FRANCE’S FUTURE STANCE ON RUSSIA

Several trends are likely to affect French policies towards Russia and the Eastern neighbourhood in the coming decade and beyond. France’s foreign policy activism is largely pursued within the EU and NATO. Paris therefore has to factor in the strategic concerns of its Eastern allies by, for instance, participating in collective exercises in their region. The economic component of the Franco-Russian relationship has clearly taken precedence over the political one, which both sides felt was bringing few benefits and had become potentially costly to France in the EU context. French policies towards Russia have been increasingly “Europeanised”. France’s membership of the EU and its bilateral relationship with Germany plays a key role in the formulation of its foreign policy strategy towards Russia.

Pro-Russian voices are mainly found in far-left and far-right populist parties and in the main opposition party, Les Républicains (LR). In that sense, political change is probably one of the main domestic factors to consider in speculating on France’s future stance on Russia.

In the classic bipartisan configuration of French politics, LR has the greatest chance to win power in the elections next year. A member of the party sponsored a parliamentary resolution calling for the lifting of EU sanctions on Russia – a non-binding resolution that was supported by all of the party’s MPs that were present. The party’s leader, former President Nicolas Sarkozy, has even made statements implicitly endorsing the annexation of Crimea. Beyond personal views and personal ties, the admiration for strong leaders, the Gaullist legacy, and the attachment to traditional values is what shapes LR politicians’ positions on Russia. An LR victory in the 2017 presidential elections might bring a change of discourse but is unlikely to bring a radical shift in France’s policies. Alain Juppé, who is the frontrunner to be the party nominee, has adopted positions on the Ukraine crisis and Russia that are close to the current diplomatic line. And the election results will not have fundamentally changed the domestic and European context in which France’s policies are determined. Generally, the lines of French foreign policy are set by a small number of decision-makers and, in this exercise, their party tend to weigh in only in marginal ways.

Front National’s (FN) political, ideological links with Russia are well-known, and have been commented on at length. They do not affect French foreign policy choices, however, and are unlikely to do so in the near future since the FN is not close to gaining power. Besides, even if Marine Le Pen does end up sitting in the Elysée in 2030, her policies on Russia might turn out to be the least of Europe’s (and France’s) problems compared to other points of her programme.

For Paris, the security interests of the Alliance should be the point of departure in its policies (i.e. how the admission of a new member affects the security of the Alliance) and more generally that these policies should seek to reinforce the security of its members whilst managing the potential for conflict. 

Until the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, France mainly regarded Russia as a promising emerging market. Russia is one of several important trading partners for France (its tenth largest trading partner in 2013, accounting for 2 percent of its overall trade). The value of France’s bilateral trade with Russia ($20 billion) was, in fact, lower in 2014 than that of Germany ($67 billion), Italy ($35 billion), the Netherlands ($36 billion) or Poland ($27 billion). Russia is of greater weight as a market for French direct investment in the country (the third biggest stock among EU member states and superior, for instance, to that of the US). Several of France’s major companies have important stakes in the Russian market, notably in the sectors of energy, transport, arms, banking and retail. Finally, economic links with Russia should be considered not just in light of France’s actual positions on the Russian market but also those it hopes to gain through its revamped economic diplomacy.

The economic recession in Russia and the sanctions and counter-sanctions are, however, eroding these links. Between 2014 and 2015, French exports to Russia dropped by 33 percent and France lost 27 percent of its market share in the country. French economic interests in Russia have been affected more by Western financial sanctions than by Russia’s counter-sanctions. French banks are reluctant to fund Russia-related projects which makes life difficult for French companies. Even if EU sanctions were lifted the situation might not change. Overall, Russia’s continued economic decline and the maintaining of sanctions in the medium term would affect France’s economic position in Russia, but have a moderate impact on its external trade.

The further closure of Russia’s political and civic space would affect the Franco-Russian relationship, which has a strong historical, cultural, and educational dimension. France was the third destination for Russian students in 2012 for instance (after Germany and the US). Beyond science and education, France maintains a substantial cultural network in Russia. In this regard, and especially in light of the central role devoted to culture in France’s foreign policy, Paris is likely to be increasingly disturbed by the Kremlin’s new discourse that castigates Europe as an ontological other, especially if this discourse moves beyond rhetoric into actual policy. 

Overall, the how will matter in addition to the where: France, after all, did not have key interests in Crimea but is concerned by the annexation as a violation of the basic rules of the European security order. It sees it as a dangerous re-opening of border issues in the post-Soviet space as well as potentially weakening for the non-proliferation regime (particularly central in France's foreign policy). These considerations have, in conjunction with the German-led European dynamic, played an important role in shaping Paris' response. France is not allergic to the very notion of Russian power, but rather worried how this power is wielded. The dual approach set out in its 2008 Foreign Policy White Book, of refusing to be drawn into a geopolitical competition with Russia over the common neighbourhood and of rejecting Russia's actions that break international norms, applies to the Ukraine crisis and will continue to guide its policies in the future. 

The Eastern Partnership (EaP) region is not a strategic priority for France but will continue to matter as one of the EU’s neighbourhoods. By and large, France will continue to adhere to the ENP’s inherent logic of attempting to bring stability to the neighbourhood rather than see it destabilise the EU. It will back EU support for reform in EaP countries, though probably more in principle than in practice.

However, Paris will remain engaged on the Ukraine issue. France, as one of the sponsors of the Minsk Agreements, cannot push for the lifting of sanctions if no progress is made on the ground, not least because this would discredit sanctions as an EU foreign policy tool. This also means that it finds itself politically exposed on this dossier and that it will want the process to produce concrete results, especially as pressure is mounting at home. While many of the other items of the Minsk Agreements are stalling, Berlin and Paris are currently placing the emphasis on local elections in the Eastern regions and hope to achieve to progress there. A partial implementation of the Minsk Agreements could lead to calls for a partial lifting of sanctions (Crimea sanctions excluded). France regards sanctions as a policy instrument, which to be efficient needs to be linked to concrete demands, applied with some flexibility and combined with political dialogue.

If the conflict in Ukraine moves towards resolution, France will be ready to work towards a diplomatic overhaul of EU-Russia relations and of regional security more broadly. It is crucial that France remains engaged at the EU and NATO levels on Russia, so as to preserve the cohesion of these organisations, to demonstrate solidarity with their members, but also to calibrate their responses and to maintain a dialogue with Moscow with a view to returning to diplomacy with a more co-operative Russia.