THE CONFLICTED POLITICIANS IN THE NEXT EP

To constitute an official party group in the next EP, the rues state the following: “25 Members are needed to form a political group, and at least one-quarter of the Member States must be represented within the group. Members may not belong to more than one political group.”  

The future Eurosceptic parliamentary group might include the FN (France), PVV (Netherlands), Liga Nord (Italy), the European Alliance for Freedom (which includes the Freedom Party (Austria) Vlaams Belang (Belgium), Front National (France), Citizens in Rage (Germany), Sharon Ellul-Bonici, Independent  ( Malta), Sweden Democrats (Sweden), Godfrey Bloom, Independent, formerly UKIP (United Kingdom), Paksas Rolandas (Lithuania).

While the far right will undoubtedly have enough parties and seats to form an official party group, history teaches us that the chances that this group will be an important political actor in the next EP are slim to none. Rather than changing Europe, this new group will probably continue the tradition of “conflicted politicians” with much bark and little bite.

While  the populist radical right – as well as Eurosceptic parties – will make significant gains in the European Parliament (EP), Populist radical right MEPs face a fundamental conflict. On the one hand, in most cases their ideology commits them to being fiercely critical of the EU – in some cases they want out altogether. At the same time, they benefit from the EU – obtaining money, representation, legitimacy and contacts – and are part of one of its core institutions. This core conflict is manifested in a series of ways.

1. First, some populist radical right MEPs are fiercely against the political consensus in the European Parliament on certain core populist radical right issues – for instance, immigration and ethnic minority rights. Especially anti-consensus parties that are part of the populist radical right family include the Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV), the British National Party (BNP) and Vlaams Belang. When placed in the situation of being part of an institution they dislike, it appears that some populist radical right MEPs react by rebelling against the institution and regularly voting against the majority on the issues that matter to them.
2. Second, populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have struggled to form strong alliances in the European Parliament. The Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group – containing a number of populist radical right parties – has a relatively low cohesion rate compared to other political groups. That is, the EFD’s members often do not vote the same way. The other PRRPs are not attached to any group, largely because they do not have the required number of members to form a political group. This weakness on the populist radical right’s part is rooted in ideological heterogeneity, a fear of stigmatisation, and conflicting nationalisms.
3. Third, the populist radical right has little impact on policy and substantive issues in the European Parliament. When compared to the other political groups, its MEPs participate less often, write fewer reports and opinions, and are less successful at pushing through amendments and winning votes. They rarely hold the balance of power and so have little ‘blackmail power’ to offer the other political groups votes in exchange for advancing their policy interests. Where they have made a difference to a voting decision, it is generally because they have sided with the centre right on a particular issue. This lack of impact appears to be both because populist radical right MEPs are marginalised in the EP and because they have little interest in influencing policy. In particular, the core conflict of populist radical right MEPs between their hostility towards the EU and their role within it may well force them to distance themselves from the policy-making process.
4. Fourth, when it comes to making speeches and asking questions, the populist radical right tends to outdo other MEPs. The populist radical right focuses its role on gaining publicity rather than participating in policy-making activities in the European Parliament. The reason for this is given by the populist radical right’s fundamental conflict in the European Parliament, pitting PRRPs’ antagonism towards the EU against the benefits they receive from having members within the parliament. In response to this conflict, populist radical right MEPs tend to want to be perceived in the media and by national audiences as railing against the system from the inside