MEMBER STATES GOVERNMENT POSITIONS ON BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS

1. Austria: Euroscepticism specially around the EU migration crisis will define Austrian politics and its approach to EU-UK negotiations.
2. Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia): Waiting for the larger Member States’ positions on Brexit. They will try to find a place for themselves within the emerging coalitions. The Baltic States’ but especially Lithuania’s and Latvia’s economic ties to the UK and potential for losses after Brexit mean they probably will opt for a relationship with the closest possible ties between the UK and the EU, including maintaining full access to the common market along the lines of the European Economic Area. Given the scale of internal EU migration, they will lobby to preserve freedom of movement, in particular treatment of their citizens in the UK, including social support guarantees. 
3. Belgium: Will hold a firm line on the four freedoms. However, domestic politics will soften this position.
4. Bulgaria: Bulgaria is not expected to come up with any red lines on its own. With regard to the general framework for future EU-UK relations, Bulgaria can be expected to align its stance with the big and powerful players, foremost Germany. With regard to specific Central-East European concerns it will probably continue coordination with Eastern partners. Bulgaria will be interested in keeping the UK as part of the Single Market with its freedom of movement. Furthermore, Bulgaria will be interested in a Norwegian type settlement for the UK that sees a full contribution to the EU budget.
5. Croatia: The Croatian view is more symbolic and normative than issue-based. The total of Croatian exports to the UK is just 2%. The UK extended restrictions on the mobility of Croatian workers until 2018, with a possible further extension for another two years after that. Croatia has little incentive to discuss any red-lines in EU-UK negotiations.
6. Cyprus: Given the special status between Cyprus and the UK, the Government will definitely seek to control any adverse effects stemming from Brexit and try to make this development as smooth as possible. Commercial and financial ties between the two countries are of vital importance to the economy of Cyprus, and the number of Cypriot nationals living in the UK (and vice versa) is significantly high. As a result, Cyprus will want to see the UK remain within the European free trading area that also includes free movement of people, so that existing ties will not be jeopardized in any way.
7. Czech Republic: As the UK’s role in Czech foreign trade has been increasing for years and the British export market was the fourth most important for the Czech Republic in 2015, the Czech Republic will seek the UK’s close cooperation with EU countries not only in the area of the internal market, but also in international trade policy. Moreover, the UK’s withdrawal will negatively influence EU regional policy. As a net beneficiary of EU money from structural funds, the Czech Republic will ask for the EU-UK agreement to be similar to the arrangement with other non-EU members in the European Economic Area. There are an estimated 45,000 Czech citizens living in the UK. Therefore, the Czech government will insist on guarantees of non-discrimination of Czech workers in the UK.  
8. Denmark: Will seek to preserve its close economic relationship with the UK and avoid stoking domestic Euroscepticism.  Denmark will strongly support keeping as many political and economic links as possible to the UK. Denmark will support an arrangement that facilitates UK trade with the EU and the internal market. A European Economic Area (EEA) style arrangement may be an aim. One area in which Denmark may take a tougher stance towards the UK is on fisheries i.e. matching UK access to the Danish parts of the North Sea fish stocks with an equivalent access to British fish stocks in a quid pro quo.
9. Estonia: Estonia will need to make its position clear, not least because holding the EU’s Presidency means it will need to lead on such matters. These will include whether it will agree to an EU-UK deal that allows the UK continued access to the Single Market, whether it will expect freedom of movement as part of some UK membership of the EEA, and whether (and how) the UK could be involved in EU cooperation on security matters relating to Russia.
10. Finland: A constructive and pragmatic approach will probably emerge in Helsinki. Any agreement is likely to be assessed vis-à-vis existing arrangements of economic and political association with the EU as well as what is compatible with the EU Treaties. Avoiding disruption to trade and economic links more broadly will be a Finnish priority. Finland will also aim to find pragmatic solutions to questions about Finnish-UK migration. Given the small numbers involved this should not be a difficult question. Finnish positions will also reflect an assessment of the broader economic and political implications of a major member state leaving the EU. In this regard, Finland will most likely attempt to strike a balance between a good and well-functioning EU-UK relationship, and unity and cohesion among the remaining EU27. 
