EFTA-3 CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE IN THE EU

EFTA-3: Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein

Commission

The Commission is the main formal point of access for the EFTA-3. The EFTA-3 do not have Commissioners or staff within the DGs. However, they do have the right to information and consultation in all areas relevant to the EEA Agreement during Commission’s formulation of legislative proposals . The Commission relies on expert committees and consultative committees to help it formulate its proposals . At this stage the EEA Agreement contains provisions for EFTA-3 access to the Commission through which they can attempt to influence the content of the final proposal submitted to the EP and Council .

Expert Groups

Expert groups have an important role in the initial stages of the legislative process because they provide the Commission with essential technical advice . They consist of specialists appointed by states from inside and outside national governments . In theory, the Commission invites experts to participate based on their professional qualifications. They are not considered representatives of individual states and their contributions are not necessarily meant to reflect their government’s official position. Rather, they are expected to provide input based on scientific, ethical, practical, judicial, or sector considerations. However, in practice, experts often convey their government’s views . Experts from the EFTA-3 have the same formal status within expert groups as EU delegates. Nevertheless, the significance of EFTA-3’s participation in these groups is questionable because of the (unofficial) limits placed on participation by non-EU Member States, the characteristics of the EFTA-3 administrations, and the advisory status of expert groups within the decision-making process.

This can in part be explained by the fact that EFTA-3 experts do not have access to expert groups in policy areas that are not included in the EEA Agreement, such as Agriculture or External Relations. However, there are also signs that civil servants in Brussels are not granting the EEA countries as much access as they are entitled to or are forgetting to consult EFTA-3 specialists .

Furthermore, evidence suggests that in practice EFTA-3 experts may not participate on equal footing with representatives from the EU Member States. In some cases, Committee Chairs do not look favourably on EFTA participation . Representing a non-Member State may also have a psychological impact on the EFTA-3 participants to the extent that they suppress their views, in deference to representatives from “fully-fledged” EU Member States.

Finally, expert groups are purely advisory and do not take binding decisions or vote. Thus, ultimately it is up to the Commission both whom it asks for advice and whether or not it takes it. Unlike the EU Member States, the EFTA-3 are not able to vote on legislative proposals in the Council and Parliament . Therefore, although one of the main channels of EFTA-3 participation in the policy-making process is expert consultation, the impact of this alone might be considered fairly limited.

Lobbying decision-making institutions from the outside

The Council

The EEA Agreement does not grant the EFTA-3 any representation in the Council or access to its working groups or committees . Even though the EFTA-3 are small countries, and would not have a large proportion of the vote in QMV, the fact that their voices are absent from discussion during the working groups, COREPER and Council meetings means that they are unable to influence from within any changes to Commission proposals, once they have reached this stage of the policy.

Although EFTA-3 countries do not have inside access to the Council, EFTA-3 governments have various ways of lobbying EU member states, particularly the other Nordic countries, outside of the EU framework. The Nordic countries have a long history of cooperation in various policy areas. The EFTA-3 frequently have so called pre-meetings with the other Nordic, and  the Baltic states, before Council meetings in order to discuss the items on the Council’s agenda . For example, in the area of environmental policy, the Nordic countries have regular informal meetings where the EFTA-3 can express their views prior to Council meetings . EFTA-3 ministers also cooperate closely with their Nordic counterparts in Transportation, Industry, Finance and other areas . At these meetings the EFTA representatives try to get messages across to the EU Member States and then hope that they will make their opinions known within the Council. But this is all very informal. The Nordic countries are not necessarily always on the same side and always looking out for each other but they often have similar interests. If their interests clash, the EFTA-3 countries have to rely on contacts with other states.

The Parliament

Together they form the EFTA Parliamentary Committee. Switzerland also participates but does not have a vote on EEA issues.

Much like the Council, the EFTA-3 do not have any MEPs and the EEA Agreement does not grant them formal access to the EP’s committees. The EFTA-3 have some opportunities to gather information and informally participate in discussions within the EP. It is solely at the discretion of the EP, whether to invite EFTA-3 experts to these meetings or whether to take their advice.

