COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM IN THE EU

A major challenge to Europe is the increasing travel of European citizens, mostly young men to and from Syria seeking to join forces opposing the Asad regime. Many of them end up in the ranks of violent extremist groups such as al-Nusrah Front or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). These “foreign fighters” spark increasing concerns, and actions to address them, by European countries worried about the growing number of their citizens travelling to the battlefield and possibly returning radicalized. European governments, in particular the EU and several member states affected by this phenomenon, have taken action to assess the problem and to devise an array of responses to discourage their citizens from going to Syria to take part in the conflict. These efforts range from new administrative procedures to prevent travel to Syria, to steps to counter recruitment and facilitation efforts, and programs to investigate and/or reintegrate persons returning from conflict zones.

Austria: The BVT monitors Austrian Islamist fighters returning from the civil war in Syria, radicalized individuals among second and third-generation immigrants, and religious converts. Austria has a broad legal framework to combat terrorism. Relevant statutes criminalize training in terrorist camps abroad and allow telephone surveillance of individual suspects or small groups with the permission of an independent judge or ombudsman. The Austrian Parliament has passed the country’s new National Security Strategy, which emphasizes international cooperation to fight terrorism and cybercrime. The document also identifies “successful integration of immigrants” as a prerequisite to prevent radicalization.

Belgium: Belgium maintains an effective counterterrorism system, overseen by the Ministries of Interior and Justice. Significant numbers of Belgian foreign fighters have travelled to Syria, and in response, the Belgian government formed a task force focused on countering radicalization, preventing prospective fighters from travelling to the region, monitoring returnees, and arresting and prosecuting recruiters, facilitators, and those returnees who represent a clear threat. Belgium has taken a lead role in EU discussions on foreign fighters. Belgium has the highest per capita number of Syrian foreign fighters of any European country; Belgian government estimates range from 100 to more than 200. Most returnees are connected to the radical Salafist group Sharia4Belgium, which formally disbanded in 2012, although its members remain active in Syria or as recruiters in Belgium. Some of the individuals arrested have been released on parole, subject to police monitoring, while others remain in detention, pending trial. Among the components of the government’s strategy on preventing radicalization is an effort to counter violent extremist messaging on the internet. The government’s strategy on preventing radicalization to violence also includes an interagency effort in support of local government actors who work with returnees from Syria to monitor their reintegration into society and provide them with guidance and support.

Bulgaria: An influx of asylum seekers from Syria has exacerbated border security challenges, raised interethnic tensions, and challenged underfunded state agencies. There are concerns that this flow of people could allow some foreign fighters to transit in and out of Bulgaria. The Interior Ministry continues to host operational units responsible for deterring, detecting, and responding to incidents, including the Specialized Unit for Combating Terrorism, Security Police, and Special Police Forces. Specialized law enforcement units are properly equipped and supported with relevant training.

