CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE U.S.

Author: Thomas Graham, Distinguished Fellow, Council of Foreign Relations (CFR)

1. With its NATO allies, accelerate and expand its current augmentation of forces in vulnerable allies along the frontier with Russia to reassure them—and convince Moscow—of the alliance’s commitment to collective defense.
2. Step up its already intensive schedule of consultations with allies to maintain alliance unity in the face of a burgeoning Russian threat.
3. Develop a long-term plan to reduce Europe’s dependence on imported Russian gas, building on the stopgap measures it is already putting in place to deal with a near-term decision by Moscow to stop flows of gas westward.
4. Consider cutting off energy imports from Russia, and asking the Europeans to do the same, but only after it has prepared the American public for the economic hardship (rising energy costs, inflation) such a step would entail.
5. Accelerate efforts to harden American and allied critical infrastructure against cyber intrusions.
6. Resist the temptation to cut off channels of communication, as past administrations have done in reaction to Russian aggression. (White House−to-Kremlin and military-to-military channels will be critical to reducing misunderstandings that could lead to direct military confrontation between the two countries. In addition, a White House−to-Kremlin link could provide a platform for negotiating an end to the conflict before it spreads beyond Ukraine).
7. Carefully recalibrate its rhetoric to ensure that the confrontation does not turn into an existential one, where victory, whatever that might mean, is the only acceptable outcome. Such a posture would ignore the reality that Russia is unlikely to capitulate in a matter of vital interest—and would escalate rather than surrender. Talk of regime change and possible war crimes charges would probably prove counterproductive and fuel public support for escalation, especially at a moment when polls suggest the war effort enjoys the backing of the vast majority of the Russian population.
8. Avoid appearances that the United States and NATO are waging a conflict against the Russian people. Releasing constructive proposals for resolving the conflict (including provisions for the lifting of sanctions), and urging the Ukrainians to publish reasonable negotiating terms, would be more likely than bellicose warnings to turn the Russian elites and public against the war. Russians need to be persuaded that the United States and Europe are not seeking a punitive peace but are open to a renewal of relations should their country act to end the conflict.
9. Accelerate efforts to get information to the Russian people that would give them a more accurate portrayal of the brutal, unnecessary conflict their leaders are waging allegedly on their behalf. Students and young professionals would be particularly receptive to such information and inclined to protest. 

The mitigating options identified below, with the exception of invoking Article 5, could also be taken now to induce Russia to de-escalate and withdraw from Ukraine.

Mitigating Options

1. Should the conflict spread beyond Ukraine despite U.S. efforts, the task will be to bring it to an end on terms favorable to the United States as quickly as possible. Washington could consider diplomatic initiatives, defensive steps, and sanctions.
2. Diplomatically, Washington could invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to make clear NATO’s determination to come to the aid of members under Russian attack. It could call for an urgent session of the UN Security Council to focus on the threat posed by Russia to international peace and security. The debate would doubtlessly be acrimonious, but the United States needs to make a concerted effort to shape public opinion and isolate Russia as the aggressor. Washington could also propose a P5 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) meeting to discuss steps to reduce the risk of nuclear war. To avoid turning this into a two-bloc standoff between Russia and China and the Western powers, India could be added to the discussion. But New Delhi could resist being drawn into an East-West conflict, as it has in the past.
3. With regard to defensive measures, Washington could enlarge NATO de facto to coordinate strategy and tactics with Sweden and Finland, with an eye to their de jure membership in the near future. It could also send a small NATO contingent to the Balkans (Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia) to warn Serbia and Republika Srpska against aggressive actions against Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4. Concerning sanctions, Washington could build on the sanctions it had already levied to raise the costs further. However, the Biden administration should take care not to provoke severe Russian retaliation or produce spillover effects that cause undue harm to its or its allies’ interests.

Recommendations

The Biden administration is already taking steps to prevent the spread of conflict in Europe and harden the resilience of allies and partners in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: further augmentation of NATO forces, including a greater presence of American troops and equipment, along the entire Russia/NATO frontier stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea; frequent consultations with allies and partners; steps to handle the large-scale exodus of refugees from Ukraine; organization of fuel shipments to Europe from various sources to cover gaps in the event of a Russian cutoff of gas exports; measures to harden U.S. and allied computer networks against attacks. The task is to turn those expedient measures into strategies to fortify the transatlantic community against a prolonged threat from the East, which Russia will continue to pose even if the current crisis is somehow defused in the near future.

