THE AMERICAN LOBBY IN BRUSSELS

The EU is a highly lucrative market for US-owned firms with large direct investments. The enormous volume of these investments makes it difficult to separate ‘European’ from ‘American’ business interests in the EU. American companies have developed their own political links to the EU. In particular the American Chamber to the European Union (AmCham EU) is an important agent of US influence in Brussels. Most of its members are concerned with ensuring that the political- legal framework in Europe is conducive to their business interests. The most influential American actors in terms of day-to-day EU policymaking are primarily private actors who wield a potent and unique combination of structural and ‘soft power. The AmCham EU is an important information source for U.S. companies, many of which have set up their European headquarters in Brussels.

The American lobby in Brussels combines private and public resources. The US Mission in Brussels is the most important “public” face of the American lobby. It is the arm of the American government which is most often at the front-line of relations with the Union. Admittedly, the US Mission must serve and promote a general “American interest” which is broader than the relatively narrow interests of the members of the AmCham EU. Still, the US Mission and the AmCham EU are usually on the same side of most issues. EU policymaking reinforces this public/private linkage: it is a complex process of mainly informal bargaining between networks of actors, including representatives of European governments and EU institutions. Private actors have important opportunities to promote their own interests and to shape policy at the supranational level, particularly at the crucial, early stages of decision-making when the Commission first formulates formal proposals. The AmCham EU often is consulted (usually discreetly) during the early, crucial stages of policy formulation, when the Commission seeks advice from a relatively few “resourceful interest groups and other policy specialists which are most able to play an active role in influencing decision-making”

The AmCham EU can offer discreet, reliable advice and information that may prove crucial in deciding arguments between different units of the Commission. Consequently, the AmCham EU tends to lead the “American lobby” in Brussels, and thus has a decided advantage in influencing the US position on matters of EU policy.

Ultimately, the AmCham EU is usually the most influential American actor in EU policymaking. It wields a unique sort of power in Brussels. In important respects, it is structural in that it arises from the deep embeddedness of its firms in the EU’s economy. Yet, the AmCham EU’s power is also "soft" in that it arises largely from gathering, processing and disseminating reliable information.

Nearly all of the largest and most powerful American-owned multinationals invest heavily in Europe and belong to the AmCham EU. It is a common perception in Brussels that, compared to their European counterparts, American companies are much more mobile and willing to move their operations around or out of Europe to benefit from market situations. As a consequence, one could argue that American firms possess greater structural power than do European companies.

However, structural power does not translate automatically into influence or access. In fact, while the AmCham EU’s identity as a collection of “European firms of American parentage” is clear and unadulterated, it is a double-edged sword. Despite the effectiveness of its working methods and the quality of its position papers, the AmCham EU is still perceived as representing American-owned industry. There are important limits on the extent to which the AmCham EU can be an “insider” in the Union’s policy process. The AmCham EU thus must work with and through other actors, particularly ones that have a “European” identity. Accordingly, it must develop resources that are fungible , in the sense that they empower any actor regardless of their identity. The AmCham EU’s lack of a European identity and or a national patron which can assure access, means it must nurture its “soft power,” or ability to influence the policy process in subtle ways which do not involve heavy-handed or aggressive lobbying. The solution is information. The AmCham EU produces many position papers  on a variety of EU legislative matters. Over time, the high quality of these and other AmCham EU publications have acted to foster its reputation in Brussels for compiling, processing and disseminating reliable and useful information. Commission officials often acknowledge making direct use of data or ideas found in AmCham EU’s white papers . Moreover, members of the AmCham EU  appear to share information and cooperate more generally far more readily than is normally the case with American firms. One consequence is that little appears to arise on the EU agenda that catches the largest American firms by surprise. The AmCham EU has developed a complex and expert structure of specialist committees which represent an unrivalled network of advance intelligence within the EU.

Information only translates into power if it is managed carefully. In this context, the AmCham EU is highly-skilled at “issue management:” the early identification of an impending EU proposal, the making of contacts with the appropriate officials and the writing of timely position papers. The AmCham EU often offers complete and explicit alternatives to proposed legislation. It often develops “ready-made” amendments to Commission proposals which can be picked up and “run with” by the European Parliament. Above all, the AmCham EU has become the primary source of reliable information on single market legislation. The AmCham EU’s extensive track record as a source of reliable information is crucial because of the way in which benefits accrue exponentially to actors which are present, reliable and useful to the EU’s hard-pressed and under-resourced institutions for long periods of time.