Cyprus: The Government of the Republic of Cyprus collaborates closely with the United States, the EU, and other countries, bilaterally and multilaterally in international counterterrorism efforts. The Republic of Cyprus enacted a National Law on Combating Terrorism in 2010 that incorporates EU Council Framework Decisions. The criminal code has been used to prosecute terrorism-related offenses. In 2013, the Acting Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Justice and Public Order, in his capacity as Cyprus' National Counterterrorism Coordinator, supervised an ad hoc interagency committee to draft a new National Counterterrorism Strategy for the Republic of Cyprus that will be based on the four pillars of the corresponding EU strategy: “Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Respond.” The strategy’s aim is to reduce the terrorist threat in Cyprus while safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms. The committee consulted relevant government departments of the Republic of Cyprus and cooperated with similar authorities in the UK and the United States to prepare the strategy. Cyprus National Police (CNP) created and put into practice a screening watchlist mechanism. On the CNP’s Counterterrorism Office watchlist, among others, are all persons subject to travel bans and asset freezing sanctions by UNSCRs and EU decisions concerning terrorism. The Aliens and Immigration Unit of the Cyprus Police, in cooperation with FRONTEX, has also prepared a strategic plan to combat illegal immigration and relevant cross-border crime. The plan includes: information exchange with other EU member states and third countries; participation in FRONTEX operations; and activities to train border guards in passport control issues and profiling of immigrants, potential victims, and suspects involved in serious organized crime and terrorism. The Cypriot Police's Counterterrorism Office also participates regularly in various regional working groups, including the EU Police Working Group on Terrorism, the Working Group on Terrorism of the EU Council, Europol’s High-level Expert Meetings and First Response Network, and the European Expert Network on Terrorism. Cyprus, as a member of the Terrorism Working Party of the Council of the EU, participated in the recent revision of the EU’s Radicalization and Recruitment Action Plan. The Cyprus Police, as well as other services of the Republic of Cyprus, are implementing various measures of the Radicalization and Recruitment Action Plan and are participating in Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) meetings. The Police’s Counterterrorism Office is focused on the ongoing training of first line police officers and prison employees about radicalization to violence. The Counterterrorism Office participated as a partner in the Community Policing and the Prevention of Radicalization (COPPRA) project. The COPPRA-produced training manuals are fully incorporated into the training programmes on radicalization to violence that were created and implemented by the Cyprus Police’s Counterterrorism Office. The prevention of recruitment and radicalization to violence also falls under the first pillar of PREVENT of the National Counterterrorism Strategy of the Republic of Cyprus.

Denmark: The Kingdom of Denmark (Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands) has devoted significant assets to counterterrorism programmes, as well as to initiatives that seek to counter violent extremism in Denmark and abroad. Denmark remains a target of terrorist groups, including al-Qa’ida. In 2012 and 2013, a new trend arose of Danish citizens and residents of the Muslim faith voluntarily leaving Denmark to fight in Syria. Danish security services have focused on addressing this trend; there is concern that Danish fighters in Syria could be exposed to terrorist ideology and training before returning to Denmark. As of the end of 2013, Danish authorities announced they had identified 90 Danes who left Denmark in 2013 to fight in Syria for opposition groups, including known terrorist groups.

France: The Government of France is concerned about the possibility of attacks against its interests inside and outside of Syria, Mali, and across the Sahel. France recognizes the potential threat posed by its nationals travelling abroad to join terrorist organizations or to fight in Syria. In December 2012, the French government adopted counterterrorism legislation that allows authorities to prosecute French citizens who return to France after committing an act of terrorism abroad, or after training in terrorist camps with the intention of returning to France to commit terrorist attacks. France passed legislation expanding the scope of the government’s domestic surveillance powers , which has raised data privacy concerns by some groups. France has a system of non-jury courts for terrorism trials and a broad definition of what is considered a terrorist offense the so-called “association of wrongdoers” offense, which allows it to cast a wide net and imprison a broad range of suspects. Under French law, foreigners can be deported if they are believed to pose a serious threat to public order. Throughout the year, France monitors French citizens wanting to go to Syria to fight against the regime of Bashar al-Asad. The Government of France considers its integration programmes for all French citizens and residents a major tool in countering radicalization to violence and violent extremism in France. Many of these programmes target disenfranchised communities and new immigrants. For example, the Ministry of Education works to instill "universal values" in all French pupils, regardless of ethnic origin or country of birth. Ministry regulations mandate that all French public schools teach civic education, and that all students attend school until age 16. The French government also offers adult vocational training for older immigrants and minorities who never attended French schools. The Ministry of the Interior plays a significant role in countering radicalization by increased police presence in disenfranchised areas, neighbourhoods, and regions with high criminality and juvenile delinquency rates. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) implements rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for former criminals.

