THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN EU AFFAIRS NEEDS TO BE REVISITED

By now, it is not only uncontested that assemblies in the Member States should be kept in the loop of the Union’s activities but also that national parliaments dispose of a full repertoire of different instruments to ensure they can play a direct role in the system. National parliaments’ rights to access information, participation and objection to EU legislation are guaranteed in the Treaties, and seek to complement both the traditional functions of these assemblies – that is, to hold their governments accountable and communicate with their voters – as well as the work of the European Parliament, aiming to safeguard democratic representation and accountability at EU level.

The road ahead points into three possible directions that are not irreconcilable with each other: refining existing instruments, devising additional tools, and revisiting the role of national parliaments at ‘home’.

1. Upgrade the available gear

The first avenue could see the reinforcement and improvement of mechanisms already in place with the aim of beefing up their impact and boosting their credibility in the eyes of national parliaments. In the case of the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM), revisions could include, for example, a more exact definition of the subsidiarity principle, longer deadlines and lower thresholds for national parliaments’ reactions to legislative proposals by the European Commission, and a better coordination of subsidiarity checks across Member States. In addition, the Commission could strengthen its commitment to provide national parliaments with a proper and clear follow-up to the opinions submitted by national parliaments. All these measures could be taken in the framework of the existing Treaties and without the risk of stalling EU decision making. Nevertheless, their efficiency would depend on the readiness and capability of national parliaments to use the EWM in a more constructive manner and not merely as a veto mechanism. Going one step further, a potential transformation of the ‘yellow’ card into a ‘red’ card, giving national parliaments an effective ban and forcing the Commission to withdraw a proposal on grounds of subsidiarity infringement, could also be envisioned but would entail treaty change at a time when the appetite for such revisions is at best limited.

In fact, on 12 January 2014, Conservative members of the UK parliament sent a letter to Prime Minister David Cameron publicly suggesting that the House of Commons should have the right to block new EU legislation and repeal existing policies that threaten Britain’s ‘national interest’.

Additionally, there is scope to reinforce the political dialogue with the Commission and the inter-parliamentary cooperation with the European Parliament in order to facilitate the collection of national parliamentary positions and to enhance transnational political interaction. Concerning the dialogue with the Commission, hearings could, for instance, be held on an institutionalised and regular basis with members of the College in national parliaments (on the floor or in the relevant committee) to present and debate, for example, the Commission’s work programme or the Country-specific Recommendations brought forward in the context of the European Semester. As regards the inter-parliamentary collaboration, the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Economic and Financial Governance of the EU (convened for the first time on 16-18 October 2013 under the Lithuanian EU Presidency) could become a regular platform for networking and exchanges. This Conference could even be turned into a permanent forum for national parliaments to develop and express their views on the Annual Growth Strategy (which sets out the broad EU economic priorities for the year to come) and on recommendations in the framework of the European Semester.

2. Expand the toolkit

A second possible avenue is the introduction of completely new mechanisms to enhance the influence of national parliaments in European affairs and to counter the risk of their growing ‘marginalisation’ that may result in the reform process prompted by the on-going crisis.

There is no shortage of proposals down this road. For example, some advocate the enhancement of COSAC (Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs) – a ‘super COSAC’ – by strengthening its ability to produce more concrete outputs that can directly influence the work of the EU institutions. Others call for the establishment of a separate parliamentary chamber bringing together members of the EP and national assemblies from the countries of the euro area in order to allow them to assume decision-making competences alongside the EU’s main institutional actors. Still others promote the idea of setting up a forum for national parliaments in Brussels to monitor those fields of EU/Eurozone governance where the EP plays no significant role – especially those areas in which the European Council and the Euro Summits have the final say. In addition, there are some who argue that the work and recommendations of the Troika, which have an effect not ‘only’ on individual programme countries but on the EU as a whole, should be thoroughly scrutinised by the EP in an attempt to somehow compensate for the loss of power of national parliaments in the countries concerned. Finally, the introduction of bilateral “Contractual Arrangements” between individual Member States and the Commission (Reform Contracts), which is currently under negotiation, might offer new opportunities for national parliaments. If such an arrangement were to be reached with a given country, the involvement of its national parliament could go beyond the formal role of ratifying this contract. The national parliament in question could actually insist on the right to closely scrutinise the negotiations by their government from the very beginning. Such a comprehensive approach might further strengthen the commitment and public acceptance of the contract negotiated with the European Commission, including any potential country-specific reform programmes attached to it.

