THE ‘SPECIAL INTEREST’ LABEL IN THE U.S.

The term "special interest" is one of those terms that makes politics what it is: no one can say exactly what the "special interest" label means, but everyone knows that it doesn't apply to them. "Special interest groups" are made responsible for rising taxes, delays in decision-making, the corruption of politicians, and the antagonistic tone of politics. The trouble is, in trying to locate this phrase in the social-discursive landscape, it is very hard to pin down the extension of the term (i.e., the limits on what groups can count as "special interest groups"), because no one wants to have the "special interest" label pinned on them. This combination of pejorative force and unclear extension makes it a powerful and highly contested keyword.

In many current discussions of special interest groups, another theme emerges. Many of the political commentators who warn of the dangers of "special interest groups" apply the "special interest" label to any organization (aside from political parties) that seeks to affect political decision-making. They then go on to argue for a wholesale rejection of any such groups, as "special interests" undermining "the common good.

Today, a "special interest" can be defined quite generally, for example, as "a body of persons, corporation, or industry that seeks or receives benefits or privileged treatment, especially through legislation. 

For many critics of "special interest groups," however, the problem cuts across party lines; it is a problem that results from the tendency of a politics based on competing interest groups to undermine the common good. This thought provides the basis for several general critiques of interest groups. Most specific critiques of interest-group politics are uncontroversial. Lobbyists often overstep their bounds. Politicians become addicted to the favors and services of some interest groups. Campaign finance laws are inadequate to deal with the pressures that are forcing candidates to turn to political action committees ("PACs") to pay the skyrocketing costs of running their campaigns. These specific critiques provide support for those who argue that interest-group politics is destroying "democracy" in the U.S., but they do not, in themselves, justify the more general critique of interest-groups that underlies the contemporary discourse on "special interests."

What we know:

• Lobbying is widespread throughout the U.S. political system; previous research puts lobbying expenditures at the federal level at approximately five times those of political action committee (PAC) campaign contributions. For instance, in 2012, organized interest groups spent $3.5 billion annually lobbying the federal government, compared to approximately $1.55 billion in campaign contributions from PACs and other organizations over the two-year 2011-2012 election cycle.
• Corporations and trade associations comprise the vast majority of lobbying expenditures by interest groups — more than 84% at the federal level — compared with issue-ideology membership groups, which makes up only 2% of these expenditures.
• While lobbying is presumed to be influential, the actual rate of firms engaging in lobbying is relatively low — approximately 10% of all firms.
• Large corporations and groups are more likely to lobby independently than smaller groups, which tend to lobby through trade associations. Some researchers suggest that smaller groups lack the resources to cover the high fixed costs of a lobbying organization.
• Lobbying efforts often increase when (1) the issues in question are considered more salient; (2) there are high stakes for the organized interest based on certain policy outcomes; and (3) the policy issue is related to budgeting or taxation issues.
• There is mixed evidence on the question of whether lobbyists derive more value from what they know (expertise) or whom they know (personal connections). The fact that some lobbying firms specialize in certain policy areas suggests that issue expertise could be valuable. However, other research suggests the connections might be more important; a study examining revenue of former legislative staffers who become lobbyists found that a lobbyist’s revenue declined 23% after the legislator for whom the lobbyist worked was defeated in an election or retired from Congress.
• Determining and quantifying the impact of lobbying on policy outcomes can be challenging given the many other factors that can influence decisions (omitted variable bias). Using quasi-experimental methods — including differences-in-differences and instrumental variables — could better isolate these causal mechanisms.
• New data could also improve research on lobbying. In particular, detailed transactional data over longer time periods, combined with current archival datasets and other external datasets could be valuable. In addition, it could be useful to examine data outside of the United States to determine the generalizability of any U.S.-based empirical work.