Germany: The threat from violent extremism remains high . In 2013, Germany investigated, arrested, and prosecuted numerous terrorist suspects and disrupted terrorist-related groups within its borders with connections to al-Qa’ida (AQ) and other violent Islamist extremists, Kurdish nationalist, and neo-Nazi terrorist organizations. Security authorities are concerned about the estimated 240 Islamists that have departed Germany for Syria, some with the intention to hand over donations collected in Germany, others to join violent Islamist extremist groups fighting the Asad regime because they could be trained in Syria and return with the intent to commit terrorist acts.  The Joint Terrorism and Defense Center (GTAZ) serves as the central coordination body for information sharing and interagency collaboration on AQ-inspired terrorism. The national conference of state Ministers of Interior wants to increase efforts to analyze and counter the appeal of violent extremism, particularly with regard to individuals believed to be considering travel to Syria to fight in the conflict there. The Federal Ministry of the Interior continues its counter-radicalization assistance center for parents and friends of violent extremists; the center was established in January 2012. Germany continues its HATIF (the Arabic word for telephone) programme to assist violent extremists with reintegration. The Interior Ministry also continues a project, first launched in 2001, to prevent radicalization among young right-wing violent extremist offenders.

Italy: Italy aggressively investigates and prosecutes terrorist suspects, dismantles terrorist-related cells within its borders, and maintains a high level of professional cooperation with international partners in all areas. Terrorist activity by domestic anarchists and other violent extremists remains a threat. The Italian government continues to make use of reinforced counterterrorism legislation enacted in 2005 that facilitates detention of suspects, mandates arrest for crimes involving terrorism, and expedites procedures for expelling persons suspected of terrorist activities. Italian law enforcement remains advanced in its capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. The Ministry of Justice Penitentiary Police continues financing counter-radicalization programmes to train agents working in prisons where persons convicted of international terrorism were incarcerated.

The Netherlands: The Netherlands continues to respond effectively to the global terrorist threat in the areas of border and transportation security, terrorist financing, and bilateral and international counterterrorism cooperation. Cooperation with U.S. law enforcement remains excellent. There is an uptick in the number of Dutch nationals or residents travelling to conflict areas (especially Syria) that could constitute a threat when they return to the Netherlands. Other factors related to the threat level include: increased signs of radicalization in small groups of young Muslims domestically, the increase in scope of some terrorist networks in the Middle East and North Africa to operate freely, and that the Netherlands may have been elevated as a target in the eyes of violent extremists because of Dutch involvement in military missions in various Muslim countries, as well as alleged discrimination against Muslims in the Netherlands itself. Domestic lone wolves remain on the radar. Resilience by the Dutch population to terrorism remains high. The Netherlands continues to make use of counterterrorism legislation that facilitates arrests and convictions. The Netherlands’ law enforcement institutions demonstrate a capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist threats. There is both good interagency cooperation and national-local municipality cooperation. The main partners in the national Counterterrorism Strategy include the Ministry of Security and Justice, under which the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV)  Public Prosecutors Office, and National Police fall; local governments (the mayor being responsible for public order); and the Ministries of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (responsible for the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)); Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs and Employment, and Defense. Dutch citizens leaving to join foreign fighters has the potential to result in increased financial support for terrorist groups originating from the Netherlands. Dutch authorities are involved in monitoring this and have made changes to their anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance framework to address it. The Netherlands’ international approach is focused on countering radicalization and strengthening the counterterrorism capacity of other countries with special attention to human rights and the rule of law. In 2013, the Dutch focus increasingly turned to national security and the foreign fighter issue; the Netherlands sought bilateral, multilateral, and international opportunities for exchanging information and experiences. The Dutch also cooperated in an informal, ad hoc basis with other EU member states interested in how EU systems could better manage the travelling foreign fighter problem. The resilience of the Dutch population to violent extremism is high. In general, efforts by political and religious leaders to promote violent extremism seem to have little effect on Muslim communities or the general population as a whole. In 2013, however, there were indications of increasing radicalization, and some increasing radicalization to violence, among small groups of young Muslims and a sharp rise in the amount of propaganda on the internet including social media that openly promoted participation in the Syrian conflict. The government assessed that the open manifestation of pro-jihadist sentiments by young people suggested increased self-confidence and militancy. The main focus areas of countering violent extremism efforts are persons who travel to combat zones and identifying lone actors. Under the localized approach, the national government serves in advisory and capacity-building roles. The NCTV develops tools and training and offers them to schools, social workers, and other stakeholders, both directly and through an online database. Local partners are expected to build upon the knowledge and experiences generated in the past. National support of the local approach is focused on: identifying high-priority areas that are of interest to, or might host, radicalized individuals; and developing specific plans and approaches. Programmes are tailored by local governments around individuals of concern and focus on identification, investigation, and prosecution. There are a handful of programmes, administered to individuals, which focus on disengagement and rehabilitation.

