EUROPEAN SHIFT TOWARD RUSSIA

A shift is coming to the European order: toward accommodating, rather than countering Russia. Since the end of World War II, European leaders have maintained their ever-growing alliance as a bulwark against Russian power. Through decades of ups and downs in Russian-European relations, in periods of estrangement or reconciliation, their balance of power has kept the continent stable.

But a growing movement within Europe that includes Mr. Fillon, along with others of a more populist bent, is pushing a new policy: instead of standing up to President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, stand with him.

Mr. Fillon has called for lifting sanctions on Russia and for partnering with Moscow in an effort to curtail immigration and terrorism. He is friendly with Mr. Putin. If Mr. Fillon wins the French presidency in the spring, he could join several rising European politicians and newly elected leaders who are like-minded.

Balance-of-power theory states that, when a country like Russia rises, the other states in that region have three choices.

1. They can counter by escalating against the rising power.
2. They can flip sides to join the rising power or
3. They can accommodate the rising power, allowing it a greater stake in the region.

To the degree that is already changing, European states seem to be eyeing the third option: to accommodate Russia’s rise, indulging enough of Moscow’s demands to restore stability.

As soon as one country breaks from the united front against Russia, each European country will look to cut its own deal with the Russians. That could mean granting Russia concessions in Syria, lifting the European Union sanctions that were meant to force an end to the continuing war in eastern Ukraine, or tolerating greater Russian influence in Eastern Europe.

It is impossible to predict where these trend lines lead, not because they are in doubt but because they foretell such extreme changes in the European order that their consequences vary too widely to pin down.

A key argument against the implementation of further sanctions and the potential renewal of the current sanctions regime is that it substantially hinders large-scale and long-term European projects in Russia while delivering arguably limited political gains for the EU. EU sanctions on Russia are currently blocking access to the Russian market for European companies. For instance, for Italy alone, sanctions are currently freezing up to €32 billion in already signed contracts concerning joint Italian and Russian projects in the energy sector. More broadly, EU sanctions on Russia are hindering long-term joint technology and research projects that would take a long a time to restart.

The potential discrepancy between the official political line of the EU and private sector interests is likely to underscore an underlying disunity within EU member states concerning their overall Russia stance.

A second factor feeding disunity is generated by the economic impact of Moscow’s own counter-measures. According to studies published in June 2016, the overall cost of Russian counter-sanctions on the EU has been approximately €60 billion. The EU’s export-oriented agricultural sector is mainly affected by this situation.

Russia has implemented a ban on agricultural and food imports, which has substantially affected EU member states’ economies. In Italy, Russian sanctions have so far led to a commercial loss of approximately €800 million.  During the summer of 2016, Belgian farmers staged several protests after they had to throw away large quantities of their produce due to their inability to export it. Similar events have been unfolding throughout the EU with Polish farmers seeing agricultural product prices fall by up to 20 percent in 2016. Moreover, Russian sanctions against the EU are also having negative effects on states associated with. For instance, in 2015 Iceland saw its fish exports to Russia drop by 50 percent. This is a substantial development as the fishing industry accounts for 10 percent of Icelandic exports.

The weakening of agricultural export-oriented sectors among EU member states due to Russian counter-sanctions is likely to further increase the economic woes faced by a whole branch of EU economies. Throughout 2015, farmers have been protesting in several western European countries due to their opposition to EU and national policies. There is a realistic possibility that Russian counter-measures will create a further divide between national and EU institutions as well as local farmers; a situation which could indirectly play into upcoming elections throughout the union.

Beyond the direct and indirect economic costs of Russia’s counter-sanctions, the EU-U.S aligned policy toward Moscow has led to enhanced disunity within member states’ socio-political spheres. This situation is mainly seen in France where centre-right members of parliament of the Les Republicains (LR) party as well as centre-left politicians and members of the right wing Front National (FN) have increasingly been calling upon France and the EU to review their respective policies toward Moscow. In the 2017 presidential election in France, the debate over how to deal with Russia is likely to play a substantial role in the overall foreign policy discourse with centre-right and right-wing frontrunners potentially pushing for closer relations with Moscow.

The overall political tensions sparked by rival positions on Russia are highly likely to benefit Eurosceptic parties. These political formations throughout the EU have been generally advocating for foreign policies based on national interests and independent from both the EU and the U.S.

In addition, with President-Elect Donald Trump appearing to be willing to undertake a more open policy toward Russia and potentially evolve U.S. positions regarding the status of Crimea, EU leaders will likely find it harder to push for a renewal of economic sanctions against Moscow.