estonia (15)

• Riigikogu, European Union Affairs Committee (At least 15 Members)

Finland (38)

• Eduskunta, Grand Committee (25 titular Members and 13 substitutes, who have the right to attend and speak at the Committee meetings)

France (84)

• Assemblée nationale, Committee on European Affairs (48 Members reflecting the proportional strength of the political parties of the Assemblée nationale
• Sénat, Committee for European Affairs (36 Members reflecting the proportional strength of the political groups in the Sénat

Germany (66)

• Bundestag, Committee on the Affairs of the European Union (33 Members of the Bundestag and 16 German Members of the European Parliament without voting rights)
• Bundesrat, Committee on European Union Questions (17 Members composed of one Member of each federal state- some Members are Minister-presidents of their federal states, while others are State Ministers for European Affairs

Greece (31)

• Vouli ton Ellinon, Special Standing Committee for European Affairs (31 Members)

Hungary (21)

• Orszaggyülés, Committee on European Affairs (21 Members reflecting the proportional strength of the political parties in the Parliament)

Ireland (14)

• Houses of the Oireachtas, Joint Committee on European Union Affairs (9 Members of the Dail Eireann and 5 Memers of the Seanad Eireann)

Italy (72)

• Camera dei Deputati, Committee on EU Policies (Composed as other standing committees of the Camera dei Deputati, Currently 43 Members)
• Senato della Repubblica, 14th Standing Committee on EU Policies (Currently, 29 Members)

Latvia (17)

• Saiema, European Affairs Committee (Currently 17 Members proportionally reflecting the parliamentary groups in the Seima)

Lithuania (25)

• Seimas, Committee on European Affairs (Not less than 15 and not more than 25 Members in accordance with the principle of proportional representation of the political groups of the Seimas)

Luxembourg (12)

• Chambre des Députés, Committee for Foreign and European Affairs, for Defence, for Cooperation and for Immigration (12 Members representing the political groups of the Partliament proportionality)

Malta (9)

• Kamra tad-Deputati, Standing Committee on Foreign and European Affairs (9 Members)

Netherlands (51)

• Tweede Kamer (House of Representatives), Committee on European Affairs (24 Members representing all political parties of the Tweede Kamer)
• Eerste Kamer (Senate), Committee for European Co-operation Organisations (27 Members)

Poland (64)

• Sejm, European Union Affairs Committee (The Committee should be composed of no more than 46 Members (10% of the Sejm). The composition should reflect the composition of the Chamber
• Senat, European Union Affairs Committee (There are no formal limitations regarding the number of Members of the Committee, but currently it consists of 18 Members)

Portugal (21)

• Assembleia da Republica, Committee on European Affairs (21 Members of the Committee proprtionally represent the political parties in the Parliament)

Romania (36)

• Camera Deputatilor, Committee on European Affairs (25 Members of the Camera Deputatilor)
• Senatul, Committee on European Affairs (11 Members of the Senatul)

Slovakia (11)

• Narodna rada, Committee on European Affairs (11 Members proportionally representing the political partries in the Parliament)

Slovenia (25)

• Drzavni zbor, Committee for EU Affairs (14 Members, Political Parties are represented)
• Drzavni svet, International Relations and European Affairs Commission (11 Members composed of representatives of interest groups of the Slovenian society)

Spain (43)

• Cortes Generales, Joint Committee for the European Union (43 Members in accordance with a decision made by the Bureau of both Chambers sitting jointly)

Sweden  (59)

• Riksdag, Committee on EU Affairs (17 Memers and 42 Alternates. All sectoral committees are represented in the Committee on EU Affairs)

United Kingdom (90)

• House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee (16 Members, Their party composition reflects that of the House)
• House of Lords, European Union Committee (Around 19 Members, with a further 55 on the six sub-committees of the Committee meaning that 74 Members are involved in total.

Across the member states, two main methods are used to leverage the influence of member state parliaments in European affairs: (a) mandate systems (of the kind used most famously in Denmark) under which a parliament issues instructions to the executive determining the limits of the latter’s negotiating position in Council; and (b) scrutiny reserve systems (of the kind used in the United Kingdom) according to which a national minister is precluded from reaching agreement in Council in relation to a proposal until the national parliament has completed its scrutiny of the proposal in question. Of the two, the mandate system gives the greater powers to national parliaments where it applies. However, even in Denmark – famously the member state with the most powerful mandate system – appearances can be deceiving. The level of duality between the Government and parliament is far less than meets the eye. The Danish executive itself decides where a mandate should be sought and where it should not, then drafts its own mandate. Furthermore, the atmosphere in the Danish European Affairs Committee meeting is frequently so consensual as to have been compared in the past to an extended cabinet meeting.