Spain: Spain has deepened its cooperation with Algeria, Mali, and Mauritania to combat and contain the threat posed by al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The Spanish Criminal Code specifically punishes any act of collaboration with the activities or purposes of a terrorist organization. Spain’s law enforcement units focused on counterterrorism have effectively demonstrated their capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. Specialized law enforcement units possess the necessary and clear chain of command to effectively carry out their mission.

Sweden: According to the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO), the most significant threat to Sweden is al-Qa’ida (AQ)- inspired individuals or groups. AQ-inspired violent extremists in Sweden and abroad continue to see Sweden as a target for attacks.  Individuals associated with AQ-inspired violent extremist groups in Sweden continue to have contacts with foreign terrorist networks. The contacts include financial and logistical support as well as recruitment of individuals to travel to conflict areas to attend terrorism-related training and combat. SÄPO is concerned by the numbers of foreign fighters who have left Sweden to join violent extremist groups in Syria and confirmed that at least 75 individuals have traveled to Syria, which is more than the combined travel to all other conflict zones, and saw no indication that the travel is decreasing. The Swedes view returnees as a particular concern as these individuals have the potential to plan an attack in Sweden or radicalize and recruit others for travel. The travellers are mostly men aged 18 to 30, but there also have been women who travelled to support the fight in Syria. The Swedish foreign fighters frequently use social media to circulate photos of “martyrs” and recruitment videos that target a Swedish audience. SÄPO has the main responsibility to counter terrorism in Sweden and has demonstrated the capability to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. Sweden’s interagency counterterrorism cooperation takes place mainly within the Counterterrorism Cooperative Council that includes 13 government agencies, as well as in the National Center for Terrorism Threat Assessment that produces long- and short-term strategic assessments of the terrorist threat against Sweden and Swedish interests. There is timely sharing of terrorism-related information and prosecutors are consulted at early stages of investigations and work in coordination with counterparts in other components of law enforcement. The Minister responsible for countering violent extremism (CVE) issues has instructed the Dean of the Swedish National Police Academy to conduct a study to define the presence in Sweden of AQ-inspired and left- and right-wing violent extremism.

