HOW TO WIN FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE: THE EU WAY

In October, the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs committee endorsed a document titled “EU Strategic Communication to Counteract Propaganda Against It by Thirdparties”. Without supporting evidence, it accused Moscow of spreading “disinformation and propaganda seeking to maintain or increase (its) influence to weaken and split the EU.”

A.  Whereas information warfare is a historical phenomenon as old as warfare itself; whereas targeted information warfare against the West was extensively used by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and has since been an integral part of modern hybrid warfare, which is a combination of military and non-military measures of a covert and overt nature, deployed to destabilise the political, economic and social situation of a country under attack, without a formal declaration of war, targeting not only partners of the EU, but also the EU itself, its institutions and all Member States and citizens irrespective of their nationality and religion;

B.  Whereas with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the Russian-led hybrid war in the Donbass, the Kremlin has escalated the confrontation with the EU; whereas the Kremlin has stepped up its propaganda war, with Russia playing an enhanced role in the European media environment aimed at creating political support in European public opinion for Russian action and undermining the coherence of the EU foreign policy;

C  Whereas the propaganda war and the intrusion of Russian media is particularly strong and often unmatched in the countries of the Eastern neighbourhood; whereas national media in these countries are often weak and not able to cope with the strength and the power of Russian media;

Recognising and exposing Russian disinformation and propaganda warfare

1. Notes with regret that Russia uses contacts and meetings with EU counterparts for propaganda purposes and to publicly weaken the EU’s joint position, rather than for establishing a real dialogue;

2. Recognises that the Russian Government is aggressively employing a wide range of tools and instruments, such as think tanks and special foundations (e.g. Russkiy Mir), special authorities (Rossotrudnichestvo), multilingual TV stations (e.g. RT), pseudo news agencies and multimedia services (e.g. Sputnik), cross-border social and religious groups, as the regime wants to present itself as the only defender of traditional Christian values, social media and internet trolls to challenge democratic values, divide Europe, gather domestic support and create the perception of failed states in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood; stresses that Russia invests relevant financial resources in its disinformation and propaganda instruments engaged either directly by the state or through Kremlin-controlled companies and organisations; underlines that, on the one hand, the Kremlin is funding political parties and other organisations within the EU with the intent of undermining political cohesion, and that, on the other hand, Kremlin propaganda directly targets specific journalists, politicians and individuals in the EU;

3. Recalls that security and intelligence services conclude that Russia has the capacity and intention to conduct operations aimed at destabilising other countries; points out that this often takes the form of support to political extremists and large-scale disinformation and mass media campaigns; notes, furthermore, that such media companies are present and active in the EU;

4. Points out that the Kremlin’s information strategy is complementary to its policy of stepping up bilateral relations, economic cooperation and joint projects with individual EU Member States in order to weaken EU coherence and undermine EU policies;

5. Argues that Russian strategic communication is part of a larger subversive campaign to weaken EU cooperation and the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of the Union and its Member States; urges Member State governments to be vigilant towards Russian information operations on European soil and to increase capacity sharing and counterintelligence efforts aimed at countering such operations;

6. Expresses its strong criticism of Russian efforts to disrupt the EU integration process and deplores, in this respect, Russian backing of anti-EU forces in the EU with regard, in particular, to extreme-right parties, populist forces and movements that deny the basic values of liberal democracies;

7. Is seriously concerned by the rapid expansion of Kremlin-inspired activities in Europe, including disinformation and propaganda seeking to maintain or increase Russia’s influence to weaken and split the EU; stresses that a large part of the Kremlin’s hostile propaganda is aimed at describing some European countries as belonging to ‘Russia’s traditional sphere of influence’, thereby undermining their sovereignty and deeply rooted European identity, which in the past has been undermined by communist regimes; notes that one of its main strategies is to circulate and impose an alternative narrative, often based on a manipulated interpretation of historical events and aimed at justifying its external actions and geopolitical interests; notes that falsifying history is one of its main strategies; in this respect, notes the need to raise awareness of the crimes of communist regimes through public campaigns and educational systems and to support research and documentation activities, especially in the former members of the Soviet bloc, to counter the Kremlin narrative;

8.Stresses that Russia is exploiting the absence of a legal international framework in areas such as cybersecurity and the lack of accountability in media regulation, and is turning any ambiguity in these matters in its favour; underlines that aggressive Russian activities in the cyber domain facilitate information warfare; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to pay attention to the role of Internet Exchange Points as critical infrastructure in the EU’s security strategy; underlines the crucial need to ensure resilience of the information systems at EU and Member State level, especially against denials and disruptions that can play a central role in hybrid conflict and countering propaganda, and to closely cooperate in this regard with NATO, especially with the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence;

9. Invites the Member States to develop coordinated strategic communication mechanisms to support attribution and counter disinformation and propaganda in order to expose hybrid threats;

10. Notes the huge resources dedicated to propaganda activities by Russia and the possible impact of hostile propaganda on decision-making processes in the EU and the undermining of public trust, openness and democracy; commends the significant work accomplished by the EU Strategic Communication Task Force; calls therefore for the EU Strategic Communication Task Force to be reinforced by turning it into a fully fledged unit within the EEAS, responsible for the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, with proper staffing and adequate budgetary resources, possibly by y means of an additional dedicated budget line; calls for enhanced cooperation among the Member States’ intelligence services with a view to assessing the influence exerted by third countries seeking to undermine the democratic foundation and values of the EU; calls for closer cooperation between Parliament and the EEAS on strategic communication, including through the use of the Parliament's analytical capacities and Information Offices in the Member States;

11. Highlights the importance of communicating EU policies coherently and effectively, internally as well as externally, and of providing tailored communications to specific regions, including access to information in local languages; welcomes, in this context, the launch of the EEAS website in Russian as a first step in the right direction;

12. Condemns the regular crackdowns on the independent media, journalists and civil society activists in Russia and occupied territories, including Crimea since its illegal annexation; stresses that since 1999, dozens of journalists have been killed, disappeared without trace or have been imprisoned in Russia; calls on the Commission and Member States to reinforce the protection of journalists in Russia and in the EU’s Neighbourhood and to support Russian civil society and invest in people-to-people contacts; calls for the immediate release of journalists; notes that the EU is strengthening relations with its Eastern partners and other neighbours, and is also keeping the lines of communication with Russia open; recognises that the biggest obstacle to Russian disinformation campaigns would be the existence of independent and free media in Russia itself; considers that achieving this should be the goal of the EU; calls for special attention and sufficient resources to be provided for media pluralism, local media, investigative journalism and foreign language media, particularly in Russian,;

Comments

1. It is absurd for EU leaders and parliamentarians to call Russia a threat, harming their own self-interest in the process.
2. Sanctions were imposed and renewed. EU leaders and European parliamentarians said they’ll remain in place as long as (nonexistent) “Russian aggression” continues, and the overwhelming will of Crimeans to rejoin the Russian Federation is reversed (This will never happen)
3. These are shameless anti-Russia accusations
4. Russia threatens no one. Western media scoundrels lack legitimacy. RT and Sputnik News represent what good journalism is supposed to be.
5. Deplorable Cold War mentality persists.