ENHANCING LOBBYING TRANSPARENCY AT EU LEVEL

Lobbying and interest groups play a crucial role in the decision making processes of the EU. Policy-making has largely relied on the information provided by actors from different institutions and interest groups, upon which collaboration and competition over influence occurs. These various actors from private and public interest groups can influence decision-making, through formal consultation or as sources of information, expertise and mediation between other institutional actors. In addition, the development of the European institutions and the increasing complexity of their procedural structures have led to a growing number of interest organizations at the European level.

Lobbying exists at all governance levels, so interest groups and lobbyists substantially impact policy outcomes from local to global levels, which can be observed across all stages of the European policy process. Interest groups influence agenda setting in the Commission, policy reformation in Parliament, ratification of regulations and directives of the Council, and the application of law in nation-states. Many scholars assert that the EU relies more heavily on civil society actors than any other government in the world.

Due to a lack of regulations of lobbying in the EU context, it is clear that transparency is a central concern in this realm of civil society. Without regulation there remains quite a big problem with the dark side of this natural part of the democratic decision-making processes: corruption. This cause for concern is not only on the side of the lobbyist, but as it stands, there is no single organization that can determine if an EU official has acted unethically.

There exists a symbiotic relationship between EU officials and lobbyists, more often referred to as a resource-dependent relationship because most MEPs, assistants, and parliamentary policy advisors cannot imagine conducting their work without interest groups. Lobbyists provide information and translate complex and technical information into brief digestible notes for the MEPs.

In order to increase transparency by lobbyists, one option would be to instate safeguards and full disclosure requirements to supplement a mandatory register. Registration in the Transparency Register should be made compulsory. This would facilitate the assessment of asymmetry regarding access and influence by ensuring disclosure by all major actors. Over time, this would create a more complete and accurate picture of lobbying in Brussels, especially concerning corporate privileges and secrecy. To add another layer of controls and enhance a mandatory register, the Commission would establish safeguards against under reporting by lobbyists. The register would implement regular checks on registrations. Significant enforcement of the rules to highlight any loopholes, while ensuring full disclosure by all actors, would also be a meaningful addition to this option. Due to the subsequent changes, lobbyists would likely require guidance on disclosure requirements. A further option to address this aspect would be to establish an advisory board by which lobbyists would be able to voice their concerns or questions as a means to reduce the margin of error of disclosure and increase the credibility of information provided by the register. Moreover, the board would annually publish the names of lobbyists that have been found to be in breach of the rules as an accountability mechanism so that this can be transparent for public scrutiny. When considering policy options to address accountability and representativeness, the major question posed is how to best regulate the lobbying process at the EU level in order to ensure transparency as well as equal and full access for the public. For this sector of civil of society, there is currently no uniform way of consulting all stakeholders in the EP. Instead, it is left to individual MEPs to decide how they want to consult lobby groups. Therefore, the EU should focus on improving the lobbying consultation process. By prompting open and equal discussion of issues that prevent narrow-minded decision-making, all stakeholders would have a chance to present their views. The EP should facilitate a system, deemed a “lobbying interaction report,” whereby the public can see which interest representatives the MEPs consulted. The report would require individuals working on legislative texts to list all individuals and interest groups they have consulted with or received advice from during each stage of the drafting process. The purpose of the “lobbying interaction report” would be to bring additional transparency to the policy process by allowing constituents to see which specific interest groups or stakeholders their MEPs have contacted and provided input to in the process. The information published on the website would pertain to meetings where they would list the names of all MEPs involved in the discussion, when and where the meeting was held, the name of the lobbyist and their organization’s title, respective clients, and the issue discussed. MEPs would also publish a list on their associated website indicating consultation opportunities as well as, any formal prearranged meetings that were held with lobbyists bimonthly.