11. France: Will promote a hard line as the French presidential elections approaches. The European Commission  Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier is likely to take a hard line on EU rules and will insist that the UK accepts freedom of movement without exception or nuance if it wants to retain access to the single market. Francois Fillon, the former French prime minister who is in a strong position to be elected president next year, believes Brexit must be "fast" and leave Britain without its crucial financial passport. What Paris is expecting is that Britain will adopt the Nordic trade model, which accepts all EU regulations including the free movement of workers in exchange for access to the single market.
12. Germany: Germany has no interest in a hard Brexit. Germany would like a reasonably amicable Brexit that preserves the stability of both the political and economic frameworks of the EU and Germany but not at any cost. Elections and populism also undermine Ms. Merkel’s ability to corral other Member States.
13. Greece: Greece is not expected to significantly influence Brexit negotiations. Its main priority will be to push for guaranteed that Greek employees in the UK will not be disadvantaged as well as to preserve the harmonious co-operation between the two countries.
14. Hungary: Hungary like other Visegrad countries is a very strong opponent of the UK’s attempt to limit the free ovement of labour, and to cut the in-work and out-of work benefits for migrants coming from the EU. Any further limitation will face strong resistance. Hungary’s primary aim will be to ensure that the Hungarian community living in the UK will not be further discriminated and future job seekers will enjoy the same conditions as far as possible. Approximately 300-500,000 Hungarians currently live in the UK, with the share of immigrants having significantly increased over the past five years. If the EEA model is negotiated then  Hungary and the V4 countries are expected to insist that the EEA rules should not be loosened- so accepting the free movement of people and contribution to the EU budget must remain intact. A flexible agreement between the EU and the UK regarding the financial services market will get the backing of Hungary.
15.  Ireland: As the UK’s nearest neighbour, and the only EU country with which the UK shares a land-border, Ireland arguably has more at stake in a Brexit negotiation than any other Member State. A protracted negotiation, and a UK outside the customs union, common commercial policy and/or single market, leaves Ireland with any or all of the following outcomes: disruption to investment arising from market uncertainty; trade disruptions and restrictive tariffs on agricultural goods and other produce; the certain return of a customs regime between Ireland and Northern Ireland; and the possible return, however unlikely, of passport controls at the Northern Irish border, which could have knock-on effects for the fragile Northern Irish peace settlement. The ideal for Ireland would naturally be an agreement that preserves critical aspects of today’s mutually beneficial relationship, and it is not difficult to divine two broad Irish priorities here: preserving the Common Travel Area (CTA) between the UK and Ireland, currently protected by a joint British-Irish opt-out of the Schengen zone; and limiting disruption to the €1billion weekly trade flows across the Irish Sea, particularly with respect to the agri-food industry, which accounts for about a third of Irish exports to the UK.
16. Italy: The new Italian government might well adopt a pragmatic attitude and pursue its national interests, leaving aside other political considerations. The Italian government will want to avoid any deal that limits British access to the single market which could negatively affect economic relations between the two. Italy might ask to trade British access to the single market with concessions from the UK in the fields of security and immigration. Italian input to the EU-UK negotiations will be based on national interests to maintain good relations with the UK.
17. Latvia: In relation to migration and the economy, Brexit will have a heavy impact on Latvian citizens. The UK is among the most popular destinations for Latvian migrants, many of them residing in the country permanently (but not necessarily with a permanent resident status). The Latvian government will insist that any changes to the current structures of cooperation should be done in accordance with EU legislation and should be based on mutual interests and ways that safeguard the EU project.
18. Lithuania: Both the UK and Lithuania have long-standing economic ties. Furthermore, with more than 100,000 Lithuanian citizens living in Britain, they could be left outside the Single market. Their rights and standing will be a central concern for Lithuania
19. Luxembourg:  The Luxembourg government will insist that the UK keep most of the EU acquis in order to maintain the free access to the single market for its goods and services. On financial services, especially the fund industry, Luxembourg will expect the UK to show equivalence of the rules and potentially accepting a certain degree of regulatory cooperation to continue trading. Brexit potentially means that the right to distribute and sell financial products in the European Union for firms regulated in the UK (so-called passporting) will be lost. Luxembourg can insist on the UK respecting the acquis and EU financial regulations or make a plea for all euro transactions to be settled within a Eurozone country. Luxembourg could be rather accommodating on most other fronts if the UK wanted the maximum  option of free trade. It would try to work out the most comprehensive trade deal with the UK, but would insist on respecting the acquis. EEA membership would possibly be the preferred option.