The EFTA-3 do have a formal link with the European Parliament through the EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee. It meets twice a year and is made up of MPs from the EFTA states and MEPs. Often Commissioners are also asked to come and give reports. Its key task is to discuss the functioning of the EEA Agreement and contribute to a better understanding between the EU and the EFTA States in the fields covered by the EEA Agreement. The EFTA Parliamentary Committee discusses various issues, writes reports and gives opinions on EU matters. These reports are sent to the relevant individuals and institutions to make the EFTA-3 views more visible. The committee always has to present a joint opinion and the states don’t always agree, although cooperation has generally been good. While it may be possible to have some impact on EU policy through this route this is difficult to measure. The Joint Parliamentary Committee does, however, serve to increase awareness among MEPs of the EEA Agreement and the EFTA states which is important.

EEA EFTA comments

Collaboration between the EFTA partners has also been important for the EFTA states. The EEA Agreement gives the EFTA-3 the right to make the EU aware of its views on forthcoming legislation through the submission of comments and the adoption of resolutions in response to initiatives from the Commission which are relevant to the EEA Agreement . Comments are usually sent after a proposal has been presented by the Commission to the Council and the Parliament and are thus a way for the EFTA-3 to provide input into emerging EU policy, once the opportunity to contribute at the formulation stage has passed. They are sent to the relevant services in the Commission, EP and Council, endorsed by the EFTA Standing Committee and officially taken note of by the EEA Joint Committee Agreement. The Committee meets once a month and is made up of the EFTA-3 Ambassadors to the EU and representatives of the European Commission and EU Member States.

The Commission is obligated to transmit comments to the EU Member States, but is not bound by their content. Experience shows that the Commission is not a very committed advocate, except when its interests coincide with EFTA-3 views . Some comments are of a more political nature than others. In some cases, comments are submitted in order to voice particular support for a proposal.  Comments are also submitted to ensure participation of the EFTA-3 in a particular initiative. These comments are usually fairly uncontroversial. However, other comments voice opposition to Commission proposals.

The comitology procedure

Although policy decisions are adopted by the Council and the EP through the co-decision procedure, the majority of legal acts of the EU, and hence the EEA, are formulated through a procedure known as comitology . The implementation of policy often requires a large amount of highly technical legislation that needs to be passed quickly in order to cope with changing circumstances. Therefore, in the same way that national legislation often empowers the government to adopt secondary legislation the Commission is authorised to develop technical implementing legislation within particular areas needed to bring into effect the broader, more basic primary legislation decided on by the Council and the EP . Therefore, the Commission is subject to the supervision, and in some cases the approval, of committees composed of national civil servants appointed by the Council, through which Member States’ interests are represented . These are known as comitology committees.

The EEA-3 have observer status in the working groups of comitology committees that assist the Commission in the execution of its implementing powers and are thus also able to provide some input in the outcome of legislation in this procedure . Unlike expert groups that are purely advisory, comitology committees have a formal role in the Community decision-making process and there are clear limits on the role of EFTA-3 representatives . They do not have voting rights within the committees and representation is often limited to working groups, which carry out the committees’ preparatory work. In these sessions, representatives of the EFTA-3 have the opportunity to contribute to deliberations. However, when comitology committees take a vote, the EFTA-3 representatives are often excluded  There are different practices depending on the policy area in question. In some committees, the chairman allows EFTA-3 experts to participate in the committee and be present during voting proceedings but in others they are barred from participating once the proposal has reached this stage . Therefore, it is important for representatives from the EFTA-3 to identify potential problematic issues early in the deliberative stage of the comitology procedure, and certainly before the committee takes a vote .

Much like their participation in expert groups, EFTA-3 performance in comitology committees depends on a wide range of factors. Their non-voting status may, for example, deter EFTA-3 representatives from speaking when they are entitled to do so.  

Although delegation to the Commission is permissible only in matters of implementation rather than determining general policy, legislation adopted through comitology can be controversial and large scale commercial interests are often at stake.  Therefore, the importance of EFTA-3 participation in comitology committees should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, it is likely that their non-EU status places them at a disadvantage to influence the outcome of proceedings in comparison to the EU Member States. Furthermore, proposals that do not gain a qualified majority in the committee are passed to the Council and Parliament, where the EFTA-3 have no inside access.