Ultimately, of course, it matters little how strong a national parliament’s legal powers are in relation to European matters, if a majority in parliament never – or only very rarely – attempts to use them, or never even relies on the threat of their use to leverage influence. The mismatch between the constitutionally-conferred mandating powers of the Austrian parliament and its relative lack of influence in policy formation is a case in point in this regard.

National parliaments differ greatly from one another in terms of their functions, their construct and composition, the context in which they operate, and how they exercise powers conferred on them. This is another factor which needs to be borne carefully in mind in contemplating any increases in their European policy-related functions. In the first place, there is heterogeneity (a) in terms of national parliaments’ functions. One simple example of this is that while, in most member states, the executive is responsible to the parliament, this is not universally so – the French Assemblée Nationale does not elect that country’s president.

The functions of national parliaments, and the manner in which these are undertaken, are not of course, all determined by parliament’s formal role, however. Various traditions may also have developed as regards the appropriate role of parliament in a particular national constitutional system, and the manner in which it organises itself (e.g. whether as a talking or a working parliament and whether with a weak or strong committee structure). The strength of the party political system may also vary considerably from one country to another. Because of this, the impact of reforms may be very different in two different member states. There is a strong element of path dependency here.

There is also variety (b) in the institutional architecture of national parliaments. To take one obvious example, the European Union is split between those 13 member states which have bicameral national parliaments – viz. Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom – and those 15 member states which have unicameral legislatures, namely Bulgaria, Croatia Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden.

National parliaments are also varied (c) in terms of their composition. In particular, there is considerable variation in the membership of the upper houses in those 13 member states parliaments with bicameral legislatures. Some upper houses – like the Italian, Polish and Romanian Senates – are directly elected. The United Kingdom’s House of Lords, in contrast, is entirely appointed. The Irish Seanad is part elected and part-appointed. Some upper houses, like the German Bundesrat, are neither elected nor appointed but, instead, consist of delegates from state governments (rather like national ministers in the Council of the European Union).

National parliaments also operate (d) in very different political contexts. These contexts can lead to differing approaches to the exercise of their powers in the European policy field. For example, a national parliament should normally be expected to demand more accountability in European affairs if it operates in a national context of Euroscepticism. Further, the balance of influence has been argued to tilt more in favour of national parliaments in a situation of minority governments. Finally, there are significant differences (e) in how national parliaments exercise powers which are conferred on them, with some member states, for example, choosing to allow a minority of their membership to decide on the exercise of powers conferred on them by European Union law.

The implication of all of this appears to be that efforts directed from European level to empower national parliaments may have effects which vary quite considerably from one national parliament to another. Attempts to empower national parliaments in European policy matters are also subject to other constraints. An obvious first such constraint is that national parliaments are outsiders to the European level policy-making process, being neither geographically close to the locus of decision-making at European level nor institutionally involved in the actual process of decision-making itself. A second constraint is that national parliaments are subject to major informational asymmetries vis à-vis their national executives. Government ministers are, after all, members of a European Union institution (the Council), and national civil servants may participate in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CoRePer). It is true that the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty has brought with it provisions which are designed to rebalance such informational asymmetries and which require the direct provision of information to national parliaments. However, these provisions are not, of themselves, sufficient to enable the bridging of the information gap between national executives and parliaments. Such is the volume of information now reaching national parliaments that filtration systems are necessary to screen out the less important data. The efficiency of such systems, however, depends very much on the research and administrative resources available in the national parliament concerned. Furthermore, in order for information about European Union policy initiatives to be useful to national parliaments, the information must be contextualised by information which is normally available only to national executives, as with proposed national positions in relation to European Union policy initiatives. Thus, national parliaments still find themselves at an informational disadvantage when compared with national executives.

Over and above these limitations on a national parliament’s ability to scrutinise comes a further limitation, which consists of the fact that a question mark hangs over the level of interest many – perhaps most – national parliamentarians have in engaging in scrutiny work on European policy initiatives. The best parliamentary scrutiny and accountability system in the world can not operate successfully in the absence of parliamentarians willing to operate it. Disinterest on the part of parliamentarians in operating the system is, to some extent, only to be expected in member states where there has, historically, been a pro-European Union consensus, and little would be gained electorally by reining in the activities of an organisation that enjoys widespread public support (however constitutionally necessary such a check might be). However, even in relatively Eurosceptical countries, there appears to be little electoral recompense for such work. It is therefore unsurprising that, across Europe, there tends to be a distinct lack of appetite on the part of many parliamentarians for engaging in European scrutiny work.