United Kingdom: In 2013, the UK continued to play a leading role in countering international terrorism. The UK government continued to implement its updated counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST, which was released in 2011. This update of CONTEST set out the UK’s strategic framework for countering the terrorist threat at home and abroad for 2011-2015. In 2013, the conflict in Syria proved to be a galvanizing force for UK-based Muslim individuals and organizations. The threat of European fighters travelling to Syria and then returning home radicalized to violence and dangerous drew significant attention and resources. UK laws allow the government to investigate and prosecute terrorists using a variety of tools. In 2013,  a key piece of security legislation, the Justice and Security Act, was passed into law. The bill closed a significant legal loophole in the UK government’s ability to protect classified information; allowed “closed material proceedings” in civil courts, thus enabling the government’s use of classified information to defend itself in civil cases; and strengthened parliamentary oversight of the intelligence community. The UK has a highly capable network of agencies involved in counterterrorism efforts. The Metropolitan (Met) police leads the UK’s national counterterrorism law enforcement effort. The Met police works closely with local police, MI5, and other agencies in terrorism investigation, prevention, and prosecution. The UK has issued machine readable passports with an imbedded electronic chip since 2006. UK travel documents and visas contain a number of security features to prevent tampering and fraud. The UK has advanced biometric screening capabilities at some points of entry, but at others there is no screening at all. The UK has no statutory ability to collect advance passenger name records (PNR). It is against EU regulations for the UK to collect PNR information on commercial flights originating from within the EU. In 2007, the UK launched its Prevent strategy to counter radicalization. Prevent is part of the government’s overall national counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST. In 2011, Prevent was revised to correct several perceived problems. There had been complaints from members of Muslim organizations that UK government interaction with their communities was focused solely on security concerns. As a result, the UK divided the responsibilities for various strands of Prevent among different government organizations. The Department of Communities and Local Government took over responsibility for “integration” work, designed to ensure that Muslim communities received all the government services to which they were entitled and that immigrants were given assistance to integrate into British society. The Home Office focused on countering the ideology of violent extremism, including the identification of at-risk youth and their referral to counselling programmes. The revised strategy called for a much more focused effort to target those most at risk of radicalization. Finally, the government decided that organizations that hold “extremist views,” even those that are non-violent, will not be eligible to receive government funding or participate in Prevent programmes. Further actions that could be taken to disrupt violent extremists include promoting integration, and preventing radicalization, particularly in schools and prisons.

Countering Terrorism 

Reports indicate that over 1,000 EU citizens have traveled to join the fighting in Syria. Meanwhile, EU security agencies and lawmakers are trying to balance between protection and freedom as they look for legislation to arm agencies in their fight against EU jihadists.

However, the nature and speed of counterterrorism actions have meant that Europeans have experienced unprecedented surveillance procedures that have raised controversy and objections, as some of the officials view them as a threat to public liberties. The real threat that terrorists, particularly the Islamic State, pose is the attack against dearest values, which they take advantage of to achieve their own gains.

At Europol headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands, nearly 800 employees provide daily coordination among police agencies in the 28 EU member states, lead joint operations and cooperate with the European intelligence services.

Measures to counter the risk of “jihadists” harm public liberties and lead to restrictions on “Europeans' freedom of preserving an unknown identity online and on the freedom of travel and movement, which is guaranteed in the EU. A common European policy to confront this phenomenon has been in the works since June 2013.

Since then, the number of European jihadists has doubled and official figures estimate that there are over 3,000 jihadists at present.

Europe has adopted unprecedented measures, most recent of which is the implementation of a systematic and simultaneous inspection on the outer limits of the Schengen Zone. Even the citizens of the 26 European countries in the Schengen Zone, who are free to travel within this zone as internal borders were abolished, will be required to have their travel documents checked by electronic surveillance devices. Previously, inspection was conducted on intermittent occasions, through random surveillance, but the Schengen Information System will now be used after its inclusion of the names of wanted or suspected “jihadists.”

European fears that jihadists will conduct terror attacks if they come back from Syria with combat experience have caused unprecedented moves.

Stripping citizens of European citizenship is taking place in both Britain and the Netherlands and is subject to debate in other countries, including France, Belgium and Spain. At the same time, France is stripping potential jihadists of their passports in an attempt to prevent them from heading to Syria and Iraq. This crackdown has sparked debate and objections in many quarters. There are those who oppose it because they do not see the practical advantage. Yet, some politicians accuse right-wing governments of exploiting these circumstances to pass their hard-line policies.

The procedure of revoking citizenship is applied to those who hold dual citizenship and who join the fighting within the ranks of extremist groups. Yet, its implementation does not require a judicial conviction, since the collection of evidence, the trial and appeal require a lengthy period. These concerns are also tackled by Eurojust, an EU agency which deals with judicial cooperation among EU member states. The President of Eurojust, Michèle Coninsx, points out that “We should not exaggerate, and we need to balance between countering terrorist threats and guaranteeing freedom of movement and civil liberties".

Fear for civil liberties has become an issue in the work of police and intelligence services, with growing concern about significant violations of the principle of privacy.