“Soft power” imposes limits. The AmCham EU cannot change EU decisions outright, or force the Union into doing anything that it would not otherwise do. But the EU’s command of information gives it access to and often influence within multiple Directorates-General (DG) within the Commission. Crucially, it thus can influence the outcomes of games of bureaucratic politics, which are a primary feature of EU policy-making. Thus, the AmCham EU has long nurtured its links to many DGs.

AmCham EU Members

  1. 3M
  2. AbbVie
  3. Accenture
  4. ADM
  5. AES
  6. Afore Consulting
  7. Albermarle
  8. Alcoa
  9. Amazon.com
  10. American Airlines
  11. American Express
  12. Amgen
  13. Amway
  14. APCO
  15. Applied Materials
  16. Arnold & Porter LLP
  17. AT&T
  18. Avon
  19. Baker Botts
  20. Bank of America Merrill Lynch
  21. Barclays
  22. Baxter
  23. BDO
  24. Biogen
  25. Boeing
  26. BorgWarner
  27. Bristol-Myers Squibb
  28. British American Tobacco
  29. Brunswick
  30. Burson Marsteller
  31. CA Technologies
  32. Cabinet DN
  33. Cargill
  34. Caterpillar
  35. Charles Schwab
  36. Chevron
  37. Chubb Insurance
  38. Cicero
  39. Cisco
  40. Citi
  41. Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
  42. CNH Industrial
  43. Cognizant
  44. Covington
  45. Crowell Moring
  46. Daimler
  47. Dell
  48. Diageo
  49. DLA Piper
  50. Dow
  51. Dow Corning
  52. Du Pont
  53. EPPA
  54. Ernst & Young
  55. ExxonMobil
  56. Facebook
  57. FedEx Express
  58. Fidelity Investments
  59. First Data
  60. First Solar
  61. Fleishman Hillard
  62. Foley & Lardner LLP
  63. Ford
  64. Freshfields
  65. FTI Consulting
  66. General Electric
  67. GM
  68. Goldman Sachs
  69. Goodyear Dunlop Europe
  70. Google
  71. Gore Creative Technologies
  72. Gowan Group
  73. GSK
  74. Hasbro
  75. Herbalife Nutrition
  76. Hill + Knowlton Strategies
  77. Hogan Lovells
  78. Honeywell
  79. HP
  80. IBM
  81. Intel
  82. Interel
  83. International Paper
  84. J.P. Morgan
  85. John Deere
  86. Johnson and Johnson
  87. Johnson Controls
  88. Keller and Heckman LLP
  89. Kreab Gavin Anderson
  90. Latham & Watkins LLP
  91. Levi Strauss & Co
  92. Liberty Global
  93. Lilly
  94. Linklaters
  95. LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton
  96. LyondellBasell
  97. Mars Incorpoarted
  98. Marsh & McLennan Companies
  99. MasterCard Worldwide
  100. Mattel
  101. Mayer Brown
  102. Mc Donald
  103. McGuireWoods
  104. McKinsey& Company
  105. MetLife
  106. Michelin
  107. Microsoft
  108. Monsanto
  109. Morgan Lewis
  110. Morgan Stanley
  111. Motorola Solutions
  112. MSD
  113. Nielsen
  114. Nike
  115. Norton Rose Fulbright
  116. O’Melveny & Myers LLP
  117. Oracle
  118. P&G
  119. PartyLite
  120. Pfizer
  121. Philip Morris International
  122. Pitney Bowes
  123. Qualcomm
  124. Quinn Emanuel
  125. RELX Group
  126. SAS
  127. SheppardMullin
  128. Shire
  129. Sidley Austin LLP
  130. Skadden
  131. Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services
  132. StanleyBlack&Decker
  133. Steptoe
  134. Swift
  135. Symantec
  136. Syngenta
  137. Synopsys
  138. TE Connectivity
  139. Tenneco
  140. The Carlyle Group
  141. The Coca Cola Company
  142. The Walt Disney Company EMEA
  143. Thomson Reuters
  144. TimeWarner
  145. Tyco
  146. United Technologies
  147. UPS
  148. Van Bael & Bellis
  149. Verizon
  150. Weber Shandwick
  151. WestRock
  152. White & Case
  153. Wiley
  154. WilmerHale
  155. Wragge Lawrence Graham & Co
  156. Yahoo!
  157. Zurich

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