THE EU’S REVOLVING DOOR

Past revolving-door scandals have over the years inspired pledges for more institutional accountability. Current rules require recent Commissioners to seek approval from the European Commission for new roles.

Under the Commission’s Code of Conduct, former members must notify the Commission for two years of any new professional activity. They are also barred from lobbying the Commission “on matters for which they were responsible within their portfolio” for that period of time. Often, the European Commission will approve a private sector role with restrictions, like a prohibition on sharing information from Commission meetings. Sometimes, the Commission asks an ethics panel for input, but it doesn’t have to follow its advice.

Despite the formal restrictions that often come attached to the Commission’s approvals for the roles of former Commissioners critics have argued that some include potential conflicts of interest.  While there’s agreement that ex-Commissioners can pursue business interests of their choosing, good government advocates and some MEPs argue the EU’s current system is too opaque to judge whether those interests actually clash with EU priorities. The result, they say, is an erosion of trust in the EU’s independence. 

The current Commission procedure lacks accountability and transparency. As an example, critics point to the Commission’s ethics committee, a three-person body appointed by the Commission that offers non-binding advice. They also note how infrequently the Commission turns down employment requests from ex-officials. Out of 363 requests for post-public office employment of former Commission officials in 2019, only three were rejected. 

Some MEPs are pushing for a single, independent EU ethics body that would have investigative and enforcement powers, including in revolving-door cases. And while Commission President Ursula von der Leyen supported the idea of creating one ethics body for all EU institutions at the beginning of her term, it remains unclear whether the project could get sufficient political backing. 

There needs to be a shift in attitudes so that people considering moving from the public to the private sector reflect on how their new post might damage public trust.

The Commission defends its procedures arguing that there is no quantitative limit to the number of activities that a former Commissioner can perform after her/his mandate and that post-mandate activities are thoroughly scrutinized by the European Commission to protect public interests and avoid conflicts of interest.

What the critics say

Art. 16 of the EU Staff Regulations provides for the legal basis to forbid a job move by officials of the EU institutions to engage in lobbying. Art. 16 in the EU Staff Regulations and Art. 1 in the Commission Decision C(2018) 4048), apart from not being applied properly, are not sufficient to protect the integrity and independence of the EU institutions.

Critics say that it is necessary to sharpen the Staff Regulations in at least three ways:

  1. Make the existing possibility to forbid a job move an obligation, when a conflict of interest cannot be ruled out.
  2. Extend the rules for a lobby ban period to avoid undue lobbying to two and three years for senior officials and presidents or executive directors respectively.
  3. Reform the rules so that an authorization granted for a job move can be reversed if rules have not been complied with properly.

The Commission Decision needs to be sharpened in terms of at least one point: The wording in the Commission Decision on the “fundamental right to engage in work” is being used to override all other concerns. Yet, forbidding one specific job for a certain amount of time is not the same as preventing the right to engage in work. So the critics see a clear need for changes to be made in the Commission Decision in order to clarify that the fundamental right to work is not jeopardized by forbidding specific job moves, when they are in conflict with the responsibilities laid out in the Staff Regulations and EU Treaties.

There have been cases concerning other EU institutions which have been widely considered as illegitimate moves from a public to a private institution. This has undermined the public trust in EU institutions. There is an unevenness and lack of consistency in the implementation of the EU Staff Regulations. Rules on conflict of interest should thus follow the same high standard across all EU institutions, making sure that revolving doors are stopped and the independence of EU institutions is maintained.

The Commission currently works with the EP and the Council on setting up an independent ethics body common to all EU institutions. This process is a crucial step towards better enforcement of ethics rules. In light of the fundamental importance of supervising mechanisms to maintain public trust in the EU institutions, the Commission needs to be inclusive, so as to ensure that the widespread concerns over revolving doors are properly included in the decision on the role and mandate of the ethics body. An important step in the creation of functional ethics systems is to ensure that the staff are familiar with the rules in place and understand why they exist. Yet, a report by the European Court of Auditors found the EU staff lacking in knowledge of ethics rules. The European Commission should spearhead a move towards improving staff knowledge and understanding of the ethical framework by providing supporting material and encouraging the staff to attend relevant training.

 

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