Across the European Union, there has been a gradual centralisation of national parliamentary powers in European affairs through the setting up, over time, of European affairs committees. By now, European affairs committees are to be found in all 28 member states of the European Union. Many bicameral states have chosen to have a committee for each House. The advantages of the creation of European affairs committees mirror, to some extent, those of the setting up of any parliamentary committee. They include: (a) the delegation of European Union-related tasks to a sub-group of a national parliament’s total membership, whose smaller numbers facilitate more effective action; and (b) the facilitation of the development of expertise in European Union matters among parliamentarians. Such expertise enables them (i) to have an overarching understanding of the institutional workings of the European Union; (ii) to address what can sometimes be complex and substantive European questions; and (iii) to provide some kind of check on an executive branch with an enormously greater means of informing itself on such issues.

The difficulty in processing all European Union issues through European affairs committees, however, is that – given the application of European Union law to an increasingly broad range of disparate policy areas – expertise in European policy alone is not now, if indeed it ever was, sufficient to enable a parliament to maximise its influence. Furthermore, it ‘quarantines’ European Union law issues, excluding all but a small group of parliamentarians from any real role in relation to them.

A means for deploying subject-specific expertise and enhancing inclusiveness in dealing with European policy matters is therefore, arguably, needed. It is here that a role can arise for sectoral committees. Bringing specialised committees onto the scene means that all MPs, and not just the small minority in the [European Affairs Committee], become routinely involved in EU matters. As a result the parliament makes better use of its own policy expertise and is able to monitor the government’s behaviour more effectively, a rationale that applies in general to the empowerment of committees. Indeed, it is possible to envisage European issues being dealt with entirely by a range of sectoral committees. However, there are potential disadvantages to a wholly sectoral approach that lacks any centralised co-ordination. The objectives of efficiency and of maintaining a uniform level of scrutiny across a range of committees may both be hindered by leaving European policy to a range of sectoral committees. Moreover, in practice, the experience in more than one member state has been that, within individual sectoral committees, European policy matters may end up being neglected in favour of more familiar domestic issues and, consequently, an inadequate standard of scrutiny is provided regarding European matters. The building up of an adequate degree of European policymaking expertise among parliamentarians may also be hindered by dividing up the relevant issues across too many committees. For the same reason, it also seems inadvisable to divide up the minority of national parliamentarians who would normally be interested in European affairs. Overall, an entirely sectoralised approach runs the risk of becoming a disjointed, fragmented, incoherent and sub-standard approach to European issues.

The optimum arrangement, therefore, probably involves some method of combining the benefits of centralisation with those of inclusiveness. A centralised or ‘sinkhole’ approach to European matters on the one hand, and a decentralised or ‘fragmented’ approach on the other, should thus be seen as extremes, with the use of either one in exclusivity likely to result in a failure to provide the appropriate standard of national parliamentary accountability in respect of European affairs.

Various means have been found by national parliaments across the European Union of combining the merits of centralised and decentralised approaches. Some such approaches do not involve the use of sectoral committees. One inclusive technique is to allow attendance at Committee meetings by parliamentary colleagues who are not committee members. In the Austrian upper house, the Nationalrat, Members are permitted to attend sittings of that body’s European Union Committee in an advisory capacity. An alternative approach somewhat along the same lines is that of the European Union Select Committee of the House of Lords. This has 19 members. However, it also has six sub-committees with a collective membership of 74 parliamentarians so that, in total, over 10 per cent of the membership of the House is involved in European policy matters.

National parliamentary involvement in European policy matters requires an adequate structure. Among the more evident structural requirements are: the provision of adequate information on European policy matters in order for national parliaments to perform their functions; adequate time to carry them out; and adequate means of communication with the executive – which has been argued, for instance, to require the personal presence of Government ministers representing the executive in Council meetings before parliamentary committees for European affairs. Additionally, dialogue with the executive also seems necessary if parliament is to exert any real influence, requiring both ex ante and ex post facto interaction between national parliaments and government ministers attending Council meetings. An adequate incentive for the executive to engage in dialogue with the national parliament may also be needed, and many European states have provided such an incentive through the creation either of a mandate system or a scrutiny reserve system binding national ministers negotiating on the national behalf in the Council of the European Union.