A NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS

Russia has long viewed Europe as an important reference point for values, a civilizational model worthy of emulation. This attitude is rooted in long-standing intellectual traditions, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union Russians genuinely considered the “European path” as the preferred scenario for the country’s development. At some point, that sense of cultural and historical solidarity with Europe was transferred to the European Union as the current form of its institutional organization.

However, there has always been a gap between what was declared and what actually happened in practice. Russia, despite repeating all of the necessary “mantras” for years, has always been guided by pragmatic interests in relation to Europe, and that pragmatism eventually took shape as its official policy. Russian interests primarily included the following: a fair and predictable commercial relationship in the energy field, the free movement of citizens, non-interference by the EU in the internal affairs of countries within Russia’s zone of vital interests and, finally, a sufficient degree of access to the rich European market for competitive Russian goods.

In order for this relationship to develop successfully, it must be based not on ephemeral “common interests and values” (that have never been clearly formulated), or on bringing Russia’s model of development into line with EU’s, but on the clearly enunciated interests of every party. Only through frank dialogue can we work out the rules of behavior and move forward.

Russia needs Europe as a responsible and predictable partner in resolving economic, and to some extent political issues. It is also in the best interest of the European Union to become an independent and fully capable player. We do understand however constraints put on the EU policy by the long-lasting transatlantic relationships and solidarity. Thus Russia must be prepared to work with American partners in order to smooth the objective consequences of these limitations.

The fact that Russian statehood and culture are basically European in nature does not mean that modern Russia must become “Europeanized” according to EU standards. The EU is the specific and current form of interaction among a dominant group of European states – one that does not, on the whole, represent the “end of history” for Europe. The norms and values contained in official EU documents are not an exhaustive list of all European norms and values. Rather, they reflect the vision of the European political establishment at this moment in time. Both that vision – and the membership of the establishment itself – could undergo serious changes as a result of the internal convulsions and increasingly difficult political atmosphere that Europe is experiencing. In a broader sense, we can say that the practice of one player adopting the norms of another is “going out of fashion” in the global community. As an economically and geopolitically polycentric world takes shape, the focus is less on reaching a single, standardized system and more on mutually beneficial harmonization and coexistence. That is how the Eurasian and Asian approaches differ from that of the European Union.

The future model of Russia-EU relations could be defined in the following way: close and adjacent to each other, rather than together. Europe is a large and important neighbor for Russia, and one with which it will always have close and multifaceted ties. Europe remains a source of primarily intellectual resources that are necessary to Russia’s development. Russia has an imperative need to ensure that its Western flank is secure. In addition, the European Union, even in its current weakened form, continues to play a political role in international processes of importance to Russia. However, relations with the European Union cannot and should not be considered a monolithic and rigidly fixed structure. For objective reasons they are fairly fragmented, and formalizing that fragmented status serves Russia’s national interests.

Openness should be the primary principle of these relations. Russia is willing to develop relations with any state or non-state player in the EU, define different priorities at the national or European level and propose initiatives that are targeted at specific political and business partners.

The most important task before Russia with regard to the European Union and its member states is its involvement in the process of reforming the global regulatory environment. That currently takes place within the framework of global institutions such as the “G-20” or as an element of talks on climate change, and the European Union plays a major role in this. Russia should not withdraw itself from influencing these processes, especially because nobody denies that a multiplier effect results when Russia and the EU join political forces to address issues of common interest.

How to move forward

As the first step toward building a new model of relations with the European Union, Russia should put forward the basic principles of the new philosophy guiding those relations, and both sides should take stock of the forms and areas of practical cooperation they have built up over the past 25 years. The first step would enable Russia to develop a coherent policy line, thereby making it easier for the EU to adjust its approach as well. The second would make it possible to identify which elements of that shared experience are most useful going forward, and which are now superfluous. Concerning the second process, it is important to single out the areas that are most effectively managed at the bilateral level with individual EU member states. This bilateral approach should be given equal importance with the Moscow-Brussels dialogue. European partners would do well to be guided by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality that are central to EU rules. In fact, they cannot violate the very EU norms that European Union representatives often cite as evidence of the infeasibility of this or that Russian initiative. This approach is appropriate in the security sphere, for example. Events of recent years have increased the role of the larger member states at the expense of the EU as a whole. At the same time, a unified Europe has largely abstained from resolving the most challenging international security problems.

