PUTIN’S REGIME: ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

Author: Mark Galeotti and Graeme P. Herd

Scenario 1

This scenario is predicated on the impossibility of a “forgive and forget” political settlement in Ukraine. Russia remains in political and cultural isolation with economic trade (mainly gas and oil) only occurring where absolutely necessary. A regime tilting even more to the “security bloc’’ is consolidated in Russia. The military and siloviki are funded and the regime is secure. Soft neo-Stalinist societal repression incubates a passive and apathetic public – there is no political relaxation or “thaw” this side of the horizon. Russia may have a rhetorically confrontational foreign policy but domestic public opinion and a weak economy limit aggressive action. The current pattern of foreign adventures is less easily enabled (physical access) and less affordable. The leadership, which may or may not include Putin, may be more stable, predictable, and pragmatic, but is likely to continue to regard the West as hostile and thus continue political operations it hopes will divide and distract it.  In this context, Russia might be able to gradually reduce the costs of the occupation of Ukraine and address the worst aspects of crisis and confrontation with the West – or it may continue to justify the perception that it is now a “rogue state.”

If Putin is removed, then this would assume that the stakeholders, his inner circle, the chiefs-inside-the-system can meet, negotiate and bargain and find a consensus over successor team or ‘transition alliance.’ This in turn assumes that factional interests can be evenly balanced and the current regime is self-sustaining and resilient without Putin, or with Putin as a symbolic head (President of the State Union). 

However, these assumptions can be challenged. In an increasingly personalistic regime, Putin is the glue that binds the elite together. Consensus is not possible. For the siloviki, if Putin could agree to step aside or could be persuaded, what follows could raise the fear of perestroika II leading to system collapse. Furthermore, there are no real formal mechanisms to appoint a successor, no Party to provide a cohering elite matrix.

Scenario 2

A securitocracy retains primacy. Russia’s national-security emergency regime becomes a pariah and Russia considered a rogue state. Russian nuclear blackmail is consecrated by mystical, apocalyptical “nuclear Orthodoxy.” The nationalization of oligarchs takes place under the rubric of ‘liquidation of property.’ Autarky is declared as a national goal and necessary defiant response to sanctions. State-organized crime symbiotic relations are strengthened as organized crime groups break sanctions for the state, merging patriotic impulses and profit principles. State control of the media is absolute, and campaigns to “clean up” fifth and sixth columnists are justified through claims that these “internal Nazi agents” have ruined the Russian economy. In foreign policy we see the emergence of a Russian imperium consisting of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine in the name of “restored Slavic unity.” “Territories” that fall outside “ancient Russian lands” and the “triune state” are not forcibly incorporated into the imperial core. “Forced neutrality” and buffer zone status is imposed on Georgia and Moldova. 

This scenario is based on two assumptions: elite and societal challenges to Putin are not forthcoming and Putin’s “all-or-nothing” mindset means that he is determined to remain in power. What beliefs do these assumptions rest on? First, that Putin’s control of the FSB and National Guard are absolute, and because of this he can discount elite or societal opposition. Second, predictive thinking within the elites (the defense industrial complex, the siloviki, and the military) calculate that having irrevocably burnt bridges with the West, Russia’s strategic choices are stark: subordination to China and stability or to maintain strategic autonomy at terrible domestic cost. It assumes that that those willing to remove Putin are unable and that those able are unwilling. 

There are two powerful drivers that trigger this scenario. First, extreme rhetoric propagated by the Russian state-controlled media continues to radicalize itself. Narrative triggers that dehumanize Ukrainians as “Nazi,” fascists, reflecting official policy of “denazification” call now for “total war.” Russia’s media posits Putin’s unprovoked aggression as an existential struggle between “us” and “them,” demanding “cleansing” and “liquidation” as the only viable responses. Second, it appears likely that martial law will be declared in Russia, creating a permissive “total war” context. This will involve national mobilization, conscription, a war time economy, and the closing of state borders. The trigger that marks this descent into darkness will be the ‘Battle of Kyiv,’ This coming catastrophe brings into juxtaposition the dissonance at the heart of Putin’s narrative: in which universe is it necessary to storm “the mother of all Russian cities” to “restore Slavic unity?” Elites and society are forced to double-down along with Putin or revolt. Martial law is designed to preempt revolt, allowing the Russian military and security services to preventively occupy the streets of Moscow.