As good as such ideas might sound in theory, their feasibility and the details of their actual implementation have not been spelled out yet. On the one hand, it is rather uncertain whether the majority of these proposals would actually have positive consequences given that they might increase the number of potential ‘veto’ players in EU policymaking, and thus the risk of multi-institutional rivalry and obstructions at the expense of efficient decision making. More actors could also add to the complexity of the EU’s institutional setting, making it even harder for citizens to understand how the system works or who is accountable for what. On the other hand, the extent to which national parliamentarians would make use of such new channels if their outcomes were not binding is highly unclear. This is especially pertinent to the suggestion of creating new inter-parliamentary bodies: if the decisions taken by these bodies have no real ‘teeth’ in terms of impact, they would struggle to make a difference and could not foster public support or democratic legitimacy for the EU.

3. Think outside the box

The third and final option invites some fresh thinking by arguing that national parliaments should mainly focus their energies on the domestic political arena, where they stand to have the highest added-value in democratic terms by fulfilling their primary roles: holding governments accountable and communicating with electorates. In this line of reasoning, even if national parliaments’ rights to access information, participation and objection in EU affairs have the potential to bring ‘Europe’ into national debates and closer to citizens, they also ‘distract’ assemblies from their ‘natural’ domestic responsibilities.

Considering that the Council is one of the EU´s two legislative bodies, the most straightforward way for national parliaments to have a say in European policymaking would actually be to scrutinise and shape their governments’ positions before they head off to meetings in Brussels. This approach can boost democratic legitimacy both at national and EU level, as well as having positive spill-over effects on the implementation of EU legislation domestically. At present, the capacity of national parliaments across Member States to control and influence their governments’ actions in the EU is far from uniform or satisfactory. The partial exceptions are still Denmark and Finland, where ministers negotiating in the Council need the approval of the EU Affairs committee in their countries’ parliaments. Other Member States could seek inspiration from these Nordic models in order to further improve the robustness of their parliamentary oversight procedures. Another possible source of inspiration could be the German Bundestag, which – alongside the Danish and Finnish assemblies – is among the most active and influential national parliaments in the EU. The German example is particularly interesting with respect to the administrative reforms it undertook in recent years, which provided the Bundestag with the necessary capacities to tackle the huge additional workload that resulted from successive legal reinforcements of its role in EU policymaking.

Similarly, national parliaments can best help to raise public awareness and interest in European affairs by politicising EU issues at ‘home’. This implies the promotion of political debate, which in turn is a defining function of working democracies. By fostering better communication and deliberation about European affairs, national parliaments can improve the visibility of the EU’s political dimension on the ground, the ability of people to make informed political choices and the capacity of elites to represent the interests and views of their citizens in Brussels. A more interactive relationship between national demoi and their political leaders could then improve democracy both at national and EU level.

National parliaments – like all other actors with a stake in fostering democratic principles – struggle to cope with their multiple roles at different levels of governance in an increasingly complex system of checks and balances. Their primary duty is to identify the most effective channels of influence at their disposal, and to use them responsibly without undermining the functioning of the system at either the national or the European level. EU institutions and governments should focus on providing suitable legal structures, not fig leaves, for a comprehensive involvement of national parliaments and the EP, and should commit to implementing them in practice. The way ahead is likely to be a steep learning curve, but the final destination – a better democratic system for the EU – will make the journey all worth it.