Russia and the European Union need a new institutional basis for their relationship. The experience accumulated through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement played its role in the early stages, but has since exhausted its potential. This is primarily true of the Permanent Partnership Council that eventually became a largely formal and unsubstantial body as the previous model for Russia-EU relations was dying. These structures must be radically revised at the very least. It is also necessary to involve all interested parties – Brussels, EU member states and private partners – in a formal dialogue on each separate issue or sector of interaction.

It would also be useful to revive the practice of Russia-EU summits. This form of communication enables leaders to discuss the most important problems face to face and to better control the actions of those who execute their decisions. In the EU the problem of the lack of horizontal communication and coordination between the individual operational divisions of the European Commission is becoming increasingly pronounced. Summits that are well prepared at the diplomatic level make it possible to address the greatest possible number of important subjects and to find effective solutions to controversial issues. As for the legal basis of relations, both sides should return to the idea Russia proposed 10 years ago to prepare a short political framework document with the possibility of conducting further work on sectoral agreements. This approach – that the Russian president has repeatedly advocated – would make it possible to more clearly identify and specify each side’s respective interests in every aspect of their cooperation. In general, taking an approach based on specific interests would prevent the parties from finding themselves locked in a “zero-sum game.” If all expectations are clearly laid out in advance, there would be no need to waste time “fumbling around” in an effort to ascertain each partner’s real needs. The parties could then immediately begin by searching for mutually acceptable options.

For its part, the Valdai Club has formulated its own “six principles” that should guide Russia’s interactions with the EU.

1. First is openness toward all partners and a readiness to develop relations with any state or non-state player in the European Union at the national or European level, and to propose initiatives targeted at specific players in the political and business environment of the EU. Relations should be transparent to the public and business community in Russia, Europe and the world. The parties can promote this by involving the representatives of a broad range of nongovernmental organizations and interest groups in the dialogue, relying on input from major economic players and by rejecting all forms of backroom dealing and parliamentary control.
2. Second is inclusiveness of relations. Russia should be comfortable with the fact that some participants in the Eurasian integration project, as well as their economic actors, are interested in maintaining and expanding their ties with the European Union – unless, of course, those ties compromise their EAEU obligations. Wherever possible, cooperation between Russia and the EU or with EU member states should benefit the process of Eurasian integration and help to improve its regulatory framework and practices.
3. Third is subsidiarity and necessity of resolving each question at the most appropriate level: either Russia working with EU member states or with the European Union as a whole. If a question can be decided at the inter-country or interregional level, it should not be put on the agenda for higher-level relations between Moscow and Brussels.
4. Fourth is proportionality of actions and levels of dialogue, which should correspond to the fragmented nature of practical cooperation. It is time to abandon the penchant for making pronouncements and the desire to address all areas of activity. Instead, we should make proportional use of institutional mechanisms for cooperation foremost concerning meetings at the highest level. It is necessary to adapt institutions to the real needs of cooperation and eliminate superfluous formats of dialogue.
5. Fifth is diversification of foreign and external economic relations. Practice has shown that, rather than foster stable relations, over-dependence leads to dangerous imbalances. Russia must gradually reduce the share of the EU in its foreign trade while simultaneously involving the European Union and individual EU member states in broader formats of cooperation – primarily those in Eurasia. These would include involvement by Russia, EAEU member states, China, Iran, India, South Korea, Mongolia and other Eurasian states.
6. Sixth is unconditional rescindment by the EU of its visa ban against all Crimean residents who were granted Russian citizenship after March 2014, as well as all “special” sanctions targeted exclusively at Crimeans. Such targeted “punishment” of Crimean residents runs contrary to basic notions of human rights.

Of course, these are only an initial treatment of these issues. It is necessary to stimulate further discussion on these subjects both within Russia and with its European partners –whether members the European Union or not. Preferably, Brussels would also participate in an official or semiofficial capacity. Only through cooperative efforts can we understand how to avoid repeating the mistakes that brought us to the current impasse and build a new model of relations that will answer the interests of all.