20. Malta: Malta is one of a group of EU Member States which are most likely to be negatively affected by Brexit. The most exposed countries are Ireland, Malta, Belgium, the Netherlands, Cyprus and Luxembourg whose exports of goods and services to the UK are at least 8% of GDP. The Malta government is well aware of the possible effects of Brexit on the Maltese society, depending of course on what kind of agreement Britain manages to negotiate.
21. Netherlands: The Dutch will aim to agree favorable trade relations with the UK and minimize disruption while at the same time discouraging Euroscepticism. The Hague will be interested in offering the UK access to the single market, but this will not be a blank check. The Dutch government will likely demand Britain pay into the EU budget in return for market access. It might be more lenient than other Member States and allow for some British restrictions on the freedom of movement of workers. But the Dutch will be wary of setting a precedent for ‘a Europe à la carte’ and rewarding London’s ability to cherry-pick those parts of the EU it likes. With Britain’s withdrawal, the Netherlands will start to lean more towards Germany, and Berlin will shape how the Dutch approach the withdrawal talks.
22. Poland: The Polish government will likely go the extra mile to help the UK negotiate a good deal on its future relations with the EU. The Law and Justice party may also think that if it offers the UK a helping hand in the withdrawal negotiations, ‘post-Brexit’ Britain will subsequently return the favour. The Polish government will  most likely expect Britain to carry on with payments into the EU budget, albeit perhaps at lower levels, in return for the access to single market. Poland  will be reluctant to compromise on the principle of free movement if ‘post-Brexit’ Britain wants full access to the common market. Poles make up the largest group of EU nationals living in the UK, with estimates surpassing 853,000 people.  Warsaw will surely attempt to mitigate the legal uncertainty for its citizens, and will urge other EU member-states to make the protection of rights of EU citizens living in the UK a priority in the withdrawal negotiations
23. Portugal: Portugal will most probably push for close ties between the remaining 27 and the UK, namely allowing British access to the single market and freedom of movement to continue. In that sense, Portugal will possibly want to see minimal disruption for those areas and so push for a European Economic Area (EEA) style of arrangement with the UK. Moreover, Portugal will most likely seek substantial British involvement in the foreign and security policy of the EU, while continuing to emphasize the importance of a good relationship between the Union and NATO.
24. Romania: Free movement will be a redline for Bucharest. Continued free-movement as part of some new UK-EU relationship that sees the UK remain in the EEA, will be something Romania will push hard for.
25. Slovenia: Due to its relatively small size and asymmetric relationship with the UK and other large powers, Slovenia will be in a weak position. It will be shaped by the positions of the UK and other large Member States. However, given the negative public opinion of the UK in Slovenia, the Slovene government will be in an unfavourable position towards granting concessions to the UK.
26. Spain: Will not play a significant role in exit negotiations as it should due to domestic distractions. However, it will seek to prioritize sovereign disputes around Gibraltar and undermine any attempts by parts of the U?K to negotiate varying levels of EU membership.
27. Sweden: The softer the Brexit, the better. The UK is the third largest market for Sweden but at the same time the Swedish position is that the EUcannot move away from the four freedoms. Sweden will aim for a close bilateral relationship with the UK, a close relationship between the EU and UK and a UK that is engaged in European security.
28. Visegrad (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic): Will oppose any Brexit agreement that limits freedom of movement particularly access to the labour market for its nationals.

Positions on the EU side

1. The ‘French axis’, consisting of the French President, the Belgian Prime Minister and President Juncker of the Commission and supported by President Schulz of the European Parliament. They see UK exit as an opportunity to push ahead with further wide-ranging integration options. They favour a ‘hard line’ in negotiating a future relationship with the UK to send a signal to other doubters that it is not possible to have the benefits of EU membership without the obligations.
2. The other view within the EU, voiced by the Dutch, Danes and central European countries and supported by Chancellor Merkel until now, is that the UK should be given time to resolve its internal political difficulties. However, whether these leaders are prepared to take a softer approach on the terms of negotiating a future trade relationship is less clear. Relevant to this is that there will be elections in important EU countries next year, beginning with the Dutch general election before March 2017, the French Presidential elections in April and May, and German elections in September or October. Depending on the outcome of these elections, the UK could be negotiating with a rather different EU in twelve months’ time.