Influence through interest groups

Most of these groups are federated structures of which national associations are members. The EEA Agreement does not give organisations from the EFTA-3 the formal right to participate in these organisations. However, the European associations are autonomous organisations with their own membership rules and they have generally allowed representatives from the EFTA-3 to become members. Thus EFTA-3 organisations that are members of their European umbrella organisations have an important link to the EU level. This enables representatives from the EFTA-3 to gather information on EU developments and initiatives and may provide opportunities to influence EU legislation , particularly in the areas of social policy through the social dialogue. Various EFTA-3 organisations are members of both labour and management organisations. These organisations are also members of the EEA Consultative Committee, which is an advisory body that represents workers, employers and other organisations in the EEA countries. The Committee is composed of representatives of the EFTA-3 and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). It meets once a year and with the view of increasing awareness and providing input on the economic and social aspects of the EEA Agreement .

Besides labour and employers associations, various other EFTA-3 interest groups follow the EU legislative procedure closely, as EU legislation can have a significant impact on them.

EFTA-3 countries work in close collaboration with interest groups, which are active at the EU level, and often relies on them to gather information and increase awareness of  their concerns in Brussels.

Exemptions and adaptations in the EEA Joint Committee

The EFTA-3 have one last forum to negotiate adaptations or exemptions from legislation adopted by the EU. Legislation does not automatically become part of the EEA Agreement. Rather, acts that are likely to be EEA relevant are examined by experts within the EFTA states. They are then reviewed and discussed by experts and officials in EFTA working groups and subcommittees,which are often attended by representatives of the Commission. The EFTA Standing Committee, made up of EFTA-3 Ambassadors to the EU and representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, then shapes a joint position of the EFTA countries. Finally, the EFTA-3 Ambassadors meet with representatives of the Commission in the EEA Joint Committee on a monthly basis to decide whether EU Acts are relevant to the EEA countries and if so how they should be incorporated into the EEA Agreement .

During this process, the EFTA-3 can try to influence the Commission and ask for exemptions or adaptations. However, according to Article 102 of the EEA Agreement, the Annexes to the Agreement must be as similar as possible to the original European legislation which means there is considerable pressure on the contracting parties to submit fully to all EEA-relevant legal acts . Nevertheless, certain exemptions and adaptations have sometimes been made for the EFTA-3 states . Technical adaptations to legislation adopted through comitology can be approved by the Commission but more substantive changes need to be approved by the Council, which also consults the European Parliament.

It is difficult to negotiate adaptations, especially if similar requests have been made by EU Member States and refused . Therefore, it is necessary to demonstrate convincingly why conditions in any of the EFTA-3 are different from those in the EU member states. This requires much preparatory work and it is far from certain that an agreement will be reached.  Experience has generally shown that the scope for special adaptations is fairly restricted . Especially as the EU has become larger and more heterogeneous, states are finding it more difficult to gain attention and the Commission has become less flexible and less willing to accommodate special concerns of the EFTA through adaptations, exceptions and transition periods as it may be disinclined to create precedents for exceptions to any given piece of legislation . Therefore, it is generally considered a better strategy to try to influence EU policy making at the early stages before it has been adopted and this is usually seen as a last resort.

Conclusion

Channels of access aren’t the only determining factor when it comes to influencing EU policy. Resources and capacity are also important considerations. It is undeniable that powerful, typically large, Member States are the most likely to succeed in uploading their policy preferences at the EU level not only because they carry the most weight in the institutions of the EU but also because they have the most resources to deal each piece of legislation. Studies have, for example, found that even though QMV over-represents the number of citizens in smaller states, larger Member States are more than twice as likely to be part of a winning coalition than the smaller ones.

Although, the EFTA-3 do not have any formal access to the working groups and committees of the Council or the EP, they have gradually begun to put into practice a range of more informal methods of making their voices heard within these institutions. For example, by making use of their ties with interest groups, lobbying EU Member States with similar interests, as well as the Nordic and Baltic members through pre-Council meetings, and most recently by focusing their attention on key MEPs.