In particular, the United States needs to work with its European allies to drastically reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. The goal should be to cut that dependence in half by the end of the decade by fully using the regasification facilities in place, building more, and accelerating work on renewables. In addition, even as the United States and European Union are dealing with the war in Ukraine, they need to recommit themselves to sorting out the continuing problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina and between Serbia and Kosovo to reduce the opportunities for destabilizing Russian interference in the Balkans. Finally, to ease the burden on states bordering Ukraine, the United States should be working with the UNHCR and its allies to develop plans for the long-term resettlement of Ukrainian refugees throughout Europe in case of a long period of instability in Ukraine.

All these steps, however, do not go far enough to deal with the enduring Russia challenge. The Biden administration needs to do more, ideally as part of a larger effort to reposition the United States strategically on the global stage. Critically, the United States should confront the urgent crisis in Europe without unduly sacrificing focus on the strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific, and to prepare for a major change in the geopolitics of the Eurasian supercontinent. A tall order but not an impossible task.

There are three core elements to this task: rethinking NATO, enhancing the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific, and creating a security forum to enhance allies’ support for U.S. policy across Eurasia.

Rethinking NATO. The strategic goal should be the achievement of a near perfect overlap in NATO and EU membership among European states. That would provide the foundation for the development of a united European pillar inside NATO, in a sense resolving the tension between NATO and the EU (if not necessarily between the United States and Europe). The European pillar would assume ever greater responsibility for the defense of the continent, backed up by the American strategic deterrent, thus freeing up American forces to deal with the growing challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. The alliance’s new strategic concept, to be adopted at the Madrid Summit this coming June, provides an opportunity to articulate this goal, as well as to lay out the full breadth and enduring nature of the Russia challenge. The United States should consider pressing for the following steps:

1. Fortify NATO’s eastern border. The alliance should abandon the pledge of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act not to deploy permanent substantial combat forces to new members. It should augment its forces in vulnerable member states, as long as there is no agreement between NATO and Russia to mutually restrict force levels in border zones.
2. Prepare for the eventual membership of Finland and Sweden to reinforce the northern flank. In the face of Russian conduct, the populations of these two countries are reconsidering their long-standing traditions of neutrality. While staying out of the domestic debate, the United States and other allies should indicate that they would welcome the two countries into the alliance and articulate clearly the changing nature of the security environment in the Baltic region brought on by a more aggressive Russia.
3. Repair relations with Turkey. This is a matter primarily for the United States, which has levied sanctions on its ally for its purchase of S-400s, an advanced Russian air defense system. The United States could take a first step by approving the sale to Turkey of the F-16s it has requested. Washington should also look for an opportunity amidst deteriorating relations with Moscow to persuade Ankara to reconsider its purchase of S-400s.
4. Forego expansion into the former Soviet space for an extended period. No one believes that any former Soviet state will be ready for membership for years to come. Without necessarily abandoning the Open Door policy, the alliance should make clear that it will not expand eastward while it focuses on its own consolidation.
5. Enhancing the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific. In the face of a prolonged conflict in Europe, the United States will still have to expend considerable resources to preserve and advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific. To reassure its allies and partners of its commitment, it will need to maintain, if not increase, the tempo of its military activities, including freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea; renew its efforts to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan; and preserve its military presence in Japan and South Korea. Australian-British-U.S. military cooperation, symbolized by the submarine deal of last fall, should be expanded in the years ahead. At the same time, Washington should continue to deepen strategic cooperation among the Quad. A special effort should be made to enhance strategic cooperation with India and reduce its reliance on Russia for military hardware and nuclear power.
6. Creating a new security forum. To link its interest in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, Washington should consider forming a small security forum to enhance allies’ support for U.S. policy across Eurasia. Those partners could include Canada in North America; France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in Europe; and Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific region—a new G12 of sorts. The United States could use this forum to underscore its commitment to Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, help its allies in the two regions gain a better sense of their mutual security and economic well-being, and, where possible, coordinate strategies. One major topic for this forum would be dealing with the growing Russia-China strategic alignment. Conflict in Europe will only push Russia and China closer together, at least initially. But Russia’s aggressive behavior undermines the stability that China requires to build its commercial and technological ties with Europe. The G12 could explore ways its members could exploit and increase this friction to attenuate the Russia-China ties, thereby improving the security situation in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific region.

As the United States repositions itself in the global arena, it will need to come to an understanding with its allies on how it wants a broader conflict with Russia to end. In a prolonged conflict, Moscow will seek to divide the allies in part through calls for peace negotiations. When to negotiate is a delicate question on which the United States and its allies are sure to have different opinions. Washington will have to work hard to forge a consensus. Both victory and defeat will be hard to define. But given the destructiveness of modern weaponry and the ever-present risk of escalation to the nuclear level, a negotiated settlement, in which neither side wins or loses, is to be preferred to pressing for victory—that is, Russia’s capitulation. It should be possible to find one that leaves the transatlantic community stronger and peace in Europe more secure.